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Abstract 
Three Essays on Water Economics 
Fahad Alzahrani 
 
The reliable provision of safe drinking water is one of the most important health-related 
programs in the United States. Since enactment of the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974, great 
progress has been made in drinking water quality and regulation in the United States. Despite 
this progress, drinking water outbreaks continue to occur nationwide and negatively affecting the 
welfare of the people. In particular, rural residents suffer from drinking water quality and 
reliability issues due to the aging water infrastructure and the lack of funding to the small water 
systems serving such areas. This dissertation consists of three essays that explore how changes in 
water supply quality and/or reliability affect health care expenditures, residential property prices, 
and residential water charges.  
The first essay explores the relationship between episodes of contaminated drinking 
water and health care expenditures in the United States. The analysis relies on panel data from 
the 48 contiguous states from 2000 to 2011. Using the population served by public water systems 
that violate health-based standards of the Safe Drinking Water Act as a proxy for contaminated 
drinking water. spatial and non-spatial models are estimated with controls for factors that may 
affect per capita health care expenditures including variables that reflect air quality violations 
along with ability to pay plus demand for and supply of health care services. The results from a 
Spatial Durbin Model indicate that a 1% decrease in the percentage of population exposed to 
drinking water quality violations is associated with reductions in in state and regional effects 
equal to 0.005% ($0.32) and 0.035% ($2.26) of per capita health care expenditures, respectively.  
Drinking water violations have a larger impact on expenditures than air quality violations (whose 
effects are not statistically different from zero).  However, compared to other factors, such as 
health status and income, the impact of these violations on health care expenditures is relatively 
small. Regional health care expenditure impacts from drinking water violations are found to be 
substantially greater than in-state impacts. Thus, a regional approach is recommended to 
addressing drinking water quality improvements.   
In the second essay, spatial and non-spatial hedonic property price models are used to 
examine the problem of water supply reliability due to aging infrastructure of public water 
systems on residential property prices. Water supply unreliability is measured by issuance of boil 
water notices (BNWs) linked to home sale observations (e.g. number of notices affecting the 
house prior to the sale). The analysis is based on 1,985 housing transactions and 350 BWNs 
throughout Marion County, West Virginia between 2012-2017. Important control variables 
include home size and age, lot size, number of bedrooms, construction quality, physical 
condition, and presence of house amenities (air conditioning, fireplace, and fence). Mapping and 
  
distance tools in ArcGIS are used to measure neighborhood characteristics such as school quality 
and distance to the nearest highway interchange. Finally, the models include fixed effects for 
both time and tax district. Statistically significant, negative impacts are found for BWNs from 
the previous year before a house sale. Depending upon how water supply unreliability is 
measured – in either days, BWN episodes, or presence versus absence, BWNs can depreciate 
housing prices between 0.57% and 18%. A quantile regression approach is used to find that 
BWNs have a larger impact on low-price compared to high-price houses. Based upon quantile 
regressions, a reduction in one day under BWN per year will increase housing values at the 
lower end of the housing price distribution by $2,100 to $2,700, whereas houses at the mid-range 
of the distribution will increase by $850 to $1,000. However, houses at the higher end of the 
housing price distribution (0.7 quantile and above) show no statistically significant impact from 
this BWNs variable. Overall, water supply unreliability has a substantial impact on the value of 
residential properties in Marion County where the aggregate marginal willingness to pay for a 
one-day reduction of BWN is equal to $4.60 million. 
The third essay examines the impact of access to raw water sources on residential water 
charges by public service districts (PSDs) in West Virginia. This analysis determines the relative 
value of raw water from each source. Using regression analysis, we compare residential water 
charges per 4,500 gallons for PSDs that utilize different raw water sources including the surface 
water, purchased water, or multiple sources. We examine the difference in water charges 
between those PSDs that use NRCS’s flood control impoundments as a water source compared 
to those who use other sources. Our analysis is based on data for 110 PSDs throughout the state 
of West Virginia. Our results show that PSDs that use multiple sources have higher residential 
water charges by about 29% of the average water charges compared to PSDs who utilize only 
one raw water source. Therefore, policies that encourage public water utilities to utilize multiple 
sources, such as the Source Water Protection (Senate Bill 373) passed by the West Virginia 
legislature in 2014, may result in higher rates. No statistically significant difference is found 
between water charges of PSDs that use NRCS’s flood control impoundments and those who use 
conventional sources. Other factors, such as providing sewer plus water service in the same time 
result in lower residential water charges. Conversely, larger long-term debt and greater network 
length result in higher residential water charges. 
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Chapter 1: Background and Significance 
 
 After Flint, Michigan water crisis in 2014, many Americans have lost the confidence in 
the safety and reliability of the water supplied by public water systems (Baum et al., 2016). This 
incident shed light on water quality and reliability issues and drew the attention of the press, 
policymakers, and researchers nationwide. For example, a recent study by Allaire et al. (2018) 
found that in 2015, about 21 million people were served by public water systems that incurred 
violations of health-based quality standards of the Safe Drinking Water Act across the United 
States. This is not a new problem. In fact, many studies have examined the economic and health 
consequences of changes in water quality or reliability (e.g. Guilfoos et al., 2018; Grossman & 
Slutsky, 2017; Heflin et al., 2014). In light of this growing literature, I study three topics that are 
concerned with the impact of water quality and/or reliability on health care expenditures, 
residential property values, and residential water charges.   
1.1. Purpose of This Study 
This research aims to improve our understanding of how changes in water quality and/or 
reliability impact health care expenditures, residential property values, and residential water 
charges.   
1.1.1. Aim of essay 1: Examine the impact of drinking water contamination on per capita health 
care expenditures in the United States. 
  Since 1970s, health economists and health policymakers have been interested in 
identifying the factors that drive health care expenditures in the United States. Previous studies 
have examined the impact of multiple factors including income, population age structure, and 
number of practicing physicians among others. However, published empirical works that 
examined the impacts of environmental quality on health care expenditures are fewer in number 
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and have used air quality as a proxy for environmental quality (e.g. Jerrett et al, 2003). The aim 
of this essay is to improve our understanding on how state-level health care expenditures 
responses to changes in drinking water contamination episodes across the United States.    
1.1.2. Aim of essay 2: Examine the impact of water supply unreliability on residential property 
values in Marion County, West Virginia. 
 Many of the pipes and main lines that deliver water across the country are more than 100 
years old and subject to variety of stressors (American Society of Civil Engineers [ASCE], 
2017). The costs associated with replacing outdated water infrastructure are large, which were 
estimated to be around $1 trillion and $17 billion in the United States and West Virginia, 
respectively (American Water Works Association [AWWA], 2012; West Virginia Infrastructure 
and Jobs Development Council [WV IJDC], 2017). Most of the needed improvements in water 
infrastructure are funded by local governments and public water systems revenues generated by 
ratepayers. Since it is not optimal for a water system to achieve 100% reliability, decision 
makers need to make decisions that require a trade-off between cost and risk (Howe et al., 1994). 
In such cases, the required investment costs are usually known, but the risk preferences of the 
affected consumers are not. In this essay, the aim is to examine the impact of water supply 
unreliability on residential property values and estimate the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) 
for improving the reliability of public water services in Marion County, West Virginia. 
1.1.3. Aim of essay 3: Examine the impact of access to the different raw water supply sources on 
residential water charges in rural West Virginia. 
 The raw water supply sources that are utilized by public water systems play an important 
role in affecting not only the cost of treatment, but also the residential water charges (Erfanian & 
Collins, 2018). Previous studies, such as Bae (2007), found that public water systems that use 
groundwater sources have lower residential water charges compared water systems that use 
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surface water or purchased water. After the Elk River chemical spill in 2014, legislators in West 
Virginia passed a new law (SB 373) requiring public water systems that use surface water or 
groundwater influenced by surface water as supply sources to complete or update their source 
water protection plans. One of the main goals of these plans was to assess the ability of public 
water systems to construct or establish a secondary or backup source that to be used in cases of 
emergency or contamination of their primary water source. This push toward public water 
systems to have more than one water supply source may affect the residential water charges, 
especially in rural areas. The aim of this essay is to examine the impact of the different water 
supply sources on residential water charges for public service districts in West Virginia.  
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Essay 1: Drinking Water Quality Impacts on Health Care Expenditures in the United 
States 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Health care expenditures in the United States have been rising at a rate faster than any 
other country in the world (Sawyer and Cox, 2018). In 2015, health care expenditures accounted 
for 17.8% of the country’s GDP (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS], 2018). 
However, higher health care expenditures do not necessarily lead to better health outcomes. 
Compared to most Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries, the United States has a lower life expectancy, a higher obesity rate, a lower percentage 
of health insurance coverage, and below average numbers of doctors and hospital beds (OECD, 
2017). This has led health economists and health care policymakers to explore what factors are 
causing increases in health care expenditures and to devise cost containment measures. 
Since the 1970s, many studies have attempted to identify what factors impact health care 
expenditures. We categorize those factors into two groups: (1) non-environmental factors, and 
(2) environmental factors. Most of the literature on the determinants of health care expenditures 
has focused on non-environmental factors such as income, population age structure, inflation, 
number of practicing physicians, number of hospital beds, technological progress, and public 
financing of health care services. among many others.  Gerdtham and Jönsson (2000) and Martín 
et al. (2011) provide reviews of this literature. Published empirical works that have examined the 
impacts of environmental quality on health care expenditures are fewer in number and have used 
air quality as a proxy for environmental quality (Jerrett et al., 2003; Narayan and Narayan, 2008; 
Qureshi et al., 2015; Yahaya et al., 2016; Zou et al.2016).   
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Environmental quality is an important factor that affects the health of individuals (World 
Health Organization, 2018). Poor air and/or water quality can have adverse effects on human 
health (Hunter et al., 2010; Katsouyanni, 2003). For example, in the case of air pollution, it has 
been found that sulfur dioxide (SO2) causes changes in airway physiology (Chen et al., 2007); 
carbon monoxide may cause pulmonary edema (Raub et al., 2000); and particulate matter has 
been associated with cardiovascular diseases (Pope and Dockery, 2006). 
Water pollution can affect human health through exposures from direct consumption or 
recreational use. The main acute effects of drinking polluted water on health is gastrointestinal 
infections (Hunter et al., 2010).  In addition, chronic or acute exposure to different organic and 
inorganic chemicals in water can cause more severe health impacts including cancer, 
developmental or reproductive effects, neurological effects, and organ damage (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency [U.S. EPA], 2018a). 
Over the years, multiple laws have been enacted in the United States to ensure a health-
sustaining rather than health-threatening environment. The Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970, the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 (re-authorized as the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 
1972), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974 are few examples of federal 
environmental pollution laws passed to improve and protect the quality of air and water. Under 
these laws, the EPA establishes national environmental quality standards. States then have the 
option to apply for primacy and if accepted, they will be responsible for implementing and 
enforcing these laws. In addition, primacy states are authorized to set their own regulations to be 
stricter than the EPA’s minimum requirements. Because of these laws, the United States has 
witnessed numerous improvements in terms of human health and environmental quality. For 
10 
 
example, Sullivan et al. (2018) found that from 1970 to 1990 the CAA provided an estimated 
improvement of $22 trillion in cumulative human health and reduced mortality benefits.  
In terms of environmental quality, between 1970 and 2015, aggregate national emissions 
of six common air pollutants (particles, ozone, lead, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, and 
sulfur dioxide) dropped an average of 70% (U.S. EPA, 2018b). Moreover, before the SDWA, 
about 40% of public water systems failed to meet basic health standards, and now this value 
decreased to only 10% (U.S. EPA, 2014). In 2015, about 21 million people living in the United 
States were served by public water systems that incurred violations of health-based quality 
standards of the SDWA (Allaire et al., 2018). While not all violations cause immediate health 
problems, it has been estimated that contaminated drinking water is responsible for between 16.4 
to 19.5 million cases of acute gastroenteritis every year in the United States (Duggal et al., 2015; 
Messner et al., 2006).   
Despite these efforts towards improving environmental quality as well as the significant 
progress in water treatment technology, multiple mid- and large-scale drinking water 
contamination episodes have been observed over the past few years (Duggal et al., 2015; 
Guilfoos et al., 2018). One example is the Flint, Michigan crisis in 2014 where approximately 
100,000 residents were exposed to high levels of lead from drinking water. Compared to other 
cities in Michigan, fertility rates decreased by 12%, fetal death rates increased by 58%, and 
overall health at birth decreased in Flint during the time of exposure (Grossman and Slusky, 
2017). Another contamination incident occurred in 2014 in Charleston, West Virginia where 
chemical spills into the Elk River contaminated the drinking water for about 300,000 residents. 
This incident resulted in immediate and long-term health impacts. For the immediate health 
impacts, there were about 369 cases of acute gastrointestinal illness and 13 hospitalizations 
11 
 
attributed to this contamination episode (Benedict et al., 2017). For the long-term health impacts, 
Guilfoos et al. (2018) estimated the causal effects of this incident on infant health outcomes and 
found a significant decrease in 5-minute Apgar Scores. Finally, another example is the Toledo, 
Ohio crisis in 2014 when toxic algae were found in the municipal drinking water affecting about 
500,000 residents. This incident resulted in about 110 cases of acute gastrointestinal illness 
(Benedict et al., 2017). Toledo spent an estimated $200,000 per month to mitigate the effects of 
this event (Duggal et al., 2015). 
The exposure to contaminants in drinking water has been demonstrated to increase the 
consumption of health care services due to its deleterious impacts on human health and in turn, 
health care expenditures are bound to increase as well. For example, spending on medical care 
and water provisions in Flint amounted to about $60 million in response to the 2014 water crisis 
(Muennig, 2016). Furthermore, Naumova et al. (2016) estimated the costs of treating infections 
related to drinking contaminated water from 1991 to 2006 to be about $600 million per year for 
Medicare beneficiaries alone. Given the existence of this relationship between drinking 
contaminated water and health care expenditures, this research seeks to statistically validate and 
quantify the connection between drinking water quality and health care expenditures at an 
aggregated state level on an annual basis.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The rest of this section provides a 
background of the SDWA and in the next section we review of the literature that examined the 
impact of environmental quality on health care expenditures. Then, the following sections are 
data, the empirical model, and results describing the analytical framework and empirical results. 
Finally, the paper concludes with policy implications and research limitations plus future 
research. 
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2.1.1. The Safe Drinking Water Act: Background 
The SDWA was initially passed in 1974 and then amended in 1986 and 1996. This act 
authorizes the U.S. EPA to regulate drinking water sources and infrastructure to protect public 
health by setting national health standards for drinking water against both naturally-occurring 
and man-made contaminants occurring in drinking water. Currently, the U.S. EPA has drinking 
water regulations for more than 90 contaminants. These standards apply to every one of the more 
than 150,000 active public water system in the United States (U.S. EPA, 2013).  
The SDWA requires water systems to report their water quality periodically to the state 
primacy agency to make sure they meet the minimum requirements. The U.S. EPA has set 
different monitoring and sampling schedules for public water systems based on certain criteria 
such as population served, water source type, and historical monitoring data. For example, for 
microbial contaminants regulated under the total coliform rule (TCR), a public water system is 
required to take monthly samples based on its size as follows: 1 sample/month (very small), 2–3 
samples/month (small), 4–10 samples (medium), 15–100 samples/month (large), and 120–480 
samples/month (very large) (U.S. EPA, 2010). If a water system is collecting less than 40 
samples/month and has more than one total coliform-positive sample, then the water system will 
be considered in violation to SDWA standards. On the other hand, if it is collecting 40 or more 
samples/month, and has more than 5% of the samples with total coliform-positive, then the 
system will be in violation of SDWA standards. Each quarter, the primacy agency then reports 
any violations of the SDWA to the U.S. EPA.  
Violations to the SDWA standards are grouped into two main categories: (1) health-based 
violations, and (2) monitoring and communication with the public violations. Health-based 
violations include violations to the Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs), Maximum Residual 
Disinfectant Levels (MRDLs), and Treatment Techniques (TT) standards. MCL and MRDL set 
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the highest level of a contaminant or a disinfectant residual that is allowed in drinking water 
without imposing any danger to the human health. If it is technically not possible to monitor a 
certain contaminant or not economically feasible to do so, a TT is used instead. For example, 
lead has no known safe levels and since it is impossible to monitor it under the MCL regulations, 
a TT is used, where any detection of lead may result in replacing some of the service lines to 
consumers.  
Monitoring and communication with the public violations include violations to 
Monitoring and Reporting (MR) and other standards such as not sending the annual drinking 
water quality report to the customers. If a water system has a MR violation, this indicates that the 
system has failed in completing the regular testing requirements or failed to submit test results to 
the state primacy agency in the required time. 
 In this paper, we follow Carrie et al. (2013) and Allaire et al. (2018) and focus only on 
health-based violations since it is unclear whether the monitoring and communication with the 
public violations pose a health threat. In addition, monitoring and communication with public 
violations have poor data quality since only a small portion of these violations (9-23%) are 
reported to the national Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS) database (U.S. EPA, 
2004). 
2.2. Literature Review 
As mentioned in the introduction, previous research has focused on the relationship 
between health care expenditures and non-environmental factors, such as income and population 
age structure. Those studies have used different methodologies and models to explore these 
relationships. Previous research shows variable coefficient estimates with conflicting results. For 
example, some studies such as Wang (2009) and Thornton and Rice (2008) found that the 
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number of beds has a positive impact on per capita health care expenditures, whereas others such 
as Prieto and Lago-Peñas (2012) and Reich et al. (2012) found the opposite impact. However, 
income has been found to consistently have a positive impact on health care expenditures 
(Baltagi and Moscone, 2010; Xu et al., 2011). Some researchers argue that the inconsistent 
findings from non-income factors can be attributed to differences in estimation methods used or 
the lack of a formal economic theory regarding the determinants of health care expenditures 
(Gerdtham and Jönsson, 2000; Wilson, 1999). 
Some older studies attempted to capture the effect of environmental quality by using 
urbanization as a proxy, which coincides with industrialization and, in turn, industrial pollution 
(Gbesemete and Gerdtham, 1992; Gerdtham et al., 1992; Kleiman, 1974). However, urbanization 
is highly correlated with income and other variables, and these studies found either insignificant 
coefficients or unexpected signs. 
Jerrett et al. (2003) were among the first authors to investigate the direct relationship 
between health care expenditures and environmental indicators. They represented environmental 
indicators as total toxic pollution emissions in all environmental media and government 
environmental protection expenditures. Cross-sectional data from 49 counties in Ontario, Canada 
were employed in a sequential two-stage regression model to consider the endogenous 
relationship between health care expenditures and mortality. They found that counties with 
higher pollution emissions tend to have higher per capita health care expenditures, where a one-
ton increase in emissions is associated with $0.03 higher per capita health expenditures. 
Moreover, counties that spend more on improving environmental quality have lower per capita 
health care expenditures. It was estimated that a one dollar increase in defensive expenditures are 
associated with $0.31 lower per capita health expenditures. 
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Narayan and Narayan (2008) examined the relationship between environmental quality 
and health care expenditures using data for eight OECD countries from 1980 to 1999. As a proxy 
for environmental quality, they used air emissions of sulfur oxide, nitrogen oxide, and carbon 
monoxide emissions. Furthermore, they used a panel cointegration approach to estimate both 
short- and long-run impacts of environmental quality on health care expenditures. They found 
that in the long-run, sulfur oxide and carbon monoxide emissions had statistically significant, 
positive impacts on per capita health care expenditures. For example, they estimated that a 1% 
increase in sulfur oxide emissions increases per capita health care expenditures by 0.04%. In the 
short-run, carbon monoxide emissions were the only environmental quality indicator that had a 
statistically significant, positive impact on per capita health care expenditures. However, the 
magnitude of the impact was smaller than the long-run. 
Using a panel cointegration approach similar to Narayan and Narayan (2008), other 
studies such as Qureshi et al. (2015), Yahaya et al. (2016), and Zou et al. (2016) examined the 
relationship between environmental quality, proxied by various indicators related to air pollution, 
and health care expenditures. Generally, the results from these studies indicate that in the long-
run, air pollution has a statistically significant and positive impact on health care expenditures, 
but this estimated impact is smaller in the short-run. 
Past studies that explored the relationship between environmental quality and health care 
expenditures have largely used air quality to proxy environmental quality. Thus, a possible 
extension to the literature is to use other proxies to environmental quality, such as drinking water 
quality, which is the research objective of this paper. 
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2.3. Data 
In this section, we provide background information and data sources for the variables 
used in the analysis. The empirical analysis is based on annual, state-level data for 48 contiguous 
U.S. states for the period 2000 to 2011. 
2.3.1. Dependent variable – Health care expenditures 
To measure health care expenditures, we use the per capita Personal Health Care (PHC) 
expenditures component of the National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA) estimates 
provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The NHEA comprise the 
official government estimates of aggregate health care spending in the U.S. These annual 
estimates are comprehensive since they encompass all the main elements of the health care 
system in a unified, mutually exclusive and exhaustive structure. These are multidimensional 
because they include information about expenditures on medical goods and services, and those 
who paid to finance these expenditures. Consistent methodology and classification systems are 
used that employ a common set of definitions which allows comparisons between groups over 
time (Catlin and Cowan, 2015; CMS, 2015). 
The NHEA categorizes state health care spending data into two types: spending by state 
of provider and spending by state of residence. In the former, the estimates include all revenues 
obtained by health care providers in a state for supplying health care goods and services to both 
residents and non-residents. These estimates are used to measure the GDP of a state from the 
health care sector. In the latter, the estimates contain all health care expenditures by residents of 
a state whether the service is provided in or out of the state. These latter estimates are used to 
develop the per capita measures to compare between states which are used in this paper.  
To estimate health care expenditures by state, the CMS follows a multi-step process: (1) 
expenditures by state of provider (or the state where health care goods and services are 
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consumed) are developed for each PHC service using provider-based survey data; (2) estimates 
of spending by payer (Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurance) are developed using a 
combination of administrative claims data and survey data; and (3) the provider-based 
expenditures for each service and for Medicare are converted to a state of residence basis using 
information on health care expenditure patterns (or flows) between states. Expenditure estimates 
for Medicaid and for private health insurance are both assumed to be already on a state of 
residence basis. The aggregate values then are divided by the total state population to obtain the 
per capita PHC.  
PHC is defined as total spending on health care goods and services minus administration 
and the net cost of private health insurance, government public health activities, and investment 
in research, structures, and equipment. Various goods and services are included in the PHC such 
as hospital care, physician and clinical services, dental services, and home health care. However, 
two types of health care spending are not included in the PHC due to the availability of the data: 
(1) health care expenditure estimates for health services provided to recipients outside the 
country that were paid for by Medicare, and (2) health care services obtained by individuals 
residing in United States territories who returned to the United States to receive them. According 
to Cuckler et al. (2011) those limitations do not affect the findings when using the per capita 
PHC data. 
Since the values provided by the CMS are nominal, we use the Personal Health Care 
index to adjust for inflation, which according to Dunn et al. (2016) is the most preferred index to 
use when adjusting total medical expenditures for general medical price changes. Finally, it is 
important to note that health care expenditures do not measure health outcomes. While 
measurement of direct health outcomes is preferable (such as a measure of improved health 
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status) to examine the impact of water contamination episodes, these data are not available at the 
scale of analysis we are considering here.   
2.3.2. Independent variables 
We group the independent variables into four categories based upon how they affect 
health care expenditures: drinking water quality, ability to pay, demand for health care services, 
and supply of health care services. 
2.3.2.1. Drinking water quality 
In this paper, we are interested in the impact of health-based violations for drinking 
water, so our focus is limited to the population served by public water systems. The percentage 
of the population served by public water systems in each state that experience at least one 
violation of the MCL or TT standards during a year are used as a proxy for drinking water 
quality since MRDL violations rarely occur. Even if MRDL violations are used, they are too 
small to result in consistent outcomes (Wallsten and Kosec, 2008). We obtain the population 
served by those systems that experienced violations in each year from the U.S. EPA’s Factoids: 
Drinking Water and Ground Water Statistics reports. We then divide these U.S. EPA estimates 
by each state’s population to compute the percentage of the state population that has been 
exposed to health-based violations for drinking water provided by public water systems at any 
time during the year.    
2.3.2.2. Ability to pay for health care services 
Income:  One of the most important factors that drives health care expenditures is 
income. Previous studies that explored the determinants of health care expenditures at the 
international, national, and regional levels have all shown that an increase in income will result 
in an increase in health care expenditures (Murthy and Ukpolo, 1994; Newhouse, 1977; Wang, 
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2009). To control for this variable, we use real per capita state GDP as a proxy for income. These 
data were obtained from the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
Unemployment and uninsured rates:  The impacts of unemployment and uninsured rates 
on health care expenditures are ambiguous. An increase in state’s unemployment rate or 
uninsured rate could limit the ability to pay for health care goods and services, and therefore, 
health care expenditures would decrease. On the other hand, an increase in states’ unemployment 
rate or uninsured rate could also increase per capita health care expenditures since while less 
people will be covered by private health insurance, more people will be covered by programs 
such as Medicaid. These two variables represent access to health care, which is an important 
determinant of health care expenditures. Data for these two variables were obtained from two 
different sources. The first is the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the second is the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) 
survey. To measure uninsured rate, the BRFSS asks the participants the following question: “Do 
you have any kind of health care coverage, including health insurance, prepaid plans such as 
HMOs, government plans such as Medicare, or Indian Health Service?” Each of these variables 
are measured as a percentage of the state population. 
2.3.2.3. Consumption of health care services 
Health status: The health status of the state’s residents will determine how much of health 
care goods and services will be consumed. To measure population health status, we use the 
health status variable from the BRFSS survey, where participants are asked, "How is your 
general health?", and respondents can choose among the provided answers (excellent, very good, 
good, fair, or poor). This measure is the percentage of population who have excellent health, 
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therefore, we expect the coefficient to be negative since better health status will lead to less 
health care expenditures.   
Population age structure:  Another important determinant of health care expenditures is 
the state’s population age structure. It is well observed that personal health care expenditures are 
unevenly distributed through a person life, with larger spending during older ages (Reinhardt, 
2003). Therefore, we use the proportion of the state population who are enrolled in Medicare as 
measure of state’s elderly population. According to CMS (2017), this measure has an advantage 
over the proportion of population over 65 years old because it is more closely related to state 
health spending. The data for this variable came from the CMS’s Medicare Enrollment 
Dashboard. It is expected that an increase in this proportion will result in an increase in health 
care expenditures. 
Environmental expenditures:  Following Jerrett et al. (2003), we control for state’s 
environmental expenditures to avoid the risk of omitted variable bias since it is expected that 
environmental expenditures may be correlated with the number of violations in a state. To 
measure this variable, we use state’s spending on natural resources as a proxy similar to 
Fredriksson et al. (2011) and List and Sturm (2006). We use per square mile measures to account 
for size variation between states. It is expected that an increase in state’s environmental 
expenditures will improve the state environmental quality and the overall public health, and 
therefore decrease health care expenditures. We obtain the data for this variable from the annual 
survey of state government finances from the Census Bureau. 
Air quality:  Following other studies that examined the impact of environmental quality 
on health care expenditures, we control for the impact of air quality by using the percentage of 
population that live in nonattainment areas (counties) that violate air quality standards. To 
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compute this variable, we first obtain detailed information about those areas from the U.S. EPA’s 
Green Book, which shows the status of each county in terms of attainment of nonattainment of 
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). Then using population estimates from 
the Census Bureau we calculate the percentage of population affected by air pollution in each 
state. Since some states have no violations in some years, we transform this variable using 
𝑙𝑜𝑔⁡(𝑎𝑖𝑟⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 0.001). 
2.3.2.4. Supply of health care services 
The supply of health care services varies across the states. To account for this variation, 
we use the number of hospital beds per 1,000 population as an indicator for health care capacity 
in a state. As mentioned previously, the impact of this variable is ambiguous. In a competitive 
market environment, we would expect that a greater availability of health care services would 
lead to lower per capita health care expenditures, all other things being equal. However, it has 
been shown repeatedly in the literature that a greater supply of health care services may result in 
increased demand for health care services leading to higher health care spending. This positive 
impact is often explained as the supply-induced demand problem, where increasing competition 
leads health providers to recommend unnecessary services (Frech, 1996; McGuire, 2000). The 
data for this variable were obtained from the CDC’s Health, United States reports. 
2.3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the annual variables used in the analysis. The 
dependent variable is state level, real per capita health care expenditures. This variable ranges 
from $4,003 in Utah to a maximum of $9,417 in Massachusetts. Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
distribution of the average real per capita health care expenditures across the states between 2000 
and 2011. Some of the highest levels of per capita health expenditures are observed in the 
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Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions, whereas some of the lowest levels are observed in the 
Southwest and Southeast regions.  
In a similar manner to per capita health care expenditures, Massachusetts was also the 
state with the highest percentage of population served by public water systems that violated the 
health-based standards with 78.56% of its population affected in one year (Table 2.1). Figure 2.2 
shows the distribution of population served by public water systems that violated health-based 
standards. To examine how per capita health care expenditures and drinking water quality 
variables moved together during the analysis period, we divided the U.S. into EPA regions and 
calculated the average of per capita health care expenditures and the percentage of population 
affected by health-based violations in each region and report them in Figures 2.3 through 2.12. 
Per capita health care expenditures show a continuous increase in all regions from 2000 to 2011. 
On the other hand, except for regions 6 and 10, health-based violations mainly fluctuate over the 
years in most regions.  
The statistical values for the other variables vary widely across the states over the 
analysis period. Real environmental expenditures per square mile vary from $910 for Nevada to 
$74,070 for New Jersey. Real per capita GDP also covers a large range, from $29,730 to 
$86,200, with Mississippi and Idaho having the lowest values and Delaware and Connecticut 
having the highest values. The percentage of the population with excellent health ranges from 
13.40% to 28.80% across the states, where the lowest value is for West Virginia and the highest 
is for Connecticut. Finally, variation in the percentage of population affected by air pollution is 
large between states, where some have almost no pollution and others have all the population in 
the state affected by air pollution. 
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2.4. Empirical Models 
We estimate two sets of models: non-spatial and spatial. First, we use variations of state 
level fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models motivated by Reich et al. (2012), 
Cantarero and Lago-Peñas (2010), and Crivelli et al. (2006). Five models are estimated: (1) 
pooled OLS, (2) state fixed effects (FE), (3) random effects (RE), (4) state FE with year fixed 
effects, and (5) RE with year fixed effects. Results from the Hausman (1978) specification test 
indicate that the FE model is more appropriate than the random effects model. However, since 
most of the variables do not vary much over time within the sample period, FE methods can lead 
to imprecise estimates (Wooldridge, 2002).1 Table 2.2 shows the within, between, and overall 
variation of the variables included in the analysis. Except of drinking water quality and 
unemployment rate, all the other variables have low within variation. Hahn et al. (2011) show 
that the Hausman (1978) test is not appropriate when some or all of the explanatory variables 
have little within variable variation. Therefore, we present the results from both models and 
compare them.  
It follows from the model description above that:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,          𝑖 = 1,… ,  𝑁,   𝑡 = 1,… ,  𝑇  (2.1) 
where 𝒚𝒊𝒕 is the state’s per capita health care expenditures, 𝒙𝒊𝒕 is 𝑲⁡ × 𝟏⁡and contains our 
variable of interest and other control variables, 𝒂𝒊 is the state’s fixed or random effect to account 
for the unobservable characteristics, 𝜆𝒕 is the time fixed effect, and 𝜀𝒊𝒕 is the error term. Based on 
the epidemiological evidence found in many studies (see Villanueva et al. 2014), we hypothesize 
a positive association such that an increase in the percentage of the population exposure to 
                                                          
 
1 Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009), we examine the within and between standard deviations to determine 
which variables have low within variation. The results indicate that most of variables in our sample have low within 
variation. 
24 
 
drinking water violations within a state will result in an increase in state level per capita health 
care expenditures. 
In addition to using basic panel estimation methods, LaSage and Pace (2009) and Elhorst 
(2014) state that use of a general non-spatial estimation is based upon observed values being 
independent of location when there is no correlation between neighbors. In other words, in a 
non-spatial model, each observation has a mean of 𝑥𝑖𝛽 and a random component 𝜀𝒊. The 
observation 𝒊 represents a region or point in space, which is considered to be independent of its 
neighboring regions or points j, i.e., 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝜀𝑗) = 𝐸(𝜀𝑖)𝐸(𝜀𝑗) = 0. 
However, in many cases, the assumption of observations’ independency is not applicable. 
In other words, observations at different points or regions are dependent (LeSage and Pace, 
2009). Pollution levels and health outcomes are examples of such a dependency assumption 
between the variable of interest and an outcome. For example, the pollution levels in region 𝒊 
may influence health outcomes in a neighboring region 𝑗 (Chen et al., 2017; Erfanian and 
Collins, 2019). 
With spatial interdependence, we suppose two neighbors (regions) 𝑖 and 𝑗 which are 
spatially correlated with normality being assumed for the error terms: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖⁡ (2.2) 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝜌𝑗𝑦𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗𝛽 + 𝜀𝑗 ⁡⁡⁡ (2.3)⁡ 
where the dependent variable in neighbor 𝒋 influences the dependent variable in neighbor 𝒊 and 
the reverse also holds true. Once a spatial component (whether this component is from the 
dependent variable, control variables, or the error term) is found to be statistically significant, 
then any coefficients estimated by a non-spatial model may be biased. In addition, by applying a 
non-spatial model when the spatial component is significant, variances may be non-efficient 
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(Griffith, 2005; LeSage and Pace, 2009). Accordingly, statistical tests (t-test and F-test) may be 
invalid, leading economists to interpret their results improperly. 
Given that state level real per capita health expenditures show visual evidence of 
clustering (Figure 2.1), we test for spatial autocorrelation among states with a Moran’s I (see 
Anselin, 1988, p.101).  The global Moran’s I is statistically significant (Moran’s I index for 2000 
= 0.16, P-value = 0.02; Moran’s I index for 2011 = 0.21, P-value = 0.004) demonstrating that 
spatial interrelationships exist for per capita health care expenditures and the need to apply 
spatial econometrics modeling. We also report the scatter plot of Moran’s I to be sure that the 
positive spatial correlation for some observations and negative spatial correlation for other 
observations do not cancel out each other. Figure 2.3 provides these results and illustrates that 
both at the start and end of the data, most of the states with high real per capita healthcare 
expenditures are adjacent to states with high real per capita health care expenditures. This also is 
true for the states with low real per capita health care expenditures. Thus, we have ample 
evidence to apply a spatial econometrics model in our analysis. 
There are five possible spatial models. The first is a Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) Lag 
Model as shown in equations (2.2) and⁡(2.3). A Spatial Error Model (SEM) has dependency in 
the error term, while a SLX model (Spatial Lag of Explanatory variables) assumes that only 
explanatory variables play a direct role in determining dependent variables. A Spatial Durbin 
Model (SDM) includes spatial lags of explanatory variables as well as the dependent variable, 
while a Spatial Error Durbin Model (SDEM) includes these lags along with spatially dependent 
disturbances. 
To observe dependence between neighboring observations, spatial econometric models 
differentiate between direct and indirect effects. Direct effects show how changes in a variable 
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for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ state influences the 𝑖𝑡ℎ state’s dependent variable (in-state impacts). Indirect effects 
explain the effects of a variable in 𝑗𝑡ℎ state on 𝑖𝑡ℎ state’s dependent variable (regional impacts). 
LeSage (2008) discusses that since the impacts of a variable are different among observations, it 
is desirable to have a measurement of overall and average impacts. Thus, these measurements are 
divided into the concepts of average direct, indirect, and total effects (LeSage and Pace, 2014).   
Parameters in a general, non-spatial linear regression are interpreted as a partial 
derivative of the dependent variable with respect to the explanatory variable. An assumption of 
independence between observations serves as the basis for this interpretation. In a spatial model, 
however, interpretation of the parameters becomes more complicated. As numerous economists 
(Anselin and Le Gallo, 2006; Kelejian et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2003; Le Gallo et al., 2003; 
LeSage and Pace, 2009) point out a model with a spatial lag of the dependent variable requires 
special interpretation of the parameters. Elhorst (2014) calculated the direct, indirect and the total 
effect in a general nesting spatial model as 
𝑌 = (𝐼 − 𝛿𝑊)−1(𝑋𝛽 +𝑊𝑋𝜃) + 𝑅⁡ (2.4)⁡ 
where 𝑊 is the spatial weight matrix, 𝛿 is called the spatial autoregressive coefficient, 𝜃 
represents a 𝐾⁡ × 1⁡vector of fixed but unknown parameters to be estimated, and 𝑅 represents the 
intercept and error terms. 
The matrix of partial derivatives of the expected dependent variable with respect to 
changes in explanatory variables becomes: 
[
𝜕𝐸(𝑌)
𝜕𝑥1𝑘
⁡.⁡⁡
𝜕𝐸(𝑌)
𝜕𝑥𝑁𝑘
] = ⁡
[
 
 
 
 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦1)
𝜕𝑥1𝑘
.
𝜕𝐸(𝑦1)
𝜕𝑥𝑁𝑘. . .
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑁)
𝜕𝑥1𝑘
.
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑁)
𝜕𝑥𝑁𝑘 ]
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= (1 − 𝛿𝑊)−1 [
𝛽𝑘 𝑤12𝜃𝑘 . 𝑤1𝑁𝜃𝑘
𝑤21𝜃𝑘 𝛽𝑘 . 𝑤2𝑁𝜃𝑘
. . . .
𝑤𝑁1𝜃𝑘 𝑤𝑁2𝜃𝑘 . 𝛽𝑘
⁡⁡] ⁡ (2.5) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the (𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑡ℎ element of 𝑊. Every diagonal element of the partial derivative matrix in 
equation (2.5) shows the direct effect while the indirect effects are shown by every off-diagonal 
element. Since the direct and indirect effects are unique for each observation, LeSage and Pace 
(2009) suggest reporting the summary indicators (the average of the diagonal elements for the 
direct effect and the average of either the row sums or the column sums of the off-diagonal 
elements for indirect effects). Since 𝜃 in a SAR model is equal to zero, indirect effect would be 
equal to the off-diagonal elements of (1 − 𝛿𝑊)−1𝛽𝑘. 
The weight matrix 𝑊 describes the interrelationships between observations. According to 
Elhorst (2014), the weight matrix can be thought of as a tool to define the neighbors for any 
given region. This definition can be in a geographical dimension or in another framework such as 
the share of trade or transportation. Various units of measurement for spatial dependencies such 
as cities, counties, states, and countries are available for spatial analysis (Getis, 2007).  
Our spatial weight matrix is based on the distance between the center of states and we 
applied a three nearest-neighbors weight matrix. We chose the most representative weight matrix 
for the analysis by testing for different nearest neighbors. The weight matrix based on three 
nearest neighbors had the highest log likelihood value, which indicates that a weight matrix 
consisting of three nearest neighbors for the analysis is the most representative weight matrix for 
the analysis. In addition, we tested between SDM and SDEM model by using a Bayesian 
posterior probability model and the result confirmed that the most appropriate model to capture 
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the spillover effect for our model is the SDM model.2 Spatial econometric models are estimated 
using Matlab software codes provided by Lacombe (2016).    
Following previous literature which examines determinants of health care expenditures, 
all variables are converted to logarithmic form for estimation, so that regression coefficients are 
interpreted as elasticity estimates. Moreover, we evaluate these data using the extended 
projection (PE) test from MacKinnon et al. (1983) to compare the log-log and linear model 
specifications.  The results indicate that the log-log model is more appropriate. With the SDM, 
we estimate the marginal effects (direct, indirect, and total) of the independent variables on per 
capita health care expenditures using 2000-2011 data.  
2.5. Results  
Table 2.3 reports the regression results for the non-spatial models. In most models, our 
coefficient estimates for drinking water quality violations are positive and statistically 
significant, but they become insignificant when we include time fixed effects. In terms of the 
expected signs for the other explanatory variables, RE model coefficient estimates are similar to 
those for the FE models. Comparing the 95% confidence intervals for the drinking water quality 
coefficients in models (2) with (4) and those of models (3) with (5), we find that the estimates 
are within the 95% confidence intervals of each other.3 Since there are no large differences 
between the estimates of FE and RE, we continue and use the RE as the preferred approach.  
Table 2.4 reports the results of the direct, indirect, and total effects from the Spatial 
Durbin Model (SDM) with RE and year fixed effects. The coefficient of spatially lagged 
                                                          
 
2 SDM probs = 0.69, SDEM probs =0.31 
3 The confidence intervals for the drinking water quality variable coefficients are:  model 2: (-0.0002, 0.0169), 
model 4: (0.0011, 0.0174), model 3: (-0.0032, 0.0036), and model 5: (-0.0027, 0.0040). 
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dependent variable is 0.149 and statistically significant at a 1% level, which indicates that the 
regression coefficient estimates from Table 2.3 are likely biased. This result also reveals that 
state level per capita health care expenditures tend to increase in response to higher per capita 
health care spending in neighboring states. This is expected since state level health care 
expenditures and health policy decisions depend on the surrounding states (Bose et al., 2015). 
Therefore, this prior research suggests that per capita health care expenditures follow the same 
path as state level health care expenditures.  
With respect to the drinking water quality variable, the results show that this variable has 
a positive and statistically significant impact on per capita health care expenditures both within 
the state itself as well as in neighboring states. Relative to the direct effect, the magnitude of the 
average indirect effect of drinking water quality violations in state 𝒊 is fairly large.  Specifically, 
a 1% decrease in the population served by public water systems that experience violations of 
SDWA’s health-based standards in state i, on average, would decrease annual per capita health 
care expenditures by 0.005% ($0.32) in state 𝑖, and by 0.035% ($2.26) in its three neighboring 
states.4 The direct effect of drinking water quality is small compared to other variables with 
statistically significant, but larger direct impacts.  For example, a 1% increase in health status 
would result in a decrease of annual per capita health care expenditures in state 𝑖 by 0.053% 
($3.42), about ten times the impact of drinking water quality violations on per capita health care 
expenditures. 
The large difference between the direct (in-state) and indirect (regional) effects of 
drinking water quality on per capita health care expenditures is unexpected since water quality 
                                                          
 
4 Dollar values are based on the average per capita health care expenditures reported in Table 2.1. 
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contamination episodes are generally viewed as local problems as evidenced by the discussion in 
section 2.1. There are two possible explanations for such a disparity between direct and indirect 
effects. The first is that population movement between states so that exposed persons to a water 
contamination episode in state i have actually traveled from adjacent j states. Such spillover 
impact can be small if we look at one region but if we cumulate these small impacts on all 
neighbors it may leads to situations where the spillover impacts are much larger in magnitude 
than the direct impact (LeSage and Dominguez, 2012),  The second is that changes in the 
percentage of population exposed to contaminants in one state are indictive of a larger regional 
problem with water quality contamination. One example is extreme weather events (Curriero et 
al., 2001). Such an explanation warrants a more coordinated regional approach across states 
when addressing water quality problems related to drinking water quality violations as is 
practiced by entities such as river basin commissions (Abdalla et al., 2011). 
To illustrate the extent of this decrease on a state’s total health care expenditures, we 
choose the state of Montana. This state represents the average of our sample, where the 
percentages of population exposed to violations is 6.67% in 2011 compared to an average of 
6.37% for the other 47 states. We calculate the estimated decrease in total health care 
expenditures resulting from a 1% decrease in the population experiencing violations in drinking 
water quality. We obtain this value by multiplying $0.32 by Montana’s 2011 population. 
Therefore, a 1% decrease in the population exposed to drinking water quality violations would 
result in an estimated $319,302 decrease in annual health care expenditures within the state of 
Montana. For Montana’s three nearest neighbors (Idaho, North Dakota, and Wyoming), 
however, this 1% reduction would, on average, result in about a $6.41 million reduction in 
annual health care expenditures. Further, we examine the in-state and regional impacts of a 1% 
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reduction across all 48 contiguous states. Multiplying the dollar values by the 2011 state 
populations, we find that, on average, this will lead to $98.9 million and $698.2 million 
reductions in annual health care expenditures for in-state and regional impacts, respectively.  
The public water system costs to achieve a 1% reduction in the number of violations 
across all 48 states are uncertain. These costs will be largely passed on to the water system’s 
customers and will depend on many factors such as system size and type of contaminant. 
According to Auerbach (1994), cost increases to comply with SDWA standards range from 2% 
of water charges for households served by large public water systems to 55% for households 
served by small systems. A more recent estimate of the costs associated with compliance to 
SDWA standards over the next 20 years is provided by the U.S. EPA’s (2018c) Drinking Water 
Infrastructure Needs Survey and Assessment. The U.S. EPA estimates that out of total national 
needs ($472.6 billion), about 12% ($57 billion) is related to violations of SDWA regulations. It is 
unclear how much of this $57 billion would be required to achieve a 1% reduction.   
Comparing drinking water quality with air quality, we find that drinking water quality 
violations have a larger impact on health care expenditures than air quality violations, which 
have a statistically insignificant impact. This result is in contrast with other findings which have 
examined the impact of air quality on health care expenditures (examples include Narayan and 
Narayan (2008) and Yahaya et al. (2016)). Our result shows that when exposure to 
environmental contamination is measured as violation of a standard plus along with being 
aggregated across multiple pollutants, then exposure to drinking water quality violations has a 
larger impact on health care expenditures than exposure to air quality violations.     
For the other control variables, the direct effect of income is positive and statistically 
significant as expected. Our estimates, however, are much lower in magnitude than the estimates 
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found in other studies.  Wang (2009) and Bose (2015) found income to have impacts over twice 
as high (0.71 and 0.64, respectively). For access to health care variables, the unemployment rate 
is statistically insignificant in all effects. The indirect effect of uninsured rate is positive and 
statistically significant, which indicates that an increase in the uninsured rate in state 𝒊 will result 
in an increase in per capita health care expenditures in neighboring states.  
Examining the variables for consumption of health care services, the health status 
variable has a statistically significant, negative direct effect as expected. Medicare enrollment, 
similar to CMS (2017), is positive and statistically significant for both the direct and indirect 
effects so that increases in Medicare enrollment not only increases in state, but also the 
neighboring three states’ per capita health care expenditures. This variable has the largest impact 
of any variable on per capita health care expenditures in our model. This impact is expected 
since per capita health expenditures for people age 65 or older, on average, are three to five times 
higher than spending by young people (Reinhardt, 2003).  
Finally, environmental expenditures per square mile have positive and statistically 
significant direct effects on health care expenditures. This result indicates that higher 
expenditures reflect the existence of more environmental problems, leading to higher per capita 
health care expenditures due to the population facing more health risks related to environmental 
quality.  
For the supply of health care variable, only the indirect effect for number of hospital beds 
is negative and statistically significant. A possible explanation for this result is that hospitals in 
state 𝒊 compete with hospitals in neighboring states by improving quality of the services, and 
therefore, lower the cost of health care for patients from neighboring states (Bose et al., 2015). 
Thus, a higher supply of health care services benefits consumers in neighboring states by 
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reducing their per capita health care expenditures rather than in the state where more hospital 
beds are provided.  
2.6. Conclusions 
The impacts of drinking water quality violations on state level per capita health care 
expenditures are estimated using a proxy variable of the percentage of population served by 
public water systems that experienced violations of SDWA’s health-based standards. We 
estimate both spatial and non-spatial models and control for factors that the reflect air pollution 
as well as ability to pay plus consumption of along with supply of health care services using data 
from 48 contiguous states for the period 2000 – 2011. 
We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between drinking water 
quality violations and state level per capita health care expenditures. Specifically, the results 
from the Spatial Durbin Model indicate that a 1% decrease in the percentage of population 
exposed to violations is associated with reductions in direct and indirect effects equal to 0.005% 
($0.32) and 0.035% ($2.26) of per capita health care expenditures.  
It is important to note that reductions in per capita health expenditures stemming from 
lowering drinking water quality violations is just one benefit that arises from drinking water 
quality improvement. Other, more localized benefits from fewer violations include real estate 
value impacts from correcting source water contamination problems. Examples of this research 
include Liu et al. (2017), Tuttle and Heintzelman (2015), and Leggett and Bockstael (2000). 
Given the high investment costs associated with lowering of drinking water quality violations, a 
full accounting of all benefits from these reductions will be needed to offset these costs.  
Limitations of this research relate primarily to the data that are used. First, using an 
aggregated data at the state level may average out the effects at the local level where drinking 
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water quality violations are occurring, therefore resulting in biased estimates. Lindo (2015) 
provides a discussion on how the results may change based on the level of geographic 
aggregation of the data used in the analysis. Since per capita health care expenditures data are 
only available at the state level we could not explore any other options.  
Second, sometimes people get exposed to contaminants in drinking water multiple times 
a year. However, our analysis does not account for this. Therefore, including some kind of an 
intensity treatment in the analysis may result in different conclusions. Third, our data only covers 
public water systems, thereby excluding about 45 million people who use private wells for their 
drinking water and thus are not regulated under the SDWA (U.S. Geological Survey, 2009). 
Considering this population in future research would expand results to consider the implications 
of drinking water violations to more rural areas.  
Fourth, the proxy variable that we used to reflect exposure to drinking water 
contamination also has its flaws. These data include multiple types of contaminants that affect 
human health differently (i.e. short- and long-run health impacts).  However, we did not include 
a lag system for population exposure to drinking water violations in our model to account for a 
range of temporal health impacts from contaminant exposures.  
Finally, water systems have financial incentives not to comply with all the U.S. EPA 
regulations due to the higher costs that it will impose on these systems (Bennear et al. 2009). 
Therefore, there is a higher probability that false or missing data are being reported. For 
example, the agency estimated that states were not reporting 40% of all health-based violations 
(U.S. EPA, 2004). Employing these changes in the drinking water quality variable may yield 
different results from our current models. 
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2.8. Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 2.1. Average real per capita health care expenditures between 2000 and 2011 ($2009) 
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Figure 2.2. Percentage of population served by PWSs that violated health-based standards (2000 
– 2011 average) 
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Figure 2.3. Average per capita health care expenditures and percentage of population exposed to 
health-based violations – Region 1: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, and VT 
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Figure 2.4. Average per capita health care expenditures and percentage of population exposed to 
health-based violations – Region 2: NY and NJ 
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Figure 2.5. Average per capita health care expenditures and percentage of population exposed to 
health-based violations – Region 3: DE, MD, PA, VA, and WV 
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Figure 2.6. Average per capita health care expenditures and percentage of population exposed to 
health-based violations – Region 4: AL, GA, KY, MS, NC, TN, FL, and SC 
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Figure 2.7. Average per capita health care expenditures and percentage of population exposed to 
health-based violations – Region 5: IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, and WI 
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Figure 2.8. Average per capita health care expenditures and percentage of population exposed to 
health-based violations – Region 6: AR, LA, OK, NM, and TX 
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Figure 2.9. Average per capita health care expenditures and percentage of population exposed to 
health-based violations – Region 7: IA, MO, KS, and NE 
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Figure 2.10. Average per capita health care expenditures and percentage of population exposed 
to health-based violations – Region 8: CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY 
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Figure 2.11. Average per capita health care expenditures and percentage of population exposed 
to health-based violations – Region 9: AZ, CA, and NV 
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Figure 2.12. Average per capita health care expenditures and percentage of population exposed 
to health-based violations – Region 10: ID, OR, and WA 
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Figure 2.13. Scatter plots of Moran’s I for 2000 and 2011 
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics of annual, state-level data for the contiguous 48 states, 2000 to 2011 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Health care expenditures 2009 dollars 6451.47 973.48 4003.96 9417 
Drinking water quality % 7.33 7.72 0.01 78.56 
Air quality % 39.97 36.98 0 100 
Income Thousand 2009 dollars 48.94 9.25 29.73 86.20 
Environmental expenditures per sq/mi Thousand 2009 dollars 10.56 12.21 0.91 74.07 
Medicare enrollment % 14.88 1.98 9.18 20.81 
Health status % 20.90 2.78 13.40 28.80 
Number of hospital beds   2.95 0.90 1.70 6.10 
Uninsured rate % 14.80 4.30 4.30 29.80 
Unemployment rate % 5.73 2.12 2.30 13.70 
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Table 2.2. Within, between, and overall variations of the variable used in the analysis 
Variable 
Standard Deviation 
Within Between Overall 
Health care expenditures 568.55 797.87 973.48 
Drinking water quality 0.06 0.05 0.08 
Air quality 0.11 0.36 0.37 
Income 3.57 8.61 9.25 
Environmental expenditures 2.57 12.05 12.21 
Medicare enrollment 0.65 1.89 1.98 
Health status 1.45 2.40 2.78 
Number of hospital beds  0.17 0.90 0.90 
Uninsured rate 1.61 4.03 4.30 
Unemployment rate 1.84 1.05 2.12 
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Table 2.3. Non-spatial regression results, dependent variable of annual, state level per capita 
health care expenditures   
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Pooled FE FE RE RE 
            
Drinking water quality 0.016*** 0.008* 0.000 0.009** 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.055) (0.910) (0.026) (0.705) 
Air quality  0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.938) (0.526) (0.176) (0.688) (0.432) 
Income 0.323*** 0.058 0.271*** 0.212** 0.305*** 
  (0.000) (0.596) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
Environmental expenditures 0.015*** 0.047* 0.008 0.021 0.018** 
  (0.005) (0.073) (0.481) (0.165) (0.043) 
Medicare enrollment 0.721*** 1.212*** 0.443*** 1.130*** 0.521*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Health status -0.038 -0.168*** -0.042** -0.214*** -0.031 
  (0.281) (0.001) (0.050) (0.000) (0.134) 
Number of hospital beds -0.018 -0.463*** 0.077 -0.262*** 0.061* 
  (0.305) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.055) 
Uninsured rate -0.114*** 0.004 -0.043*** -0.028 -0.052*** 
  (0.000) (0.885) (0.001) (0.374) (0.000) 
Unemployment rate 0.107*** 0.009 -0.001 0.052*** 0.006 
  (0.000) (0.526) (0.902) (0.000) (0.545) 
Constant 3.515*** 5.448*** 4.563*** 4.177*** 3.895*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Year Fixed Effect No No Yes No Yes 
N 576 576 576 576 576 
R-sq 0.662 0.754 0.959 0.516 0.868 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses represent p-values.             
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 2.4. Spatial Durbin model with random effects regression results, dependent variable of annual, 
state level per capita health care expenditures 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
        
Drinking water quality 0.005*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 
  (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
Air pollution  -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
  (0.379) (0.850) (0.755) 
Income 0.253*** 0.078 0.331*** 
  (0.000)  (0.209) (0.000) 
Environmental expenditures 0.013** -0.018 -0.005 
  (0.028) (0.518) (0.882) 
Medicare enrollment 0.606*** 1.374*** 1.979*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Health status -0.053** 0.125 0.072 
  (0.019) (0.296) (0.598) 
Number of hospital beds -0.001 -0.438*** -0.439*** 
  (0.953) (0.000) (0.000) 
Uninsured rate -0.010 0.126** 0.116** 
  (0.379) (0.014) (0.048) 
Unemployment rate 0.001 -0.018 -0.017 
  (0.875) (0.460) (0.533) 
    
Rho 0.149***     
  (0.000)      
        
Year Fixed Effects Yes     
Observations 576     
R-sq 0.983     
Note: Numbers in the parentheses represent p-values. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Essay 2: The Impact of Public Water Supply Unreliability on Residential Property Prices 
in Marion County, West Virginia 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Lack of access to a reliable water supply is usually perceived as an issue that is faced 
mainly by developing countries.5 However, recent studies and reports show that developed 
countries, especially the United States, are also facing similar challenges due to problems 
associated with affordability, demographic change, high environmental quality expectations, and 
aging water infrastructure (Wescoat et al., 2007; OECD, 2016; Mack & Wrase, 2017; Allaire et 
al., 2018; Allen et al., 2018). For example, the Flint, Michigan crisis in 2014 brought increased 
attention to water supply reliability issues in the U.S.  
Aging water infrastructure coupled with major funding shortfalls are threatening the 
nation’s water security (Alfredo et al., 2016).6 Many of the pipes and main lines that deliver 
water across the country are more than 100 years old and subject to variety of stressors 
(American Society of Civil Engineers [ASCE], 2017). Aging water infrastructure leads to a 
higher rate of main breaks that result in lower water quantity and quality due to leaks and 
flowing contaminants into the water supply. An estimated 40% of the water distribution 
network’s valves in the U.S. are not functioning properly (Baird, 2011). According to the ASCE 
(2017), an estimated 240,000 water main breaks occur each year, wasting over two trillion 
gallons of treated drinking water. In terms of quality, previous research has linked water system 
                                                          
 
5 There is no unified definition of water supply reliability (Majuru et al., 2018). Here, we follow the definition given 
by Zérah (2000): “a service is reliable if it is provided in time, and with the quality and the quantity required.” 
6 Water infrastructure involves what is constructed to pump, divert, transport, treat, store, and deliver water, as well 
as to collect, treat and discharge storm and wastewater. 
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deficiencies (e.g. loss of pressure caused by main breaks or maintenance work) to an increase in 
the flow of contaminants, in which result in more gastrointestinal illness incidents among the 
exposed households (Nygård et al., 2007; Ercumen et al., 2014).  
The costs associated with replacing outdated water infrastructure are large. The American 
Water Works Association (2012) has estimated $1 trillion in water infrastructure needs just to 
maintain current levels of water service over the next 25 years. West Virginia, being one of the 
most rural states in the country, faces many challenges related to water supply reliability due to 
the aging or non-existent water infrastructure (Levêque & Burns, 2018).  Statewide, there have 
been an increasing number of boil water notices related to water main breaks and other 
contamination episodes (Figure 3.1). In addition, more than 55% of the treated water produced 
by public water systems in West Virginia is considered non-revenue water due to leaks in the 
distribution network (Coyne, 2019). The WVIJDC (2017) has estimated that $17 billion is 
needed to connect all state residents to public water and to rehabilitate the existing water 
infrastructure.  
In addition to public infrastructure costs, health and safety concerns lead some residents 
to incur defensive expenditures in order to avoid contamination from public water. For example, 
some West Virginia residents have been reported to pay up to $200 per month for bottled water 
and water filters above their public water bill and to drive for one to three hours each week to fill 
up water jugs from a mountain spring (West Virginia Public Broadcasting, 2019).  
Most of the needed improvements in water infrastructure are funded by local 
governments and public water systems revenues generated by ratepayers (ASCE, 2017). Since it 
is not optimal for a water system to achieve 100% reliability, decision makers need to make 
decisions that require a trade-off between cost and risk (Howe et al., 1994). In such cases, the 
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required investment costs are usually known, but the risk preferences of the affected consumers 
are not. A large literature exists that examines consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for different 
levels of public water supply reliability (e.g. Howe et al., 1994; Griffin & Mjelde, 2000; Koss & 
Khawaja, 2001). However, the majority of these studies use stated preference approaches to 
conduct their analysis with a focus on developing countries. Other studies, using revealed 
preference approach (averting behavior), have found that an unreliable water supply also can 
alter consumer’s behavior leading to additional costs to the affected households (e.g. Pattanayak 
et al., 2005; Jakus et al., 2009; Vásquez, 2012).   
Since water service is location specific, access to a reliable and safe water supply should 
be an important public infrastructure attribute in determining residential property values. 
Therefore, the objective of this research is to examine the impact of water supply unreliability on 
residential property values. We examine this impact using a hedonic property model and measure 
this unreliability with boil water notices (BWN) in Marion County, West Virginia. Since water 
service reliability has been found to be associated with sociodemographic characteristics of 
communities (see VanDerslice, 2011), we utilize a quantile regression approach to estimating the 
impact of water supply unreliability on residential home values. This allows us to gain 
information on the property value impact of unreliable water supply across the distribution of 
home prices. We find statistically significant, negative relationships and that the estimated price 
impacts are not uniform across the distribution of housing prices. Specifically, we find that 
BWNs have a larger impact on low-price compared to high-price houses. 
 The rest of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of four 
strands of literature related to water supply unreliability and their impacts on consumers. 
Sections 3 describes the model that combines hedonic property price and averting behavior 
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theories, while section 4 covers the data utilized in analyses. Section 5 provides information 
about the empirical model and estimation strategy. Finally, results are discussed in section 6 and 
conclusions in section 7. 
3.2. Literature Review 
The literature review is divided into four sections concerning studies that: (1) investigate 
the economic impacts of water supply unreliability on domestic users; (2) examine the effect of 
boil water notices on consumers; (3) examine the impact of investments in water infrastructure 
on economic growth; and (4) investigate the impact of water supply unreliability on consumers’ 
risk perceptions. 
3.2.1. Economic impacts of water supply unreliability on domestic users 
Previous research on the economic impacts of water supply unreliability on domestic 
users can be categorized in two general groups of studies. The first group have examined the 
economic and social losses caused by interruptions or restrictions in the service, mainly due to 
extreme weather events such as drought. The second group, which is the most common, has 
utilized non-market valuation methods to estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) (accept) for 
increasing (decreasing) water supply reliability. We discuss the first group briefly, then focus 
more on the second group. 
In the first group, Russell et al. (1970) was one of the first studies that examined the 
economic impact of water shortages. They estimated the losses to public and private parties from 
the 1962–1966 drought in three towns in Massachusetts. They found that the economic losses 
inflicted upon these communities were surprisingly small (between $5 and $13 per capita, in 
1970 dollars). A more recent example is Valiñas (2006) where she examined the welfare losses 
caused by rationing policies between 1992–1996 for a drought in Seville, Spain. By estimating 
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water demand functions of residential and commercial/industrial users, the WTP for a service 
without restrictions during the drought was obtained. Then, consumer surplus was used as a 
measure of welfare to calculate the welfare losses suffered by different users. On average, 
welfare losses, in 2001 Euros, were €138 and €62 per user/quarter for households and industrial/ 
commercial firms, respectively. 
In the second group, several studies have attempted to place a value on the reliability of 
the water supply using non-market valuation methods. For example, Howe et al. (1994) created a 
framework to obtain the optimal level of reliability, where the marginal benefits from increased 
reliability equal the marginal costs of achieving such a level. In this research, contingent 
valuation method was used to estimate the WTP for increased reliability in water supply (less 
probability of shortages) and the WTA for lower levels of reliability in three Colorado cities: 
Boulder, Longmont, and Aurora. They found, based upon the scenario of imposing higher bills to 
customers, that no changes in reliability could be justified for either Aurora and Longmont. For 
the city of Boulder, however, based on customers’ WTA, a reduction in reliability could be 
justified due to a very high level of reliability as a starting point.   
Other studies also used contingent valuation to estimate the WTP for more reliable water 
supply in both developed and developing countries (e.g. California Urban Water Agencies, 1994; 
Piper & Martin, 1997; Griffin & Mjelde, 2000; Koss & Khawaja, 2001; Genius & Tsagarakis, 
2006; Genius et al., 2008; Vásquez et al., 2009; Vásquez, 2014; Vásquez & Espaillat, 2016; 
Rodríguez-Tapia et al., 2017; Appiah et al., 2018).  Other research has utilized choice 
experiments for value estimation (e.g. Powe et al., 2004; Hensher et al., 2005; MacDonald et al., 
2005; Tarfasa & Brouwer, 2013; Latinopoulos, 2014).  
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Some studies have used revealed preference approaches to explore the same issue. Two 
main methods have been used: averting expenditures and hedonic property price methods. In the 
studies that have used averting expenditures, the goal is to estimate the costs related to unreliable 
and unsafe water supply, such as purchasing bottled water or installing filtering system in the 
house (e.g. Larson & Gnedenko, 1999; McConnell & Rosado, 2000; Um et al., 2002; Pattanayak 
et al., 2005; Vásquez, 2012). Following similar methodology, Jakus et al. (2009) and Vásquez et 
al. (2015) also examined the impact of perceived risk on avoidance behavior . 
There are relatively few studies that used the hedonic property price method to examine 
the issues that are directly related to water supply reliability since this method requires more 
data. This literature can be divided into two subgroups: (1) studies that have examined the impact 
of different water supply sources on residential property values, and (2) studies that examined 
the impact of water quality from both public water systems and private wells on residential 
property values.  
Within the first subgroup, research is based on different water sources offering in various 
levels of reliability and has focused mainly on developing countries.  North and Griffin (1993) 
examined the impact of different water sources (i.e. piped in the house, a deep well or tap in the 
yard, or a communal source such as a shared well or tap) on residential rental values in the Bicol 
Region, Philippines. Their sample consisted of 1,597 transactions, and they found households 
value an in-house piped water source more highly relative to other characteristics of their homes. 
They also found that households in all income ranges are willing to pay about half their monthly 
imputed rent to have piped water in the house. Vasquez (2013a) examine the impact of different 
forms of water service management (municipal, private, and community-managed) on rental 
prices in urban Guatemala. He used data from 998 households who rented a housing unit from 
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the 2006 Living Standards Measurement Survey. To account for the endogeneity that may arise 
between rental price and household choice of water service, an instrumental variable approach 
was taken. The findings from this study indicate that households assign higher values to 
municipal services (at least $38.92 per month) than to private and community-managed water 
supplies. Other studies utilize similar approaches with different datasets and estimation strategies 
(e.g. Anselin et al., 2010; Vásquez, 2013b; Berg & Nauges, 2012). 
For the second subgroup, early hedonic studies examined the impact of groundwater 
contamination on residential property values and found no significant relationship between water 
quality and residential property prices (Malone & Barrows, 1990; Page & Rabinowitz, 1993; 
Dotzour, 1997). These outcomes have been attributed to the simple and outdated econometric 
identification strategies employed in these studies (Guignet et al., 2016).  
More recently, Case et al. (2006) used a hybrid of hedonic and repeat-sales methods to 
examine the impact of groundwater contamination on residential condominium prices in 
Scottsdale, Arizona. Using data from 13,612 transactions, they found that, on average, properties 
affected by groundwater contamination decreased by 4.7% in value, but only after knowledge of 
the contamination was public. McLaughlin (2011) examined the impact of information level 
regarding groundwater contamination event on residential property values in Washington 
County, Minnesota. He finds that homeowners were initially well-informed about the 
contamination risk but were later somewhat misinformed by a government disclosure law that 
created an imperfect geographic boundary for the contamination areas. He concludes that this 
policy resulted in a negative effect on residential property values within the boundary, even for 
houses that were not actually at risk from groundwater contamination.  
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Another type of study under this subgroup relied on spatial hedonic models to examine 
the impact of groundwater contamination and residential property values. Boyle et al. (2010) 
looked at the impact of arsenic contamination of groundwater on house sale prices and bare land 
transactions in two Maine towns, Buxton and Hollis. They find that the discovery of arsenic 
contamination in 1993 led to significant, but temporary (two years) decreases in property prices. 
More specifically, they find that property values declined by 0.5% to 1% for each 0.01 mg/l of 
arsenic above the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency standards.  
Unlike previous studies that used an aggregate spatial measure for groundwater 
contamination (e.g. at the neighborhood level), Guignet (2013) and Guignet et al. (2016) used a 
specific measure for each property. Guignet (2013) examined the impact of groundwater quality 
on residential property values in three Maryland counties (Baltimore, Frederick, and Baltimore 
City) from 1996 to 2007 using property-specific well water tests. He found that simply testing a 
home’s well for contamination reduced its value by an average of 11%.  A 13% depreciation was 
found when the tests revealed levels of contamination that are higher than the standards. Guignet 
et al. (2016) examined the impact of groundwater quality on property values in Lake County, 
Florida, where pollution concerns relate primarily to agricultural run-off. They found that a 
positive contamination test results in the three years prior to a transaction results, on average, in a 
decline of 2% to 6% in property values. Focusing on nitrogen-based contamination, they found 
that prices decline by 15% when the concentrations exceed the standards.  
For water supply provided by public systems, Des Rosiers et al. (1999) investigated the 
impact of drinking water quality on housing prices. They used data for 800 houses in 
Charlesbourg municipality in Quebec City, Canada between 1990 and 1991, and employed OLS 
to estimate the coefficients. To measure water quality, they used public warnings that were 
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issued during the study period (23 warnings) affecting properties and the warnings duration (in 
days). They grouped these warnings into 17 spatial sectors, each of which experienced one or 
more warnings. They found that house buyers are sensitive to the quality of the water they drink, 
and the problems related to water quality are being capitalized into property values with average 
duration of the warning period per sector as a dominant factor. Also, market segmentation 
suggests that higher price property buyers are much more responsive to this issue, where they 
experienced value losses between 5.2% – 10.3% of mean sale price. 
3.2.2. Boil water notices impact on consumers 
Most of the research related to BWNs concerns the effectiveness of these notices as a tool 
for communicating water-related health risks and how people behave after receiving such a 
notice. In a meta-analysis study, Vedachalam et al. (2016) identified 11 studies over a 30-year 
period that examined public compliance to BWNs. They found that the median compliance rate 
with BWNs for drinking and non-drinking activities in those studies was 68%. Three reasons 
were identified for this non-compliance behavior:  forgetting, not believing the notice, and 
choosing not to boil water. Overall, they conclude that a BWN is an effective tool to 
communicate with the public regarding problems related to the water supply. 
Few studies have used surveys to estimate the costs incurred by consumers when a BWN 
is issued. For example, Laughland et al. (1993) estimated the cost of boiling, hauling, or 
purchasing water to avoid infection caused by drinking water outbreak in the Village of 
Milesburg and surrounding Boggs Township in Pennsylvania in 1989. Using three approaches 
(family income, minimum wage, and zero opportunity cost of time) to the valuation of time, they 
found that mean monthly household averting costs were $33.47 using family income, $13.07 
using minimum wage, and $5.60 using zero opportunity cost of time (in 1989 dollars). More 
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recently, Ailes et al. (2013) estimated the total costs of an outbreak in Alamosa, CO for residents, 
businesses, schools, and health care facilities and governmental plus non-governmental parties in 
2008 to be approximately $2.6 million. Finally, Heflin et al. (2014) improved on the 
methodology used by Ailes et al. (2013) by expanding the cost categories and found that 
economic impacts caused by disruptions in water service in Ithaca, NY and Somerset, MA 
ranged from over $1,400 in savings to a loss of over $1,000 with an overall average of $93.96 
per household. 
Finally, Vedachalam et al. (2014) used a logistic regression model to identify the factors 
that affect the probability of a BWN being issued from water systems located around the 
Mohawk-Hudson watershed during extreme weather event in New York in 2011. Their results 
indicate that the probability of a BWN being issued increase with higher precipitation during the 
storm, high density of septic systems, lack of recent maintenance, and low population density.  
3.2.3. The impact of investments in water infrastructure on economic growth 
Many studies have shown that improvements in water infrastructure have significant 
impacts on economic growth in an area. For example, Janeski and Whitacre (2014) examined the 
long-term economic impacts of USDA water and sewer infrastructure investments in Oklahoma 
and found that median house values increased by 5% to 13% points in communities that obtained 
a water infrastructure project compared to communities without a water infrastructure project. 
McIntosh et al. (2018) also looked at the impact of a large infrastructure investment (including 
water and sewer) experiment implemented in low-income neighborhoods across 60 
municipalities in Mexico. They found that the program increased the aggregate real estate value 
in those neighborhoods by $2 for every $1 spent on the program. Furthermore, water 
infrastructure availability, capacity, and reliability can be sources for regional competitiveness of 
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a region that attract new businesses (Center for Public Management, 2014; Munnell & Cook, 
1990). This attractiveness can be attributed to the fact that water disruptions have a large impact 
on businesses. For example, every day of water service disruption results in average losses of 
about $230 in sales per employee for U.S. businesses (Value of Water Campaign, 2017). 
In terms of the costs of these investments, Bagi (2002) examined the economic costs and 
benefits of water and sewer investments in 54 rural and 33 urban communities across 30 states. 
He found that these investments generate benefits in both rural and urban areas and, on average, 
urban water or sewer facilities cost about 30% more than rural facilities. However, urban 
facilities create about twice the number of permanent jobs, induce three times more private 
investment, leverage twice as much in public funds, and add three times more to the local 
property tax base. He argues that these differences are due to the small size and remoteness of 
rural communities.  
3.2.4. The impact of water supply unreliability on consumers’ risk perceptions 
 Multiple studies have investigated the determinants of consumers’ risk perceptions 
regarding public water supplies. The findings from these studies show that there are various 
factors that affect consumers’ perceptions about public water supply including knowledge about 
water testing results, local experience with water systems, sociocultural beliefs about tap water, 
and the sensory qualities of water, with this final factor being the most important (Doria et al., 
2009; Doria 2010). Other studies focused more on the impact of demographic and 
socioeconomic factors on risk perceptions about public water and found that race, ethnicity, 
nativity, income, age, and education influence individuals’ risk perception of drinking water 
(Pierce & Gonzalez, 2017; Javidi & Pierce, 2018). 
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 Anadu and Harding (2000) looked at the differences in risk perception about public 
drinking water and the use of bottled water in four Oregon communities. They compared 
responses from residents in two communities that have experienced water safety violations with 
responses from residents of two communities that did not have these problems. They found that 
individuals in communities with persistent drinking water problems have higher risk perceptions 
than those individuals in communities with no problems.  
3.3. Theoretical Framework 
The basic framework for hedonic property price model was provided by Rosen (1974), 
where consumers choose between differentiated products with multiple attributes or 
characteristics to maximize their utility. In applying this model to housing markets, let 𝑍 =
(𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑛) be a vector of observable attributes where 𝑧𝑖 measures the amount of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ 
attribute of a house which includes property attributes (such as age, square footage, number of 
bedrooms, etc.), neighborhood attributes (such as distance to schools and highways), and 
environmental attributes.  Water supply unreliability (WSR) is included as a separate attribute 
which combines neighborhood and environmental elements.  Here, we assume that information 
about WSR is obtained by consumers of housing from boil water notices (BWNo) that have been 
issued prior to the sale.  
Assuming a single competitive housing market and full information, the consumer 
decision problem is described as: 
max𝑈〈𝑋, 𝑍,𝑊𝑆𝑅{𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0), 𝐷𝐸[𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)]}〉 (1) 
subject⁡to⁡⁡⁡𝑌 = 𝑋 + 𝑃{𝑍,𝑊𝑆𝑅[𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)]} + 𝐷𝐸[𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)] (2) 
where 𝑋 is the numeraire good, 𝑊𝑆𝑅 is a measure of water supply unreliability which is a 
positively related to consumer expectations as derived 𝐵𝑊𝑁0, 𝑌⁡is income, 𝑃 is the hedonic 
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price schedule, and 𝐷𝐸 represents the associated defensive expenditures incurred (i.e. bottled 
water, water filter, etc.) when the water supply is unreliable so that  
𝑑𝐷𝐸
𝑑𝐵𝑊𝑁𝑜
> 0.   
Furthermore, we assume an expectation function: 
𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0) = 0⁡⁡⁡∀⁡⁡⁡𝐵𝑊𝑁0 ≤ 𝜋𝑖 ⁡ (3) 
𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0) > 0⁡⁡⁡∀⁡⁡⁡𝐵𝑊𝑁0 > 𝜋𝑖 (4) 
where 𝜋𝑖 represents a threshold on the number of BWN that housing consumers use when 
deciding whether water service provided to the house is deemed unreliable. When the number of 
boil water notices issued prior the sale are higher than 𝜋, then expectations of unreliable water 
supply are formed about the impacted property. Water supply unreliability will generate negative 
utility to the consumer leading to a decrease in the price of the house. 
Assuming that 𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0) > 0, then the Lagrangian function and the first order 
conditions are: 
𝐿 = 𝑈〈𝑋, 𝑍,𝑊𝑆𝑅{𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0), 𝐷𝐸[𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)]}〉 +
𝜆〈𝑌 − 𝑋 − 𝑃{𝑍,𝑊𝑆𝑅[𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)]} − 𝐷𝐸[𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)]〉 (5)
 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑍
= 𝜆
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑍
(6) 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
∙
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
𝜕𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)
+⁡
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
∙
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
𝜕𝐷𝐸
∙
𝑑𝐷𝐸
𝑑𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)
= 𝜆 (
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
∙
𝑑𝑊𝑆𝑅
𝑑𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)
+
𝑑𝐷𝐸
𝑑𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)
)⁡(7) 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑋
= 𝜆⁡⁡ (8) 
where 𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Focusing on the condition for 𝑊𝑆𝑅 
and substituting out for 𝜆 we obtain: 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅 ∙
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
𝜕𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)
+
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅 ∙
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
𝜕𝐷𝐸 ∙
𝑑𝐷𝐸
𝑑𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑋⏟                                
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
⁡_ ⁡
𝜕𝐷𝐸
𝜕𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)⏟      
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝐷𝐸
=
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
∙
𝑑𝑊𝑆𝑅
𝑑𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)⏟            
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
(9) 
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Equation (9) shows that, at the optimum, the marginal implicit price of BWN0 from a 
hedonic property price model (RHS) reflects both the marginal rate of substitution between water 
supply unreliability and defensive expenditures in relation to BWN0 and the numeraire good 𝑋 
along with a second term that measures the marginal cost of defensive expenditures associated 
with BWN0 due to water supply unreliability (LHS). 
Rosen (1974) also described the consumer’s maximum ‘bid’ function for a house 
𝜃(𝑍; 𝑈, 𝑌), where utility and income are fixed. This function represents the amount a consumer 
is willing to pay for different attribute vectors for a given utility-income index. Substituting the 
budget constraint into the utility function we obtain: 
𝑈〈𝑌 − 𝜃{𝑍,𝑊𝑆𝑅[𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)]} − 𝐷𝐸[𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)], 𝑍,𝑊𝑆𝑅{𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0), 𝐷𝐸[𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)]}〉 = ?̅?⁡(10) 
If we implicitly differentiate 𝜃(∙) with respect to 𝐵𝑊𝑁0, we obtain: 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅 ∙
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
𝜕𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)
+
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅 ∙
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
𝜕𝐷𝐸 ∙
𝑑𝐷𝐸
𝑑𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑋
−
𝜕𝐷𝐸
𝜕𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)
=
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑊𝑆𝑅
∙
𝑑𝑊𝑆𝑅
𝑑𝐸(𝐵𝑊𝑁0)
⁡(11) 
Combining conditions (9) and (11) we find that the marginal bid or the marginal willingness to 
pay (MWTP) for a housing characteristic is equal to its equilibrium marginal price. The first 
stage hedonic property price function 𝑃(∙) represents an envelope of consumer’s bid functions in 
equilibrium. Therefore, it can be used to obtain the marginal value that consumers place on 
housing attributes. This means that the marginal price of an attribute is equal to the MWTP for 
that attribute (Taylor, 2003). Econometrically, we can obtain the marginal price of any attribute 
by regressing the price of the house on the attributes that we are interested in, in this case being 
WSR. 
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3.4. Study Area and Data 
3.4.1. Study area 
Located in the north central region of West Virginia, Marion County is a largely rural 
county with a population of nearly 56,000 (Figure 3.2). The county encompasses an area of 312 
square miles and contains two cities (Fairmont and Mannington) and nine towns. Fairmont is the 
county’s seat and the most populated city in the county. According to the Census Bureau (2018), 
median household income in Marion County is $48,158, which is about 10% higher than the 
West Virginia median, but 20% lower than the U.S median. There are about 37,753 structures in 
Marion County in which 17% are unserved by public water services (WVIJDC, 2017). Out of 
these structures, there are about 19,839 owner occupied-housing units in Marion County with a 
median value of $110,100 (Census Bureau, 2018). The largest employers in the county are 
Fairmont State University and Fairmont Regional Medical Center.  
One indication of problems with public water supplies is evidenced by water systems 
issuance of a Boil Water Notice (BWN) to alert their customers. A BWN, also known as a Boil 
Water Advisory, is issued when there is an identified or suspected microbial contaminant in the 
water distribution system. A BWN often occurs due to water main breaks. In Marion County, for 
example, water systems reported 255 water main breaks and issued 79 BWNs in 2017. The 
BWN will instruct consumers to boil all water used for drinking, cooking, food preparation, 
brushing teeth, and making ice (Water Quality Research Foundation, 2018).  
 Currently, there are 31 public water systems in Marion County with the city of Fairmont 
Water Department being by far the largest, serving about half of the county’s population (Table 
3.1). About 5% of the county’s population use private wells for their water (U.S. Geological 
Survey [USGS], 2015). In 2017, water systems in Marion County produced nearly 3.1 million 
gallons of treated drinking water but lost about 33.8% of it due to leaks into the water 
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distribution network. Marion County is one of 10 counties in West Virginia that face major 
challenges related to water supply reliability based upon BWNs per 10,000 people (Figure 3.3). 
In addition, about 20% of the county’s population were served by public water systems that 
violated the health-based standards of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Finally, using 
water system’s net income per service connection as a proxy for resources available for the 
system, 19 systems are designated as under-resourced (Table 3.1).  These facts indicate that most 
water systems in Marion County are facing financial difficulties that may restrict service 
improvements and compliance with the SDWA standards.  
3.4.2. Data 
Our analysis is based on two main sources of data. The first is West Virginia Office of 
Environmental Health Services (OEHS). The second is Marion County Assessor. Below is a 
description of these data.  
3.4.2.1. Boil water notices (BWNs) 
To measure water supplier unreliability, we use BWNs issued by either public water 
systems or the Marion County Health Department. The OEHS provides information on all 
BWNs in West Virginia starting from 2012. Between January 2012 and December 2017, the total 
number of BWNs in West Virginia was 6,980 with the annual number almost doubling between 
2012 and 2017 (Figure 3.1). For each notice, the provided information includes: when the notice 
is issued and lifted, the name of the public water system plus its PWSID7, the public health 
sanitation district where the notice is issued, the reason for the notice, and details about the 
                                                          
 
7 PWSID is an identification code that starts with the state’s initials and followed by seven numbers. These codes 
can be used to find more information about the water system (e.g. city and county served, or the source of the 
primary water) in the Safe Drinking Water Information System/Federal Warehouse (SDWIS/Fed). 
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affected areas or street names. Using information from the SDWIS/Fed database and details from 
each notice, we obtained city and county affected by each notice.8  
3.4.2.2. Housing data 
The Marion County Assessor provides data for all residential property sales between 
January 2012 and December 2017. This data set contains 7,972 residential property transactions. 
By dropping all property sales without structures, the number of transactions declined to 5,525. 
To ensure only arm’s length sales in our analysis, a process following Herriges et al. (2005) is 
used to drop all properties that were less than 50% of their assessed values and/or sold for less 
than $5,000. Therefore, after eliminating these sales, the total number of transactions included in 
our analysis is 1,985 single-family residential properties. 
To capture housing attributes previously found in the literature to influence housing 
prices, we include variables for housing characteristics in the hedonic model such as size, story 
height, age, numbers of bedrooms plus bathrooms, and presence of house amenities (e.g. air 
conditioning and fireplace). In addition, we control for two variables that have been consistently 
neglected in hedonic property price models: (1) house physical condition, and (2) material and 
workmanship quality. Based upon assessor data for physical condition, we rank houses from 
Unsound = 1 to Excellent = 6.  For quality, we use the quality grade factor provided by the 
county’s assessor ranging from E = Poor (0.5) to X = Excellent (2.5). These two variables are 
unrelated as the first one only measures the physical condition and the second measures the 
quality of the building regardless of the physical condition.  
                                                          
 
8 Some water systems were not available on SDWIS/Fed, so we used the WV Drinking Water Watch to obtain the 
necessary information. Available at http://129.71.204.189:1977/DWWpublic/index.jsp  
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All property sales are geocoded using house’s street address with ArcGIS to measure 
neighborhood and proximity characteristics such as crime, school quality, distance to Fairmont 
State University, and to the nearest highway interchange9. For crime, we use total crime index 
that compares the average local crime level to that of the entire U.S. (an index of 100 is average). 
This index includes both property and violent crimes for 2010 at the block group level and it is 
obtained from ArcGIS database. For school quality, we follow the literature and use proficiency 
tests as a proxy (Brasington, 1999). Specifically, we use the percentage of students in elementary 
school that scored at or above proficiency levels in math tests. We obtain these shapefiles for 
attendance zones in the county from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and the 
data for math tests from the GreatSchools website. For distance variables, we obtain the 
shapefiles for Fairmont State University and highway interchange locations from the Census 
Bureau TIGER/Line database. 
3.4.2.3. Linking BWNs to house sale observations  
There were 440 BWNs in Marion County between 2012 and 2017, but 90 BWNs could 
not be used due to insufficient information about the affected locations (54 BWNs) or because 
the date when the BWNs were lifted are unavailable (36 BWNs). Thus, the total number of 
BWNs used in the analysis is 350. Then, based upon the details provided for each BWN along 
home addresses for each property transaction, West Virginia Property Viewer was used to 
allocate properties and BWNs among the 22 tax districts in Marion County (Figure 3.4).10 
                                                          
 
9 This variable was included since Fairmont serves a “bedroom” community for the more prosperous communities 
of Morgantown to the north and Clarksburg to the south (Trach 2019) 
10 WV Property Viewer is an online interactive GIS map that provides information on all properties in West Virginia 
and their owners. Also, it provides information on tax district boundaries in each county. 
https://www.mapwv.gov/parcel/  
79 
 
Following this, the details of each BWN are linked to all affected houses based on street 
addresses or affected areas. For example, if a BWN affects Street A and is issued in January 1, 
2014 and lifted on January 5, 2014, houses located at Street A and sold between January 1, 2014 
and January 1, 2015 were assigned the appropriate values for each BWN variable as described 
below.  
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the distribution of property transactions, BWNs, and properties 
affected by BWNs in each tax district in Marion County between 2012 and 2017. Over the entire 
county from 2013 to 2017, about 35% of residential property transactions are affected by a 
BWN, and as expected Fairmont has the largest number of transactions and BWNs. Specifically, 
about 41.6% of the transactions happen in Fairmont with 34% of these transactions being 
affected by BWNs. Table 3.4 provides information about the reasons behind the issuance of 
BWNs in Marion County. About 80% of the BWNs were issued due to breaks or leaks, and it is 
the same in both Fairmont and the rest of the county. We transfer the information in Table 3.2 
into a map (Figure 3.5) showing the locations of the affected and unaffected properties in Marion 
County. As demonstrated in Figure 3.5, problems of water supply reliability are spread across 
Marion County and not limited to a single location.  
 Four variables were used to measure water supply unreliability: (a) number of BWNs 
affecting a sold house a year before its sale date; (b) number of days a sold house is under BWNs 
a year before its sale date; (c) average duration under BWNs a year before a house sale date ((b) 
divided by (a)); and (d) a binary variable indicating that if a sold house is affected by BWN or 
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not for a year prior to its sale date.11 For these variables, property sales from January 1, 2013 to 
December 31, 2017 were used in the analysis and BWNs from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 
2016. Therefore, our analysis will rely on a total of 1,985 observations. 
Table 3.5 provides summary statistics and description for all variables included in the 
analysis. Explanatory variables are grouped into four categories. The first category consists of 
focus variables related to BWNs as proxy measures of water supply unreliability. We expect 
these variables to have negative impacts on housing prices. The second category is structural 
variables that include building characteristics and house amenities. Except for story height, 
construction material, and house age, all the other variables are expected to have positive impacts 
on housing prices. Property variables are the third category.  These include parcel characteristics 
of lot size and fencing with positive impacts and sidewalks with a negative impact since it is 
associated with cleaning responsibilities. Finally, there are neighborhood and proximity 
variables. For crime level and distance variables to highway and a major employer (Fairmont 
State University), negative impacts are expected whereas school quality should have a positive 
impact on housing prices.  
3.5. Empirical Models 
There are four main empirical issues for which hedonic property price theory provides no 
or little guidance. The first is selecting a functional form, the second is geographic coverage of 
the data, the third is dealing with omitted variable bias, and the fourth is spatial dependence.  
                                                          
 
11 Hedonic property models with monthly variables (i.e. number of BWNs and days a month before the sale) also 
were estimated, but the results were statistically insignificant coefficients for BWN variables in all specifications 
and we do not report them here. 
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For the first issue, two main types of functional forms are available: (a) simple choices 
such as linear, log-linear (semi-log), and log-log; and (b) more flexible options include quadratic 
specifications such as Box-Cox transformations and nonparametric approaches (Phaneuf & 
Requate, 2016). In a simulation-based experimental design, Cropper et al. (1988) showed that 
when all housing characteristics are included in the hedonic property price function, linear and 
quadratic forms of the Box-Cox transformations provided the most accurate estimates of the 
marginal implicit prices. However, when some characteristics are unobserved or are replaced by 
proxies, simple forms and linear Box-Cox performed better than the quadratic Box-Cox model. 
Based on these results, researchers in the last 20 years have relied on relatively simple functional 
forms when estimating the hedonic price functions (especially the log-linear form) (Freeman et 
al., 2014; Taylor, 2003, 2008).  
A more recent study by Kuminoff et al. (2010) used the same methodology employed by 
Cropper et al. (1988) but increased the sample size (200 vs 2,000) and focused more on the 
omitted variable bias issue. Overall, they found similar results to Cropper et al. (1988) when 
there are no omitted variables. However, when there are omitted variables and enough variation 
in the variable of interest to permit the use of a combination of spatial fixed effects, quasi-
experimental methods, and temporal controls, their results suggest that the quadratic Box-Cox 
functional form outperforms other simple forms. 
 Since we are not employing a quasi-experimental identification strategy in this study, we 
follow the results found by Cropper et al. (1988) and use a simple functional form. Also, we 
follow the literature and use the log-linear functional form (Taylor, 2003) as it allows the 
housing characteristics to impact the house’s price non-linearly, and unlike the log-log form, is 
more accommodating for the use of binary variables.  
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The second issue arises due to the underlying assumption that the study area under 
consideration represents a single housing market in which all properties are part of the same 
housing market. If the sample consists of properties from different housing markets, then 
estimating one hedonic property price function is inappropriate (Schnare & Struyk, 1976). Thus, 
it is important to make sure that Marion County represents a single housing market (i.e. there are 
no submarkets in our sample) if we were to estimate one hedonic property price model. 
Theoretically, researchers agree on the existence of submarkets, however, in practice there is 
little consensus as to how sub-markets should be identified (Xiao, 2017).  
The most common method to identifying sub-markets involves three main steps 
introduced by Schnare and Struyk (1976) (Keskin & Watkins, 2017). First, data are partitioned to 
delineate potential sub-markets. Second, hedonic property price regressions are estimated for 
each sub-market. Third, statistical techniques, such as Chow test, are used to determine whether 
significant differences exist between the sub-market specific coefficient estimates. For the first 
step, different ways are available to partition the data, but in most cases, researchers use either 
prior knowledge or other information in the data to address this challenge.  
In our case, we are interested to see if there are differences between the city of Fairmont 
and other areas in the county. Thus, residential property transactions are split into two data sets: 
(1) all transactions in Fairmont, and (2) all transactions in the rest of Marion County.  A Chow 
test is used to determine if there are significant differences in regression coefficient estimates 
between Fairmont and the rest of county data. Upon finding no significant difference between 
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the two subsamples12, we proceed to estimate one hedonic property price regression model for 
Marion County.  
For the third issue, as with any regression model, the goal is to balance between the 
variance and bias of the estimates. With inclusion of many variables, multicollinearity may 
result, leading to imprecise estimated coefficients. On the other hand, not including some 
variables may lead to biased estimates due to omitted variable bias (Taylor, 2003). Since it is 
difficult to have a fully specified model with all neighborhood characteristics, most hedonic 
models suffer from the problem of omitted variables. Different studies use varying methods to 
account for the unobservable variables such as spatial fixed effects, quasi-experimental designs, 
and/or repeated sales (Freeman et al., 2014; Kuminoff et al., 2010). Here, we use both spatial and 
year fixed effects to control for unobservable characteristics for different tax districts and for 
different years of house sales. The OLS model is thus written as 
ln(𝑃) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑍 + 𝛼𝑡𝑎𝑥⁡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀⁡ (12) 
 
where ln⁡(𝑃) is the natural log of the transaction price for the property, 𝑍 represents a vector of 
house-related characteristics including the variable of interest related to water supply 
unreliability, 𝛼𝑡𝑎𝑥⁡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 and 𝛾𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 are the tax district and year fixed effects, and 𝜀 is the error 
term. 
The fourth issue is spatial dependence, i.e. the existence of a functional relationship 
between what happens at one location and what happens elsewhere (Anselin, 1988). This issue 
may occur in hedonic property price models when houses in one location are impacted by prices 
or characteristics of nearby houses compared to houses that are farther apart (Anselin & Lozano-
                                                          
 
12 Chow statistic = 2.153, p-value = 0.116 
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Gracia, 2009). Also, spatial dependence may occur in hedonic property price models as a result 
of the presence of common practical issues such as measurement errors in explanatory variables, 
omitted variables, and other forms of model misspecification (Baumont, 2004). Traditional OLS 
hedonic property price models do not consider the spatial dimension of housing price data and 
ignoring spatial dependence may result in biased and inconsistent, or inefficient estimates 
depending on the type of spatial process involved with the model (LeSage & Pace, 2009). 
Therefore, the use of spatial econometric techniques is utilized to address this problem and to 
obtain reliable estimates of the coefficients plus standard errors.  
Two common models are used to incorporate spatial dependence into empirical hedonic 
property price models: spatial lag and spatial error specifications (Anselin & Lozano-Gracia, 
2009). The spatial lag model (SLM) accounts for spatial dependence by introducing a spatially 
lagged dependent variable (a weighted average of observations on the dependent variable in 
neighboring locations) into the model, whereas the spatial error model (SEM) includes a spatially 
correlated error term. Following Anselin (1988), a general model of housing price determination 
including both spatial effects can be written as: 
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑃) = 𝜌𝑊1𝑙𝑛(𝑃) + 𝑍𝐵 + 𝜀 
𝜀 = 𝜆𝑊2𝜀 + 𝜇⁡ (13) 
𝜇⁡~⁡𝑁(0, 𝜎2𝐼) 
where⁡ln⁡(𝑃) is the natural log of sale price, 𝑍 is a 𝑁 × 𝐾 matrix of property characteristics, 𝐵 is 
a 𝐾 × 1 vector of coefficients, 𝑊1 and 𝑊2 are 𝑁 ×𝑁 spatial weight matrices associated with 
autoregressive process in house prices and in the error term, 𝜀 is a 𝑁 × 1 spatial autoregressive 
error, 𝜇 is a 𝑁 × 1 normally distributed random error term with a zero mean and variance 𝜎2, and 
𝜌 and 𝜆 are coefficients on the spatially lagged variables, ln⁡(𝑃) and 𝜀. In equation (13), 𝜌, 𝐵, 
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and 𝜆 are estimated and 𝑊1 and 𝑊2 are chosen by the researcher based on the research objective 
and the data. If 𝜌 and 𝜆 are estimated to be statistically equal to zero, then equation (13) reduces 
to the classical linear regression model with no spatial effects. When 𝜌 ≠ 0, then the model will 
include a spatial lag specification and when 𝜆 ≠ 0, then the model will include a spatial error 
specification.  
Since the spatial lag model includes a spatially lagged dependent variable among the 
explanatory variables, the regression coefficients from this model cannot be interpreted as simple 
partial derivatives.  Therefore, special interpretation is required that takes into account the spatial 
spillovers in the model (Golgher & Voss, 2016). Basically, with spatial lag models, not only are 
we able to observe the impact of a variation in 𝑧𝑖 on⁡𝑃 for house 𝑖, but also the impact on 𝑃 
observed for other houses (for details, see LeSage & Pace (2009)). Therefore, using this model, 
three summary measures of effects are obtained: (1) the direct effect representing the average 
impact of a one unit change in 𝑧𝑖 on 𝑃 for house 𝑖; (2) the indirect effect representing the average 
impact of a one unit change in 𝑧𝑖 on 𝑃 for neighboring houses; and (3) the total effect showing 
the average total impact of a one unit increase in 𝑧𝑖 on all houses (direct plus indirect effects).  
 In choosing between SLM and SEM, empirical research utilizing spatial hedonic property 
price models rely on a data-driven approach as provided by Anselin (1988), also known as the 
forward specification analysis.13 In this specification search, an OLS model is first estimated, 
then two Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics and their robust forms are used to test the OLS 
residuals for the presence of spatial dependence in the lag and error terms. Based on the results 
                                                          
 
13 Florax et al. (2003) compared the two methods of specification searches in spatial econometrics (forward vs 
backward specification analyses) and found that forward specification analysis outperforms the backward method in 
terms of finding the true data generating process as well as in the observed accuracy of the estimators for spatial and 
non-spatial parameters. 
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of these tests, an appropriate model is then selected. Most hedonic studies have followed this 
approach (e.g. Kim et al., 2003; Anselin et al., 2010; Boyle et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017).  
Another important decision to be made before testing for spatial dependence is what 
specification to use for the spatial weight matrix 𝑊.  A spatial weight matrix defines the 
relationship between neighbors in the model (i.e. how the value in one location in the system is 
affected by the values in other locations). This relationship can either be based on distance or 
contiguity between observations (Anselin, 2001). More formally, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 1 when 𝑖 and 𝑗 are 
adjacent neighbors, and 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise. There is no formal guidance on the choice of spatial 
weight matrix since it depends on the available data and researcher preference.  
In this research, a distance-based spatial weight matrix is appropriate because we are 
using point coordinates to indicate the location of each house. Common approaches to defining a 
spatial weight matrix based on distance are: nearest neighbor, cutoff distance, and nearest 
neighbor within a cutoff distance. We use K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) weights, in which all 
observations have the same numbers of neighbors (K) irrespective of distance. This method is 
recommended to avoid the possibility of islands (i.e. observations without neighbors), which 
may result in loss of degrees of freedom since all unconnected observations will be eliminated in 
the spatial model (Anselin & Bera, 1998). Also, this type of spatial weight matrix has been used 
frequently in other hedonic studies (e.g. Mueller & Loomis, 2008; Pandit et al., 2013; Netusil et 
al., 2014; Liu et al., 2017). For the number of neighbors K, we follow LeSage and Pace (2009) 
and we choose the number that maximizes the value of a log-likelihood function. The LM tests 
for spatial dependence indicate that the SLM is the more appropriate specification (Table 3.6). 
Moreover, using the log-likelihood function criterion, we find that using five nearest neighbors 
result in the maximum log-likelihood value.  
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Finally, BWNs in our data are not equally distributed across housing price transactions 
(Table 3.7).  On average, properties transacted at the lower price quantiles experience more 
water supply reliability problems compared to the properties sold at the higher price quantiles. 
Therefore, we extend our analysis and look at the impact of water supply unreliability across the 
price distribution instead of assessing its impact with a focus on the mean. As explained below, a 
quantile regression approach is utilized to accomplish this analysis. This approach also will be 
used to estimate a threshold value 𝜋 discussed in section 3.3. 
3.5.1. Quantile regression 
The two models discussed above (OLS and SLM) specify the change in the conditional 
mean of the housing price associated with a change in the housing characteristics 𝑧𝑖. We extend 
our analysis and employ quantile regression approach (see Koenker & Bassett, 1978; Koenker & 
Hallock, 2001; Hao & Naiman, 2007) to examine the impact of housing characteristics at 
different points (quantiles) across the distribution of housing prices. Unlike OLS, quantile 
regression specifies changes in the conditional quantile, which allows us to observe how housing 
characteristics are valued differently by consumers of housing at different price ranges.   
Using equation (12) as a reference, quantile regression model is expressed as: 
ln(𝑃) = 𝛽0(𝜏) + 𝛽𝑍(𝜏) + 𝜀 (𝜏)⁡ (14) 
where 0 < 𝜏 < 1 indicates the proportion of the population having scores below the quantile at 
𝜏, i.e. the corresponding quantile of housing price distribution and 𝛽 are the quantile-specific 
parameters to be estimated. Similar to equation (14), the spatial quantile lag model is expressed 
as: 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ln(𝑃) = 𝜌(𝜏)𝑊 ln(𝑃) + 𝑍𝐵(𝜏) + 𝜀(𝜏)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(15) 
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which will result in estimates based on the conditional quantile and take account of the spatial 
effect at the same time.  
To estimate the spatial quantile model, two-stage quantile regression approach proposed 
by Kim and Muller (2004) is used to account for the endogeneity in the spatially lagged variable. 
In the first stage, the spatially lagged exogenous variables 𝑊𝑍 and 𝑍 are used to predict the 
spatially lagged endogenous variable 𝑊 ln(𝑃) at an individual quantile. The predicted 𝑊 ln(𝑃)̂ , 
is substituted for 𝑊 ln(𝑃) in the spatial lag model to eliminate the correlation between the 
spatially lagged endogenous variable and the error term. Then, the second stage regression for 
that quantile is performed to obtain 𝜌(𝜏) and 𝛽(𝜏). This two-stage procedure is then repeated for 
each quantile. 
3.6. Results 
An overview of the models estimated is shown in Figure 3.6.  The discussion in this 
section will focus on the important findings with results of all models estimated reported in 
Appendices A through D. Table 3.8 reports OLS regression model results for each of the four 
BWN variables with spatial (tax district) and year fixed effects.14 Overall, there are statistically 
significant, negative impacts found for BWN variables during the sale or in the year prior to the 
sale on residential property values.15 The magnitude of the coefficients ranges from -0.0065 to -
0.1904, meaning that a one unit change in BWNs as an indicator of unreliable water supply can 
depreciate housing prices between 0.65% and 19%, depending upon how unreliability is 
                                                          
 
14 As a robustness check we also estimated the models with census block groups spatial fixed effects with the results 
being similar to the tax district fixed effects. These model results are shown in Appendix Table 1A. 
15 To ensure that BWNs variables are not picking up impacts related to rural areas, we examined separate models for 
Fairmont only vs other areas (i.e. urban vs rural). The results are consistent between both models and are reported in 
Appendix  Tables 2A and 3A. 
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measured (i.e. in either days, BWN episodes, or presence versus absence). Examining the other 
control variables, we see that most of them have statistically significant impacts with the 
expected signs. Among all variables, the quality grade factor has the largest impact on house sale 
prices with a coefficient estimate of about 0.48. However, these OLS coefficient estimates results 
are likely to be biased as discussed in section 3.5.  
 Table 3.9 shows the regression results from the four spatial lag models. All estimates for 
the spatial autoregressive coefficient (𝜌) are positive and statistically significant, meaning that a 
positive spatial similarity exists between residential property sale prices. To interpret the results 
from the spatial lag model, we report the direct, indirect, and total effects for the four BWN 
variables in Table 3.10.16 A Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) estimation procedure 
involving 1,000 draws is used to calculate the standard errors and p-values for these effects. 
Examining the average direct effects of the variables, they are similar to the estimated 
coefficients from Table 3.8 in terms of sign and statistical significance, but with a lower 
magnitude as expected.  
For interpretation, we examine the direct impact from the BWNs_year variable.  This 
impact is that the issuance of one more BWN, on average, depreciates residential property values 
by 7%. In addition, the average indirect effect from this additional issuance of a BWN will result 
in a 1.3% decrease in value of the neighboring properties. One more day under a BWN during 
the year prior to the sale date has the smallest impact on residential property values with a less 
than 1% decrease for an additional day of BWN. However, the average duration of BWNs (i.e. 
number of days divided by number of BWNs in the past year) has a much larger magnitude, such 
                                                          
 
16 See Appendix B for the full models. 
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that a one day increase in the average duration will result, on average, in a 2.7% decrease in 
house value and 0.6% decline in the neighboring property values. Finally, the results from the 
last variable (BWN) show that regardless of the number of BWNs or number of days under 
BWNs, being simply affected by a BWN is estimated to depreciate housing prices by 18% and 
neighboring residential prices by 3.5%.  
Examining the results reported in Appendix Tables 1B through 4B, core housing 
characteristics that have statistically significant coefficients with their expected signs include:  
square footage, physical condition, building quality, age of house, number of bedrooms, and 
other property amenities such as the presence of AC, fire place, basement garage, and fence.  
These results are in line with what other studies have found using hedonic property price models 
for residential properties (e.g. Pandit et al., 2013; McLaughlin, 2011). Similar to OLS coefficient 
results, building quality has the largest effect on housing price. Houses built with Alum/Vinyl 
materials and older houses, on average, have lower prices. For indirect effects, these variables 
have similar signs and statistical significance but with much smaller magnitudes indicating that 
similar houses will have similar characteristics. 
To examine the changing impact of water supply unreliability over the distribution of 
housing prices, quantile regression model results are reported for BWN variables from spatial 
quantile regressions (Table 3.11). To facilitate the interpretation of these coefficient estimates, 
quantile level estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented in Figure 3.7. The 
straight lines represent the estimates of the 2SLS model, which show the average impact of water 
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supply unreliability on housing values.17  Focusing on coefficients that are statistically different 
from zero, it is clear from Figure 3.7 and Table 3.11 that water supply unreliability has more 
negative impacts on house sales at the lower quantiles of the house price distribution compared 
to houses priced at the high quantiles. For example, the BWNs_year variable has negative, 
statistically significant impacts for quantiles 0.1 to 0.6, but no statistically significant impacts at 
quantiles 0.7 or greater (Table 3.11).  
 Finally, we examine the valuation of water supply unreliability computed using the 
estimates from the first-stage hedonic property price model. As mentioned in the section 3.3, the 
marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) is defined as the derivative of the hedonic price 
equilibrium equation with respect to the characteristics of interest. Following Muller and Loomis 
(2008) and Anselin et al. (2010), the MWTP from the OLS model equals the estimated 
coefficient for the BWN variable multiplied by the price, or 
𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆 =
𝜕 ln 𝑃(𝑍)
𝜕𝑧𝑖
= ?̂??̅?⁡ (16) 
 
where ?̂? is the coefficient and ?̅? is the mean housing price.  For the SLM, the total effect consists 
of coefficient and a spatial multiplier because impacts from a change in one household’s water 
supply unreliability spills over to neighbors. This spatial multiplier effect needs to be accounted 
for to accurately compute the MWTP. Following Kim et al. (2003), we calculate the SLM 
MWTP for a change in BWNs variables as: 
𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝐿𝑎𝑔 =
𝜕 ln 𝑃(𝑍)
𝜕𝑧𝑖
= ?̂??̅? (
1
1 − ?̂?
) (17) 
 
                                                          
 
17 There are two common ways to estimate spatial lag models: (1) using maximum likelihood or (2) two-stage least 
squares. Table 3.9 shows the results using the first method, whereas Table 3.11 shows the results from the second 
method. 
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where ?̂? is the estimated spatial autoregressive coefficient. It is important to note that these 
marginal benefits estimates represent a capitalized rather than the annual impact from water 
supply unreliability. As such, the marginal benefit estimates are influenced both by the length of 
time the buyer of the house expects to reside in the house, the amount the buyer expects to 
receive for this attribute when he sells the house, the discount rate, and the projected 
improvements in water infrastructure. Table 3.12 shows the MWTP calculations for the BWN 
variables with statistically significant coefficients from the estimated spatial models. As it can be 
seen, on average, the MWTP for improving water supply reliability ranges from $1,160 to 
$35,116 depending upon how unreliability is measured – in either days, BWN episodes, or 
presence versus absence. 
Since the number of days in which the house is expected to be under BWNs over a year 
represents a clear and known marginal change, we use it as the preferred measure for water 
supply unreliability. Thus, by reducing the expected number of BWN by one day per year per 
house, the total effect of this change, on average, would be an improvement by $1,160 in housing 
prices when including the impacted house itself and its neighbors. This impact represents 0.86% 
of the average house price in Marion County.  
Furthermore, we see that the MWTP values for consumers of low-price houses are 
greater than consumers of high-price houses. That is, a reduction of one day under BWN per year 
will increase housing prices at the lower end of the housing price distribution by $2,100 to 
$2,700, whereas houses at the mid-range of the distribution will increase by $850 to $1,000 
(Table 3.12). Houses at the 0.7 quantile and above of the price distribution show no statistically 
significant impacts from the days of BWN variable.   
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We interpret these results to mean that these differences stem from differing risk 
perceptions and awareness about public water supply problems between housing consumers. 
Previous studies have shown that consumers who experience more problems with their water 
supply perceive the associated health risks differently and are were willing to pay more to fix 
water supply problems than those consumers who experience water supply problems 
infrequently (Anadu & Harding, 2000; Genius & Tsagarakis, 2006). Thus, the quantile 
regression results indicate the existence of a threshold for BWN of perhaps one day of BWN per 
year. If the average BWN is greater than one day per year, then expectations of reduced water 
supply reliability are included in housing prices. Below this average, then expectations for water 
supply reliability are such that the house purchaser MWTP for improving water supply reliability 
is zero as very few houses under one day per year experience water reliability issues.  
Overall, water supply unreliability has a substantial impact on the value of residential 
properties in Marion county. To calculate the aggregate MWTP for a one-day reduction of BWN, 
three factors are multiplied together: (1) the average value of statistically significant coefficients 
from the spatial quantile regression, (2) the average percentage of households that would be 
expected to be affected by BWN in Marion County between 2013-2017 (35%), and (3) from the 
quantile regression results, only 40% of the houses would incur a price impact from these 
notices.  Following this procedure, we obtain an aggregate MWTP value of $4.60 million for a 
one-day reduction of the annual BWN throughout Marion County. It is important to note that this 
is a large improvement in terms of BWNs if we look at the average of 1.4 days in Table 3.5. 
3.7. Conclusions 
Aging water infrastructure combined with funding shortfalls represent serious challenges 
to local governments and water systems across the United States. The number of water main 
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breaks has been increasing every year resulting in more interruptions in public water service 
(Folkman 2018). Since achieving full reliability in water service is most likely not an optimal 
policy, decision makers at local water utilities attempt to balance between cost and risk 
associated with their policies (Howe et al., 1994). However, water customers’ perceptions of the 
risk associated with supply disruptions is usually unknown to decision makers. Therefore, studies 
have attempted to examine the WTP for water supply reliability using stated preference 
approaches (Genius & Tsagarakis, 2006; Vásquez & Espaillat, 2016).  
In this research, we examine the impact of water supply unreliability on single-family, 
residential property sales in Marion County, WV using spatial and non-spatial hedonic property 
price models. To measure the impact of water supply unreliability, we define four variables 
based on issuance of boil water notices (BWNs) one year prior to the sale and link them to house 
sale transactions. Our analysis is based on 1,985 housing transactions and 350 BWNs throughout 
the county between 2012-2017. Important factors that affect observed house prices are controlled 
for including house size, age, number of bedrooms plus bathrooms, construction quality, and 
presence of house amenities (air conditioning, fireplace, and fence). In addition, ArcGIS is used 
to measure neighborhood and proximity characteristics such as school quality and distance to the 
nearest highway interchange. Finally, our models include fixed effects for both time and tax 
district.  
We find that there are statistically significant, negative impacts on house prices from 
prior issuances of BWNs. Depending upon the model and how unreliability is measured, BWNs 
can depreciate housing prices at the margin from 0.57% to 18%. Furthermore, by using a 
quantile regression approach, we find that water supply unreliability has a larger impact on low-
price houses compared to high-price houses. Based on what we would judge as the best estimate 
95 
 
of water supply unreliability, the marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for a reduction in one 
day under a BWN per year will increase housing values at the lower end of the housing price 
distribution by $2,100 to $2,700, whereas houses at the mid-range of the distribution will 
increase by $850 to $1,000. However, house transactions at the higher end of the housing price 
distribution show no statistically significant impacts from the days of BWN variable.   
The results from the quantile regression models can be interpreted as an inconvenience 
measure, where consumers will be willing to pay to fix water supply reliability problems until a 
certain threshold in which after that point their MWTP will be zero. Our results indicate that 
consumers’ MWTP will be positive if the house is expected to experience, on average, one day 
or more under BWNs annually. Since many houses in Marion County (particularly lower priced 
houses) experience more than one day of BWNs, water supply unreliability has a substantial 
impact on the value of residential properties in this county.  Aggregated throughout Marion 
County, a MWTP value of $4.60 million is computed for a one-day reduction of the annual 
BWN. 
Comparing our BWN impact estimate to the results found by Des Rosiers et al. (1999), 
these authors found a larger magnitude of impact for the measure (Duration BWNs_year). We 
find that reducing the average duration of BWNs by one day per year will result, on average, in 
about a 3% improvement in housing prices, whereas Des Rosiers et al. found that this same 
change led to a 5% to 10% improvement in upper priced houses. This difference is to be 
expected since we are using a larger sample size and different methodology of linking BWNs to 
sale observations. For linking BWNs to sale observations, they used aggregated measures and 
grouped the BWNs into multiple ‘spatial sectors’ where each of them had one or more warnings 
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and any house that was located in those sectors was considered having problems with water 
quality. On the other hand, we use specific measure for each house as explained in section 4. 
Our estimates indicate that some households in Marion County have a positive MWTP 
for a greater reliability in their water supply. The aggregated value of MWTP to reduce BWN of 
$4.60 million may help to guide water systems in their decisions regarding water pricing and 
investments in the water distribution network. In addition, since an unreliable water supply has a 
negative impact on property valuation and therefore property tax revenues collected by the 
county. Thus, these estimates can help inform water infrastructure investments at the local 
government level. In addition to these impacts, as discussed in the literature review, studies have 
shown that improvements in water infrastructure have positive and significant impacts on 
economic growth in an area and, in general, these investments generate benefits in both urban 
and rural areas.  
 Finally, it is important to note, however, that our findings reflect the specific nature of 
our data. The area of study is a relatively small geographical area. Also, due to missing data we 
had to drop a relatively large number of BWNs (90) from our analysis.  In addition, when 
allocating BWNs to house sale observations, most BWNs affect one or multiple streets in 
addition to surrounding areas. Due to limited knowledge, we were unable to include those 
surrounding areas in our analysis.  Therefore, not all house sale transactions affected by BWN 
were included in this analysis so that our monetary estimates of BWN impacts should be 
regarded as conservative.  
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3.9. Tables and Figures 
Figure 3.1. Total number of boil water notices in West Virginia between 2012 and 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
Figure 3.2. Study area – Marion County, West Virginia 
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Figure 3.3. Average number of boil water notices per 10,000 by County between 2012 and 2017 (WV Office of Environmental Health 
Services [OEHS], 2019) 
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Figure 3.4. Tax districts in Marion County 
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Figure 3.5. Residential property transactions affected by boil water notices in Marion County, West Virginia between 2012 and 2017 
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Figure 3.6. Schematic of the models estimated in the analysis 
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Figure 3.7.  Spatial quantile model coefficients for BWN variables and their 95% confidence 
intervals 
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Table 3.1. Public water systems serving residential areas in Marion County, West Virginia 2017 
PWS Name City Served 
Population  
Served 
Service 
Connections  
# BWNs  
# Health 
based 
Violations 
Water 
Pumped into 
Distrubtion 
System (gal) 
Water Lost 
(accounted for) * 
Water Lost 
(unaccounted for)** 
Water 
Main 
Break
s 
Water 
Charge 
($/4,500 gal) 
Net 
Income/Service 
Connections ($) 
City of Fairmont Fairmont 29,179 13,457 36 0 2,067,884 46,718 (2.26) 737,293 (35.65) 127 39.92 62.41 
Valley Falls PSD Fairmont 4,027 1,699 5 1 96,041 0 26,730 (27.83) 0 44.31 31.18 
Monongah Water Works Monongah 3,214 1,418 5 1 227,579 19,820 (8.71) 98,200 (43.15) 26 49.82 -334.41 
Tri-County Water Association - Fairmont Bridgeport 2,522 1,080 2 1 89,199 0 20,811 (23.33)   45.59 -134.49 
Little Creek PSD Fairmont 2,029 900 1 0 71,487 0 23,057 (32.25) 0 40.01 -130.71 
City of Mannington  Mannington 2,003 936 2 0 98,358 430 (0.44) 10,694 (10.87) 1 43.76 3.72 
Monumental PSD Fairmont 1,946 825 3 0 54,193 6,200 (11.44) 10,958 (20.22) 13 54.32 -23.18 
Rivesville Water System Rivesville 1,372 616 6 0 33,634 45 (0.13) 8,050 (23.93) 3 44.73 -56.99 
Paw Paw Route 19 PSD Morgantown 1,249 536 1 2 34,247 0 13,005 (37.97) 0 66.53 -75.03 
Grant Town Water System *** Grant Town 1,240 524 1 0             
Bingamon PSD Wyatt 1,213 538 3 0 47,361 1,827 (3.86) 19,163 (40.46) 21 45.53 -53.49 
Ice's Run PSD Fairmont 1,109 486 1 0 29,393 3,848 (13.09) 4,710 (16.02) 9 54.67 -45.20 
Downs PSD Fairmont 1,007 450 2 0 31,041 5,250 (16.91) 5,783 (18.63) 10 57.93 132.91 
Fairview Water System Fairview 806 357 2 0 28,314 796 (2.81) 8,607 (30.40) 1 62.50 -471.13 
Farmington Water Farmington 692 208 1 0 19,642 0 3,877 (19.74) 0 50.21 -82.32 
Montana Water Association Fairmont 692 301 1 0 16,973 0 3,292 (19.40) 1 54.94 14.54 
Worthington Municipal Water Worthington 680 299 1 0 24,559 2,273 (9.26) 1,276 (5.20) 4 34.97 -134.50 
Mannington PSD Mannington 590 249 1 0 48,118 10,102 (20.99) 8,057 (16.74) 31 71.69 -174.98 
Sugar Lane Water Association Rivesville 410 84 1 0 3,774 150 (3.97) 244 (6.47) 0 54.84 -89.76 
Four States PSD *** Worthington 380 160 2 0             
Hutchinson Community Water Association Worthington 370 157 0 0 38,940 0 31,845 (81.78) 5 24.55 -54.73 
Minister's Run Water Association Rivesville 348 147 1 1 9,967 0 3,938 (39.51) 0 49.01 17.01 
Mannington PSD - Logansport Mannington 310 131 0 0             
Mannington PSD - Metz Mannington 232 98 0 0             
Lincoln Heights Improvement Association Farmington 197 84 0 0 1,507 0 289 (19.18) 2 50.93 34.32 
Coon's Run PSD Shinnston 178 75 1 0 25,501 0 7,466 (29.28) 1 43.52 141.37 
Monumental PSD - Chesapeake Fairmont 133 56 0 0             
Tri-County Water Association - Shinnston Bridgeport 122 51 0 1             
Little Laurel Run Improvement Association Farmington 73 30 0 0 2,531 0 284 (11.22) 0 40.37 -87.77 
Rayford Acres *** Fairmont 71 30 0 0             
Sunny View Acres Water Project Farmington 69 29 0 1 888 0 28 (3.15) 0 49.73 -19.17 
  Total 58,463 26,011 79 8 3,101,131 97,459 (3.14%) 1,047,657 (33.78%) 255     
* Include: (a) mains, plant, filters, flushing, etc; (b) fire department use; (c) main leaks; (d) backwashing; and (e) blowing setting basins. 
** Due to leaks in the water distribution system (non-revenue water) 
*** reports are unavilable; empty cells indicate missing data 
Systems with multiple branches prepare only one report for their water and cost statistics (e.g. Tri-County and Mannington PSD). 
Percentage of total in parentheses 
Sources: Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS/Fed); WV Office of Environmental Health Services (OEHS); WV Drinking Water Watch; WV Public Service Commission 
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Table 3.2. Property transactions and boil water notices by tax districts in Marion County, West 
Virginia between 2012 and 2017 
Number District 
Property  
Transactions 
BWNs 
Properties Affected  
by BWNs 
1 BARRACKVILLE 53 4 30 (56.6) 
2 FAIRMONT DISTRICT 78 20 23 (29.5) 
3 FAIRMONT CITY ** 485 51 138 (28.5) 
4 GRANT ANNEX ** 136 20 45 (33.1) 
5 UNION CITY ** 177 11 34 (19.2) 
6 WINFIELD CITY ** 28 4 21 (75) 
7 FAIRVIEW 9 3 1 (11.1) 
8 FARMINGTON 14 5 10 (71.4) 
9 GRANT DISTRICT 236 20 32 (13.6) 
10 GRANT TOWN 19 2 12 (63.2) 
11 LINCOLN DISTRICT 133 37 69 (51.9) 
12 MANNINGTON DISTRICT 17 3 11 (64.7) 
13 MANNINGTON CITY  75 7 59 (78.7) 
14 MONONGAH-GRANT * 24 0 14 (58.3) 
15 MONONGAH-LINCOLN * 19 0 12 (63.2) 
16 PAW PAW DISTRICT 59 31 41 (69.5) 
17 RIVESVILLE 50 24 37 (74) 
18 UNION DISTRICT 113 12 29 (25.7) 
19 WINFIELD DISTRICT 86 11 22 (25.6) 
20 WORTHINGTON 5 1 4 (80) 
21 WHITE HALL 25 2 11 (44) 
22 PLEASANT VALLEY 144 17 45 (31.3) 
  Multiple Districts - 65 - 
  Total 1,985 350 700 (35.3) 
* BWNs that affect districts 14 and 15 usually affect other districts as well 
** Part of Fairmont City 
Percentage of total in parentheses 
 
Table 3.3. Property transactions and boil water notices in Fairmont City vs. rest of the county  
Area 
Property  
Transactions 
BWNs 
Properties  
Affected by BWNs 
Fairmont City 826 (41.6) 86 (24.6) 238 (34) 
Other 1,159 (58.4) 264 (75.4) 462 (66) 
Total 1,985 (100) 350 (100) 700 (100) 
Percentage of total in parentheses     
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Table 3.4. Reasons for issuing a BWN in Marion County 
Reason 
  Marion County   Fairmont   Rest of the county 
  
Number of 
BWNs 
Percentage of 
total 
  
Number of 
BWNs 
Percentage of 
total 
  
Number of 
BWNs 
Percentage of 
total 
Break or leak   279 79.7%   69 80.2%   210 79.5% 
     Water main break/repair   90 25.7%   22 25.6%   68 25.8% 
     Water line break/repair   171 48.9%   47 54.7%   124 47.0% 
     Water leak   18 5.1%   0 0%   18 6.8% 
Water valve repair   9 2.6%   5 5.8%   4 1.5% 
Fire hydrant replacement   13 3.7%   7 8.1%   6 2.3% 
Low chlorine   9 2.6%   0 0%   9 3.4% 
Maintenance and 
improvements 
  25 7.1%   3 3.5%   22 8.3% 
Unspecified/missing   15 4.3%   2 2.3%   13 4.9% 
Total   350 100%   86 100%   264 100% 
Note that all of the 65 BWNs that affect multiple districts were accounted under rest of the county even if some of them affect parts of Fairmont.  
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Table 3.5. Summary statistics and variable descriptions 
Variable Description Unit Average Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Dependent variable         
House price House's sale price  $ 135,338 81,082 6,000 650,000 
  Independent variables         
Focus variables             
BWNs_year Number of BWNs affecting the house a year before the sale Number 0.46 0.85 0 13 
Days BWNs_year Number of days the house was under BWNs a year before the sale Days 1.40 5.52 0 116 
Duration BWNs_year Average duration under BWNs a year before the sale  Days 0.94 2.40 0 35 
BWN  1 = if the house was affected by a BWN, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Structural variables         
SQFT Building area in square feet ft2 1,645.45 658.89 480 5,488 
Story height Story height  Number 1.27 0.42 1 3 
Construction material Material used in construction, 1 = if the material uesed is Alum/Vinyl, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Physical condition Physical condition of the house (1-6, 1 = Unsound, 6 = Excellent) Number 4.75 0.82 1 6 
Quality grade factor Quality of the material and workmanship (0.5-2.5, 0.5 = E, 2.5 = X+) Number 8.37 2.69 2 18 
Age Age of the house Years 63 36 0 167 
Bedrooms Number of bedrooms  Number 2.80 0.76 1 12 
Total Bathrooms Total number of bathrooms (full + half) Number 1.88 0.81 1 6 
AC Heating system with AC, 1 = Central with A/C, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Fire place 1 = if there is a wood burning fire place, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Basement garage 1 = if there is basement garage, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Property variables         
Lot size Lot size  Acres 0.96 5.30 0.01 130.28 
Sidewalk 1 = if there is a sidewalk, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Fence 1 = if there is a fence around the property, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Neighborhood and proximity variables         
Crime Total crime index Number 54.05 24.28 19 101 
School quality Percentage of students scoring at or above proficiency levels in the math test % 48.91 14.26 29 71 
Distance to highway exit Distance to the nearest highway interchange (I-79) Miles 2.63 2.68 0.09 17.47 
Distance to FSU Distance to Fairmont State University Miles 3.19 2.57 0.14 17.30 
Observations = 1,985             
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Table 3.6. Lagrange Multiplier (LM) diagnostics for spatial dependence 
Test Statistic P-value 
LM Error 48.3510 0.0000 
LM Lag 73.7100 0.0000 
Robust LM Error 3.1320 0.0768 
Robust LM Lag 28.4910 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7. BWN variables means by price quantile 
Price quantile BWNs_year Days BWNs_year 
Duration 
BWNs_year 
BWN 
31,928.37 1.122 4.694 2.826 0.811 
59,863.85 0.568 1.907 1.621 0.471 
81,285.8 0.383 0.890 0.676 0.313 
102,267.1 0.457 1.314 0.788 0.319 
124,880.6 0.406 0.995 0.623 0.301 
144,610.7 0.401 1.185 0.614 0.291 
167,371.4 0.338 0.540 0.427 0.268 
210,602 0.268 0.549 0.466 0.228 
301,112.6 0.204 0.505 0.376 0.162 
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Table 3.8. OLS regression results, tax district and year fixed effects are included (dependent variable is 
ln (P)) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
BWNs_year -0.0741***       
  (0.0172)       
Days BWNs_year   -0.0065**     
    (0.0031)     
Duration BWNs_year     -0.0280***   
      (0.0067)   
BWN       -0.1904*** 
        (0.0235) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0310 -0.0305 -0.0316 -0.0321 
  (0.0277) (0.0279) (0.0276) (0.0272) 
Construction material -0.0565*** -0.0541*** -0.0528*** -0.0567*** 
  (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0179) 
Physical condition 0.2153*** 0.2216*** 0.2203*** 0.2075*** 
  (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0181) 
Quality grade factor 0.4787*** 0.4809*** 0.4749*** 0.4743*** 
  (0.0760) (0.0771) (0.0765) (0.0742) 
Age -0.0016*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0015*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Bedrooms 0.0307* 0.0310* 0.0331** 0.0326** 
  (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0156) 
Total Bathrooms 0.0152 0.0172 0.0216 0.0147 
  (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0182) 
AC 0.1844*** 0.1831*** 0.1817*** 0.1847*** 
  (0.0247) (0.0248) (0.0246) (0.0243) 
Fire place 0.1162*** 0.1164*** 0.1182*** 0.1178*** 
  (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0194) 
Basement garage 0.0433** 0.0427** 0.0434** 0.0407** 
  (0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0183) 
Lot size 0.0077** 0.0076** 0.0076** 0.0078** 
  (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0033) 
Sidewalk -0.0509 -0.0502 -0.0510 -0.0482 
  (0.0387) (0.0392) (0.0390) (0.0381) 
Fence 0.0908*** 0.0945*** 0.0925*** 0.0879*** 
  (0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0184) 
Crime -0.0012* -0.0011* -0.0011* -0.0013** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
School quality 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Distance to highway exit 0.0176 0.0182 0.0161 0.0144 
  (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0136) 
Distance to FSU -0.0106 -0.0109 -0.0092 -0.0075 
  (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0116) 
Constant 9.4583*** 9.3641*** 9.4009*** 9.5381*** 
  (0.1449) (0.1460) (0.1425) (0.1383) 
          
Observations 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 
R-squared 0.7060 0.7013 0.7067 0.7132 
Adj R-squared 0.6993 0.6946 0.7000 0.7067 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 3.9. Spatial lag model results (dependent variable is ln (P)) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
BWNs_year -0.0668***       
  (0.0171)       
Days BWNs_year   -0.0057*     
    (0.0030)     
Duration BWNs_year     -0.0266***   
      (0.0066)   
BWN       -0.1806*** 
        (0.0231) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0317 -0.0312 -0.0322 -0.0327 
  (0.0272) (0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0267) 
Construction material -0.0476*** -0.0452** -0.0438** -0.0477*** 
  (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0178) 
Physical condition 0.2135*** 0.2192*** 0.2179*** 0.2058*** 
  (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0182) (0.0180) 
Quality grade factor 0.3964*** 0.3949*** 0.3902*** 0.3926*** 
  (0.0753) (0.0762) (0.0757) (0.0737) 
Age -0.0013*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0013*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Bedrooms 0.0291* 0.0293* 0.0313* 0.0309* 
  (0.0164) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0158) 
Total Bathrooms 0.0139 0.0155 0.02 0.0135 
  (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0180) 
AC 0.1744*** 0.1728*** 0.1715*** 0.1747*** 
  (0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0243) (0.0240) 
Fire place 0.1018*** 0.1013*** 0.1032*** 0.1034*** 
  (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0191) 
Basement garage 0.0289 0.0277 0.0285 0.0265 
  (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0179) 
Lot size 0.0081** 0.008** 0.0081** 0.0082** 
  (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) 
Sidewalk -0.0453 -0.0444 -0.0453 -0.0429 
  (0.0385) (0.0389) (0.0387) (0.0379) 
Fence 0.0882*** 0.0915*** 0.0894*** 0.0852*** 
  (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0182) 
Crime -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0010 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
School quality 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Distance to highway exit 0.0243* 0.0252* 0.023* 0.0212 
  (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0134) (0.0132) 
Distance to FSU -0.0163 -0.0168 -0.0151 -0.0133 
  (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0114) 
Constant 7.6052 7.4412*** 7.4996*** 7.6969*** 
  (0.1428) (0.1438) (0.1408) (0.1368) 
          
𝜌 0.1690*** 0.1762*** 0.1742*** 0.1681*** 
Log likelihood -790.7172 -804.1425 -786.4972 -765.7369 
AIC 1675.4 1702.3 1667 1625.5 
Observations 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 3.10. Direct, indirect, and total effects of boil water notices variables 
  Direct Indirect Total 
BWNs_year -0.0699*** -0.0134*** -0.0803*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Days BWNs_year -0.0058*** -0.0012*** -0.0070*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Duration BWNs_year -0.0266*** -0.0055*** -0.0321*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
BWN -0.1803*** -0.0354*** -0.2157*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.11. 2SLS estimates for the spatial quantile models (dependent variable is ln (P)) 
  2SLS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
BWNs_year -0.0669*** -0.3645*** -0.1867*** -0.0728*** -0.0447*** -0.0292*** -0.0274*** -0.0211 0.0066 0.0084 
  (0.0104) (0.0777) (0.0322) (0.0252) (0.0114) (0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0161) (0.0133) (0.0108) 
Days BWNs_year -0.0065*** -0.0664*** -0.0271** -0.0155 -0.0075 -0.0064** -0.0049** -0.0048 -0.0015 0.0009 
  (0.0016) (0.0173) (0.0121) (0.0095) (0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0030) 
Duration BWNs_year -0.0291*** -0.1189*** -0.0598*** -0.0432*** -0.0345*** -0.0316*** -0.0204** -0.0163** -0.0056 0.00002 
  (0.0037) (0.0294) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0098) (0.0078) (0.0056) (0.0049) 
BWN -0.1853*** -0.5392*** -0.2971*** -0.1750*** -0.1017*** -0.0676*** -0.0509*** -0.0449** -0.0074 0.0077 
  (0.0186) (0.0653) (0.0483) (0.0265) (0.0209) (0.0171) (0.0185) -(0.0449) (0.0205) (0.0172) 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.12. MWTP for a change in water supply reliability from the estimated spatial models 
  2SLS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
BWNs_year 11,788 14,823 14,067 6,943 5,356 4,398 4,819       
Days BWNs_year 1,160 2,679 2,093     982 868       
Duration BWNs_year 5,062 4,713 4,416 4,164 4,181 4,749 3,592 3,239     
BWN 35,116 28,690 24,746 18,304 12,875 10,421 9,090 9,129     
Note: The values represent coefficients that are statistically significant at 5%; empty cells are for insignificant coefficient. 
Since BWN is a binary variable, its marginal impact is equal to: 
Mean P in quantile * (exp(b)-1) * (1/1-rho).  
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3.10. Appendix A: OLS Models - Dependent Variable is ln (P) 
Table 3.1A. OLS Regression Results (block groups spatial and year fixed effects are included) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
BWNs_year -0.0671***       
  (0.0182)       
Days BWNs_year   -0.0064**     
    (0.0031)     
Duration BWNs_year     -0.0312***   
      (0.0072)   
BWN       -0.1926*** 
        (0.0259) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0142 -0.0111 -0.0147 -0.0168 
  (0.0301) (0.0303) (0.0298) (0.0294) 
Construction material -0.0565** -0.0537** -0.0522** -0.0577*** 
  (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0216) 
Physical condition 0.2266*** 0.2314*** 0.2293*** 0.2177*** 
  (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0204) (0.0202) 
Quality grade factor 0.5791*** 0.5859*** 0.5839*** 0.5712*** 
  (0.0985) (0.0991) (0.0981) (0.0971) 
Age -0.0021*** -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.0019*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Bedrooms 0.0152 0.0150 0.0173 0.0163 
  (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0171) 
Total Bathrooms 0.0131 0.0137 0.0182 0.0154 
  (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0218) (0.0216) 
AC 0.1743*** 0.1736*** 0.1693*** 0.1701*** 
  (0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0274) (0.0272) 
Fire place 0.1006*** 0.1015*** 0.1051*** 0.1007*** 
  (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0224) (0.0221) 
Basement garage 0.0380* 0.0393* 0.0392* 0.0353* 
  (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0205) 
Lot size 0.0096* 0.0094* 0.0093 0.0102* 
  (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056) 
Sidewalk -0.0089 -0.0092 -0.0146 -0.0053 
  (0.0441) (0.0445) (0.0438) (0.0432) 
Fence 0.0819*** 0.0848*** 0.0814*** 0.0775*** 
  (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0208) (0.0207) 
Crime -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0008 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
School quality 0.0008 0.0009 0.0007 0.0009 
  (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Distance to highway exit -0.0398*** -0.0380*** -0.0343*** -0.0391*** 
  (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0093) 
Distance to FSU 0.0240** 0.0225** 0.0235** 0.0260** 
  (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
Constant 9.5656*** 9.5042*** 9.5313*** 9.6281*** 
  (0.1753) (0.1744) (0.1692) (0.1688) 
          
Observations 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 
R-squared 0.7651 0.7621 0.7682 0.7718 
Adj R-squared 0.7146 0.7110 0.7184 0.7228 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Table 3.2A. OLS Regression Results – Fairmont  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
BWNs_year -0.0900***       
  (0.0296)       
Days BWNs_year   -0.0192     
    (0.0170)     
Duration BWNs_year     -0.0238   
      (0.0224)   
BWN       -0.1435*** 
        (0.0352) 
SQFT 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height 0.0287 0.0329 0.0341 0.0305 
  (0.0360) (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0358) 
Construction material -0.0082 -0.0065 -0.0050 -0.0047 
  (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0231) 
Physical condition 0.2069*** 0.2118*** 0.2117*** 0.2040*** 
  (0.0258) (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0252) 
Quality grade factor 0.6758*** 0.6539*** 0.6484*** 0.6697*** 
  (0.1620) (0.1667) (0.1669) (0.1590) 
Age -0.0015** -0.0017** -0.0017** -0.0015** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Bedrooms 0.0071 0.0059 0.0060 0.0084 
  (0.0213) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0209) 
Total Bathrooms 0.0131 0.0162 0.0166 0.0119 
  (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0342) (0.0339) 
AC 0.1803*** 0.1859*** 0.1875*** 0.1840*** 
  (0.0332) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0332) 
Fire place 0.1273*** 0.1280*** 0.1279*** 0.1265*** 
  (0.0331) (0.0337) (0.0336) (0.0325) 
Basement garage 0.0569** 0.0579** 0.0575** 0.0556** 
  (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0237) 
Lot size 0.0295 0.0274 0.0289 0.0363 
  (0.0355) (0.0370) (0.0368) (0.0342) 
Sidewalk -0.0685* -0.0682* -0.0675* -0.0642 
  (0.0398) (0.0406) (0.0405) (0.0392) 
Fence 0.0790*** 0.0806*** 0.0806*** 0.0796*** 
  (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0214) 
Crime -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
  (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
School quality 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 
  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Distance to highway exit -0.0233 -0.0268 -0.0281 -0.0257 
  (0.0475) (0.0481) (0.0482) (0.0472) 
Distance to FSU -0.0599*** -0.0632*** -0.0626*** -0.0553** 
  (0.0222) (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0223) 
Constant 9.3364*** 9.3021*** 9.3084*** 9.3706*** 
  (0.2504) (0.2534) (0.2537) (0.2480) 
          
Observations 826 826 826 826 
R-squared 0.6783 0.6732 0.6738 0.6827 
Adj R-squared 0.6678 0.6626 0.6632 0.6723 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 3.3A. OLS Regression Results – Other Areas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
BWNs_year -0.0712***       
  (0.0202)       
Days BWNs_year   -0.0062*     
    (0.0031)     
Duration BWNs_year     -0.0290***   
      (0.0067)   
BWN       -0.2283*** 
        (0.0326) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0779** -0.0790** -0.0827** -0.0799** 
  (0.0394) (0.0397) (0.0389) (0.0387) 
Construction material -0.0763*** -0.0734*** -0.0725*** -0.0807*** 
  (0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0254) (0.0251) 
Physical condition 0.2225*** 0.2286*** 0.2268*** 0.2115*** 
  (0.0249) (0.0247) (0.0243) (0.0244) 
Quality grade factor 0.3537*** 0.3694*** 0.3650*** 0.3410*** 
  (0.0889) (0.0891) (0.0879) (0.0874) 
Age -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0019*** -0.0018*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Bedrooms 0.0312 0.0335 0.0358 0.0318 
  (0.0227) (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0218) 
Total Bathrooms 0.0242 0.0249 0.0335 0.0286 
  (0.0222) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0220) 
AC 0.1844*** 0.1801*** 0.1751*** 0.1843*** 
  (0.0343) (0.0344) (0.0339) (0.0333) 
Fire place 0.0908*** 0.0903*** 0.0935*** 0.0975*** 
  (0.0284) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0279) 
Basement garage 0.0240 0.0220 0.0255 0.0242 
  (0.0278) (0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0276) 
Lot size 0.0079** 0.0078** 0.0079** 0.0081** 
  (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) 
Sidewalk 0.0041 0.0006 0.0017 0.0067 
  (0.1143) (0.1143) (0.1143) (0.1137) 
Fence 0.0878*** 0.0924*** 0.0900*** 0.0809*** 
  (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
Crime  -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0014 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
School quality 0.0030 0.0028 0.0026 0.0029 
  (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
Distance to highway exit 0.0241 0.0233 0.0212 0.0222 
  (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0200) (0.0196) 
Distance to FSU -0.0193 -0.0175 -0.0159 -0.0185 
  (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0194) (0.0191) 
Constant 9.5474*** 9.4527*** 9.4985*** 9.6653*** 
  (0.2062) (0.2053) (0.1964) (0.1907) 
          
Observations 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 
R-squared 0.7228 0.7183 0.7254 0.7322 
Adj R-squared 0.7129 0.7083 0.7156 0.7226 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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3.11. Appendix B: Spatial Lag Models (SLM) - Dependent Variable is ln (P) 
Table 3.1B. Direct, Indirect, Total Effects for Model (1) – BWNs_year 
  Direct Indirect Total 
  Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
BWNs_year -0.0669*** 0.0003 -0.0134*** 0.0001 -0.0803*** 0.0003 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.00005*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0000 
Story height -0.0314 0.0007 -0.0063 0.0002 -0.0377 0.0009 
Construction material -0.047** 0.0006 -0.0094** 0.0001 -0.0564** 0.0007 
Physical condition 0.2153*** 0.0004 0.0431*** 0.0002 0.2584*** 0.0005 
Quality grade factor 0.3973*** 0.0020 0.0793*** 0.0005 0.4766*** 0.0024 
Age -0.0013*** 0.0000 -0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0016*** 0.0000 
Bedrooms 0.0294* 0.0005 0.0059* 0.0001 0.0353* 0.0006 
Total Bathrooms 0.0139 0.0005 0.0028 0.0001 0.0167 0.0006 
AC 0.1762*** 0.0007 0.0353*** 0.0003 0.2115*** 0.0009 
Fire place 0.1033*** 0.0006 0.0206*** 0.0002 0.1239*** 0.0007 
Basement garage 0.0284 0.0005 0.0057 0.0001 0.0341 0.0007 
Lot size 0.0081*** 0.0001 0.0016*** 0.0000 0.0097*** 0.0001 
Sidewalk -0.0447 0.0012 -0.0089 0.0002 -0.0536 0.0014 
Fence 0.09*** 0.0006 0.018*** 0.0001 0.1081*** 0.0007 
Crime -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0000 
School quality 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 
Distance to highway exit 0.0248* 0.0004 0.005* 0.0001 0.0298* 0.0005 
Distance to FSU -0.0165 0.0004 -0.0033 0.0001 -0.0199 0.0005 
 
Table 3.2B. Direct, Indirect, Total Effects for Model (2) – Days BWNs_year 
  Direct Indirect Total 
  Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Days BWNs_year -0.0058*** 0.0001 -0.0012*** 0.0000 -0.0070*** 0.0001 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.00005*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0000 
Story height -0.0310 0.0008 -0.0064 0.0002 -0.0374 0.0009 
Construction material -0.0454** 0.0006 -0.0094** 0.0001 -0.0548** 0.0007 
Physical condition 0.2203*** 0.0004 0.0457*** 0.0002 0.266*** 0.0006 
Quality grade factor 0.3959*** 0.0021 0.0818*** 0.0006 0.4777*** 0.0026 
Age -0.0015*** 0.0000 -0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0018*** 0.0000 
Bedrooms 0.0294** 0.0004 0.0061** 0.0001 0.0355** 0.0005 
Total Bathrooms 0.0156 0.0004 0.0032 0.0001 0.0188 0.0005 
AC 0.1736*** 0.0007 0.0361*** 0.0002 0.2097*** 0.0008 
Fire place 0.1013*** 0.0006 0.021*** 0.0002 0.1222*** 0.0007 
Basement garage 0.0293 0.0007 0.0061 0.0001 0.0354 0.0008 
Lot size 0.0082*** 0.0001 0.0017*** 0.0000 0.0099*** 0.0001 
Sidewalk -0.0445 0.0011 -0.0092 0.0002 -0.0537 0.0014 
Fence 0.0928*** 0.0006 0.0193*** 0.0002 0.1121*** 0.0007 
Crime -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0000 
School quality 0.0002 0.0000 0.00005 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 
Distance to highway exit 0.0250* 0.0004 0.0052* 0.0001 0.0302* 0.0005 
Distance to FSU -0.0164 0.0004 -0.0034 0.0001 -0.0199 0.0005 
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Table 3.3B. Direct, Indirect, Total Effects for Model (3) – Duration BWNs_year 
  Direct Indirect Total 
  Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Duration BWNs_year -0.0266*** 0.0001 -0.0055*** 0.0000 -0.0321*** 0.0002 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.00005*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0000 
Story height -0.0328 0.0008 -0.0068 0.0002 -0.0396 0.0009 
Construction material -0.0439** 0.0006 -0.0091** 0.0001 -0.0529** 0.0007 
Physical condition 0.2186*** 0.0004 0.0452*** 0.0002 0.2638*** 0.0005 
Quality grade factor 0.393*** 0.0021 0.0809*** 0.0005 0.474*** 0.0023 
Age -0.0014*** 0.0000 -0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0017*** 0.0000 
Bedrooms 0.0313** 0.0005 0.0065** 0.0001 0.0378** 0.0006 
Total Bathrooms 0.0204 0.0005 0.0042 0.0001 0.0246 0.0007 
AC 0.1718*** 0.0007 0.0355*** 0.0002 0.2073*** 0.0009 
Fire place 0.1034*** 0.0006 0.0213*** 0.0002 0.1248*** 0.0007 
Basement garage 0.0291 0.0006 0.0060 0.0001 0.0351 0.0007 
Lot size 0.0081*** 0.0001 0.0017*** 0.0000 0.0097*** 0.0001 
Sidewalk -0.0458 0.0011 -0.0094 0.0002 -0.0553 0.0013 
Fence 0.0898*** 0.0006 0.0186*** 0.0002 0.1085*** 0.0007 
Crime -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.001 0.0000 
School quality 0.0002 0.0000 0.00004 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
Distance to highway exit 0.0229* 0.0004 0.0048* 0.0001 0.0277* 0.0005 
Distance to FSU -0.0150 0.0004 -0.0031 0.0001 -0.0181 0.0005 
 
Table 3.4B. Direct, Indirect, Total Effects for Model (4) – BWN 
  Direct Indirect Total 
  Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
BWN -0.1803*** 0.0006 -0.0354*** 0.0002 -0.2157*** 0.0007 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.00005*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0000 
Story height -0.0338 0.0008 -0.0067 0.0002 -0.0405 0.0009 
Construction material -0.0481*** 0.0006 -0.0095** 0.0001 -0.0576*** 0.0008 
Physical condition 0.2063*** 0.0004 0.0406*** 0.0002 0.2468*** 0.0005 
Quality grade factor 0.3948*** 0.0020 0.0773*** 0.0005 0.4721*** 0.0024 
Age -0.0013*** 0.0000 -0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0015*** 0.0000 
Bedrooms 0.0307** 0.0004 0.0061** 0.0001 0.0368** 0.0005 
Total Bathrooms 0.0147 0.0005 0.0029 0.0001 0.0176 0.0006 
AC 0.175*** 0.0007 0.0344*** 0.0002 0.2093*** 0.0009 
Fire place 0.1043*** 0.0006 0.0205*** 0.0002 0.1247*** 0.0007 
Basement garage 0.0267 0.0006 0.0052 0.0001 0.0319 0.0008 
Lot size 0.0083*** 0.0001 0.0016*** 0.0000 0.0099*** 0.0001 
Sidewalk -0.0423 0.0011 -0.0083 0.0002 -0.0507 0.0013 
Fence 0.0861*** 0.0005 0.0169*** 0.0001 0.103*** 0.0006 
Crime -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0000 
School quality 0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 
Distance to highway exit 0.0219* 0.0004 0.0043 0.0001 0.0262* 0.0005 
Distance to FSU -0.014 0.0004 -0.0028 0.0001 -0.0168 0.0005 
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3.12. Appendix C: Quantile Regression Models - Dependent Variable is ln (P) 
Table 3.1C. Non-Spatial Quantile Regression Results for Model (1) – BWNs_year 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
BWNs_year -0.3150*** -0.1889*** -0.0668*** -0.0480*** -0.0440*** -0.0277*** -0.0150 -0.0004 0.0043 
  (0.0244) (0.0167) (0.0128) (0.0096) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0107) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0711 -0.0379 -0.0431 -0.0419* -0.0308 -0.0268 -0.0189 0.0214 0.0318 
  (0.0551) (0.0377) (0.0289) (0.0217) (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0229) (0.0236) (0.0243) 
Construction material -0.1032** -0.0537* -0.0564*** -0.0519*** -0.0462*** -0.0439*** -0.0434** -0.0279 -0.0533*** 
  (0.0413) (0.0283) (0.0217) (0.0163) (0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0182) 
Physical condition 0.2518*** 0.2340*** 0.2282*** 0.2151*** 0.1934*** 0.1738*** 0.1530*** 0.1345*** 0.1258*** 
  (0.0306) (0.0210) (0.0160) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0135) 
Quality grade factor 0.5825*** 0.5209*** 0.5298*** 0.5217*** 0.4789*** 0.4561*** 0.5000*** 0.5115*** 0.5354*** 
  (0.1443) (0.0988) (0.0756) (0.0568) (0.0585) (0.0593) (0.0599) (0.0618) (0.0635) 
Age -0.0023*** -0.0025*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0021*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0017*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Bedrooms 0.0375 0.0161 0.0352** 0.0454*** 0.0442*** 0.0403*** 0.0437*** 0.0370*** 0.0280* 
  (0.0330) (0.0226) (0.0173) (0.0130) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0145) 
Total Bathrooms -0.0291 0.0170 0.0313 0.0393*** 0.0418*** 0.0329** 0.0322** 0.0134 0.0098 
  (0.0378) (0.0259) (0.0198) (0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0166) 
AC 0.2109*** 0.2562*** 0.2443*** 0.2056*** 0.2045*** 0.1964*** 0.1844*** 0.1459*** 0.0876*** 
  (0.0520) (0.0356) (0.0273) (0.0205) (0.0211) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0223) (0.0229) 
Fire place 0.1460*** 0.1305*** 0.1275*** 0.1250*** 0.1144*** 0.0979*** 0.0777*** 0.0762*** 0.0765*** 
  (0.0431) (0.0295) (0.0226) (0.0170) (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0184) (0.0190) 
Basement garage 0.0580 0.0404 0.0408* 0.0328* 0.0272 0.0111 0.0039 0.0074 -0.0045 
  (0.0444) (0.0304) (0.0233) (0.0175) (0.0180) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0190) (0.0196) 
Lot size 0.0006 0.0079*** 0.0096*** 0.0093*** 0.0084*** 0.0099*** 0.0164*** 0.0187*** 0.0220*** 
  (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Sidewalk -0.0508 -0.0860 -0.0363 -0.0104 -0.0414 -0.0517 -0.0445 -0.0620* -0.0359 
  (0.0828) (0.0567) (0.0434) (0.0326) (0.0335) (0.0340) (0.0344) (0.0354) (0.0364) 
Fence 0.1110*** 0.1076*** 0.1131*** 0.0936*** 0.0899*** 0.0865*** 0.0764*** 0.0722*** 0.0649*** 
  (0.0400) (0.0274) (0.0210) (0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0166) (0.0171) (0.0176) 
Crime -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0014* -0.0013** -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0014** -0.0018*** -0.0016** 
  (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
School quality 0.0008 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 
  (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Distance to highway exit 0.0157 0.0042 0.0037 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0017 0.0043 -0.0011 -0.0030 
  (0.0289) (0.0198) (0.0152) (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0127) 
Distance to FSU -0.0220 -0.0110 -0.0131 -0.0044 -0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0030 
  (0.0295) (0.0202) (0.0154) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0130) 
Constant 9.0437*** 9.3823*** 9.4288*** 9.5746*** 9.7164*** 9.8205*** 9.9792*** 10.1811*** 10.3263*** 
  (0.2636) (0.1805) (0.1381) (0.1038) (0.1068) (0.1083) (0.1094) (0.1128) (0.1160) 
Standard errors in parentheses               
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
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Table 3.2C. Non-Spatial Quantile Regression Results for Model (2) – Days BWNs_year 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Days BWNs_year -0.0510*** -0.0281*** -0.0133*** -0.0051*** -0.0068*** -0.0059*** -0.0032** -0.0026 0.0004 
  (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0843* -0.0512 -0.0499* -0.0345 -0.0261 -0.0295 -0.0181 0.0220 0.0308 
  (0.0495) (0.0337) (0.0288) (0.0210) (0.0215) (0.0225) (0.0232) (0.0240) (0.0251) 
Construction material -0.0711* -0.0612** -0.0623*** -0.0530*** -0.0433*** -0.0437*** -0.0380** -0.0270 -0.0494*** 
  (0.0371) (0.0253) (0.0216) (0.0158) (0.0161) (0.0169) (0.0174) (0.0180) (0.0188) 
Physical condition 0.2767*** 0.2507*** 0.2254*** 0.2193*** 0.1928*** 0.1750*** 0.1533*** 0.1324*** 0.1234*** 
  (0.0274) (0.0187) (0.0160) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0139) 
Quality grade factor 0.5237*** 0.4809*** 0.5152*** 0.4951*** 0.4908*** 0.4689*** 0.5132*** 0.5128*** 0.5449*** 
  (0.1295) (0.0883) (0.0754) (0.0551) (0.0562) (0.0589) (0.0607) (0.0627) (0.0657) 
Age -0.0021*** -0.0028*** -0.0023*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0021*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0017*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Bedrooms 0.0299 0.0338* 0.0379** 0.0465*** 0.0475*** 0.0407*** 0.0430*** 0.0379*** 0.0284* 
  (0.0296) (0.0202) (0.0172) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0150) 
Total Bathrooms 0.0049 0.0204 0.0420** 0.0399*** 0.0383*** 0.0337** 0.0318** 0.0113 0.0090 
  (0.0339) (0.0232) (0.0198) (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0154) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0172) 
AC 0.2587*** 0.2372*** 0.2388*** 0.2061*** 0.1970*** 0.1986*** 0.1827*** 0.1483*** 0.0908*** 
  (0.0467) (0.0318) (0.0272) (0.0199) (0.0203) (0.0212) (0.0219) (0.0226) (0.0237) 
Fire place 0.1328*** 0.1100*** 0.1282*** 0.1251*** 0.1140*** 0.0961*** 0.0766*** 0.0786*** 0.0784*** 
  (0.0386) (0.0264) (0.0225) (0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0196) 
Basement garage 0.0669* 0.0338 0.0381 0.0339** 0.0235 0.0135 0.0056 0.0081 -0.0066 
  (0.0399) (0.0272) (0.0232) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0193) (0.0202) 
Lot size -0.0005 0.0087*** 0.0101*** 0.0092*** 0.0083*** 0.0085*** 0.0166*** 0.0192*** 0.0213*** 
  (0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
Sidewalk -0.1414* -0.0411 -0.0548 -0.0121 -0.0403 -0.0609* -0.0377 -0.0582 -0.0305 
  (0.0742) (0.0506) (0.0432) (0.0316) (0.0322) (0.0338) (0.0348) (0.0360) (0.0377) 
Fence 0.1498*** 0.1211*** 0.1032*** 0.0910*** 0.0921*** 0.0839*** 0.0778*** 0.0725*** 0.0656*** 
  (0.0359) (0.0245) (0.0209) (0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0168) (0.0174) (0.0182) 
Crime -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0014* -0.0012* -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0017** -0.0015** 
  (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
School quality 0.0018 0.0010 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 
  (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Distance to highway exit 0.0253 0.0066 -0.0024 -0.0053 -0.0014 0.0036 0.0063 -0.0008 -0.0041 
  (0.0259) (0.0177) (0.0151) (0.0110) (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0132) 
Distance to FSU -0.0241 -0.0218 -0.0070 0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0016 0.0004 -0.0024 
  (0.0264) (0.0180) (0.0154) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0134) 
Constant 8.3390*** 9.3118*** 9.4426*** 9.5229*** 9.7028*** 9.8193*** 9.9302*** 10.1831*** 10.3312*** 
  (0.2343) (0.1598) (0.1364) (0.0997) (0.1017) (0.1065) (0.1098) (0.1135) (0.1188) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3C. Non-Spatial Quantile Regression Results for Model (3) – Duration BWNs_year 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Duration BWNs_year -0.0918*** -0.0599*** -0.0469*** -0.0364*** -0.0273*** -0.0135*** -0.0076** -0.0041 0.0002 
  (0.0073) (0.0052) (0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0041) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0773* -0.0390 -0.0519** -0.0413* -0.0260 -0.0254 -0.0144 0.0253 0.0311 
  (0.0458) (0.0325) (0.0262) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0256) 
Construction material -0.0778** -0.0598** -0.0610*** -0.0427** -0.0420** -0.0418** -0.0378** -0.0263 -0.0468** 
  (0.0343) (0.0244) (0.0197) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0192) 
Physical condition 0.2603*** 0.2432*** 0.2217*** 0.2047*** 0.1922*** 0.1738*** 0.1521*** 0.1334*** 0.1236*** 
  (0.0254) (0.0180) (0.0145) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0142) 
Quality grade factor 0.5381*** 0.5147*** 0.5284*** 0.5345*** 0.4648*** 0.4652*** 0.5132*** 0.5144*** 0.5415*** 
  (0.1198) (0.0850) (0.0687) (0.0610) (0.0608) (0.0614) (0.0618) (0.0617) (0.0671) 
Age -0.0021*** -0.0027*** -0.0023*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0022*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0017*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Bedrooms 0.0298 0.0261 0.0376** 0.0533*** 0.0480*** 0.0392*** 0.0428*** 0.0383*** 0.0274* 
  (0.0274) (0.0194) (0.0157) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0153) 
Total Bathrooms -0.0066 0.0202 0.0392** 0.0346** 0.0429*** 0.0377** 0.0311* 0.0109 0.0082 
  (0.0314) (0.0223) (0.0180) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0176) 
AC 0.2581*** 0.2494*** 0.2360*** 0.2235*** 0.2007*** 0.1917*** 0.1795*** 0.1505*** 0.0929*** 
  (0.0432) (0.0306) (0.0248) (0.0220) (0.0219) (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0242) 
Fire place 0.1362*** 0.1058*** 0.1342*** 0.1195*** 0.1094*** 0.0978*** 0.0779*** 0.0801*** 0.0791*** 
  (0.0358) (0.0254) (0.0205) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0200) 
Basement garage 0.0578 0.0291 0.0359* 0.0351* 0.0304 0.0148 0.0049 0.0083 -0.0104 
  (0.0369) (0.0262) (0.0211) (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0206) 
Lot size 0.0002 0.0083*** 0.0096*** 0.0098*** 0.0086*** 0.0075*** 0.0163*** 0.0192*** 0.0214*** 
  (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
Sidewalk -0.1393** -0.0350 -0.0461 -0.0271 -0.0399 -0.0608* -0.0420 -0.0553 -0.0323 
  (0.0687) (0.0487) (0.0394) (0.0350) (0.0349) (0.0352) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0385) 
Fence 0.1348*** 0.1279*** 0.1020*** 0.0943*** 0.0907*** 0.0828*** 0.0764*** 0.0712*** 0.0663*** 
  (0.0332) (0.0235) (0.0190) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0186) 
Crime -0.0015 -0.0017* -0.0015** -0.0013* -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0017** -0.0013* 
  (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
School quality 0.0018 0.0009 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0000 
  (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Distance to highway exit 0.0239 0.0053 0.0001 -0.0017 0.0014 0.0061 0.0076 0.0006 -0.0025 
  (0.0240) (0.0170) (0.0138) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0134) 
Distance to FSU -0.0286 -0.0210 -0.0123 -0.0021 0.0027 -0.0015 -0.0022 0.0002 -0.0022 
  (0.0245) (0.0174) (0.0140) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0137) 
Constant 8.5422*** 9.3099*** 9.5060*** 9.5415*** 9.7095*** 9.8365*** 9.9259*** 10.1653*** 10.3211*** 
  (0.2170) (0.1540) (0.1244) (0.1105) (0.1102) (0.1112) (0.1120) (0.1117) (0.1215) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
130 
 
Table 3.4C. Non-Spatial Quantile Regression Results for Model (4) – BWN 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
BWN -0.4666*** -0.2672*** -0.1697*** -0.1236*** -0.0992*** -0.0752*** -0.0529*** -0.0286 -0.0065 
  (0.0339) (0.0264) (0.0217) (0.0191) (0.0188) (0.0177) (0.0165) (0.0184) (0.0210) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0970** -0.0326 -0.0376 -0.0445* -0.0297 -0.0284 -0.0111 0.0100 0.0250 
  (0.0436) (0.0339) (0.0280) (0.0246) (0.0242) (0.0227) (0.0212) (0.0236) (0.0270) 
Construction material -0.0789** -0.0622** -0.0530** -0.0565*** -0.0526*** -0.0537*** -0.0356** -0.0312* -0.0434** 
  (0.0326) (0.0254) (0.0209) (0.0184) (0.0181) (0.0170) (0.0158) (0.0177) (0.0202) 
Physical condition 0.2251*** 0.2315*** 0.2209*** 0.2159*** 0.2007*** 0.1811*** 0.1642*** 0.1412*** 0.1188*** 
  (0.0243) (0.0189) (0.0156) (0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0132) (0.0150) 
Quality grade factor 0.5538*** 0.5454*** 0.5177*** 0.5163*** 0.5029*** 0.4932*** 0.5089*** 0.5261*** 0.5866*** 
  (0.1141) (0.0888) (0.0732) (0.0643) (0.0633) (0.0596) (0.0554) (0.0618) (0.0707) 
Age -0.0021*** -0.0024*** -0.0026*** -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0018*** -0.0019*** -0.0017*** -0.0018*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Bedrooms 0.0349 0.0217 0.0271 0.0323** 0.0412*** 0.0442*** 0.0465*** 0.0380*** 0.0140 
  (0.0261) (0.0203) (0.0167) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0136) (0.0127) (0.0141) (0.0161) 
Total Bathrooms 0.0015 0.0154 0.0231 0.0359** 0.0413** 0.0369** 0.0215 0.0213 0.0104 
  (0.0298) (0.0232) (0.0191) (0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0155) (0.0145) (0.0161) (0.0184) 
AC 0.2263*** 0.2452*** 0.2513*** 0.2171*** 0.2089*** 0.1881*** 0.1687*** 0.1438*** 0.0956*** 
  (0.0411) (0.0320) (0.0264) (0.0232) (0.0228) (0.0214) (0.0200) (0.0223) (0.0254) 
Fire place 0.1465*** 0.1227*** 0.1196*** 0.1186*** 0.0994*** 0.0948*** 0.0898*** 0.0657*** 0.0795*** 
  (0.0340) (0.0265) (0.0218) (0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0178) (0.0165) (0.0184) (0.0211) 
Basement garage 0.0270 0.0402 0.0386* 0.0196 0.0136 0.0094 0.0058 0.0016 0.0016 
  (0.0351) (0.0273) (0.0225) (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0183) (0.0171) (0.0190) (0.0217) 
Lot size 0.0000 0.0071*** 0.0085*** 0.0098*** 0.0089*** 0.0092*** 0.0138*** 0.0207*** 0.0203*** 
  (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0019) 
Sidewalk -0.0135 -0.0748 -0.0353 -0.0232 -0.0283 -0.0257 -0.0338 -0.0529 -0.0448 
  (0.0653) (0.0508) (0.0419) (0.0368) (0.0362) (0.0341) (0.0317) (0.0354) (0.0404) 
Fence 0.0805** 0.0981*** 0.1180*** 0.0849*** 0.0857*** 0.0891*** 0.0807*** 0.0764*** 0.0661*** 
  (0.0316) (0.0246) (0.0203) (0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0165) (0.0154) (0.0171) (0.0196) 
Total Crime Index -0.0018 -0.0018* -0.0015* -0.0012* -0.0012* -0.0014** -0.0014** -0.0014** -0.0021*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
School quality 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0020* 
  (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Distance to highway exit 0.0110 -0.0008 0.0006 0.0082 0.0052 0.0044 0.0092 -0.0040 0.0027 
  (0.0229) (0.0178) (0.0147) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0119) (0.0111) (0.0124) (0.0142) 
Distance to FSU -0.0116 -0.0095 -0.0129 -0.0093 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0050 0.0001 -0.0082 
  (0.0233) (0.0181) (0.0149) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.0126) (0.0144) 
Constant 9.0361*** 9.4443*** 9.5479*** 9.6324*** 9.7146*** 9.8799*** 10.0364*** 10.2573*** 10.5828*** 
  (0.2061) (0.1603) (0.1323) (0.1162) (0.1144) (0.1076) (0.1002) (0.1117) (0.1276) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.13. Appendix D: Spatial Quantile Regression Models - Dependent Variable is ln (P) 
Table 3.1D. Spatial Quantile Regression Results for Model (1) – BWNs_year 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
BWNs_year -0.3645*** -0.1867*** -0.0728*** -0.0447*** -0.0292*** -0.0274*** -0.0211 0.0066 0.0084 
  (0.0777) (0.0322) (0.0252) (0.0114) (0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0161) (0.0133) (0.0108) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0263 -0.0408 -0.0438* -0.0414** -0.0339* -0.031 -0.0116 0.0135 -0.0062 
  (0.0360) (0.0258) (0.0264) (0.0185) (0.0177) (0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0212) (0.0204) 
Construction material -0.0917*** -0.0654*** -0.0638*** -0.0578*** -0.0393*** -0.026* -0.0335** -0.0229 -0.0269* 
  (0.0267) (0.0187) (0.0229) (0.0145) (0.0133) (0.0137) (0.0168) (0.0177) (0.0143) 
Physical condition 0.234*** 0.2375*** 0.2201*** 0.2005*** 0.1804*** 0.1597*** 0.1473*** 0.1364*** 0.1444*** 
  (0.0270) (0.0228) (0.0188) (0.0141) (0.0165) (0.0137) (0.0148) (0.0166) (0.0185) 
Quality grade factor 0.4941*** 0.3962*** 0.4356*** 0.41*** 0.3803*** 0.362*** 0.3536*** 0.4262*** 0.4462*** 
  (0.0995) (0.0643) (0.0599) (0.0488) (0.0585) (0.0474) (0.0613) (0.0538) (0.0685) 
Age -0.0025*** -0.0026*** -0.0025*** -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0025*** -0.0023*** -0.0024*** 
-
0.0017*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Bedrooms 0.0104 0.0226 0.0341* 0.0517*** 0.0466*** 0.0496*** 0.0342** 0.0384*** 0.0476*** 
  (0.0199) (0.0198) (0.0178) (0.0166) (0.0119) (0.0145) (0.0134) (0.0116) (0.0140) 
Total Bathrooms -0.0165 0.0201 0.0402*** 0.0509*** 0.037*** 0.0258** 0.0367** 0.019 0.0123 
  (0.0276) (0.0175) (0.0151) (0.0141) (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0160) 
AC 0.15*** 0.2181*** 0.2344*** 0.2277*** 0.2271*** 0.2084*** 0.1701*** 0.1485*** 0.0863*** 
  (0.0469) (0.0370) (0.0315) (0.0245) (0.0241) (0.0305) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0317) 
Fire place 0.1453*** 0.1276*** 0.1127*** 0.1081*** 0.0935*** 0.0838*** 0.08*** 0.0756*** 0.0588*** 
  (0.0330) (0.0255) (0.0193) (0.0172) (0.0116) (0.0142) (0.0152) (0.0146) (0.0170) 
Basement garage 0.0202 0.0228 0.0295 0.0182 0.0068 0.0089 0.0023 0.0046 -0.0081 
  (0.0292) (0.0227) (0.0188) (0.0160) (0.0137) (0.0168) (0.0160) (0.0184) (0.0188) 
Lot size 0.0006 0.0087 0.0116*** 0.0106*** 0.0107* 0.0115 0.0241*** 0.0215** 0.0373*** 
  (0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0056) (0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0100) (0.0078) 
Sidewalk -0.0161 -0.062 -0.0434 -0.0366 -0.0572* -0.0341 -0.0568* -0.0809** -0.098** 
  (0.0559) (0.0477) (0.0399) (0.0280) (0.0343) (0.0368) (0.0308) (0.0320) (0.0423) 
Fence 0.1107*** 0.0925*** 0.1022*** 0.0974*** 0.0956*** 0.0954*** 0.0709*** 0.0671*** 0.0509*** 
  (0.0289) (0.0223) (0.0186) (0.0145) (0.0140) (0.0148) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0142) 
Crime 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 
  (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
School quality 0.0016 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0014* -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0005 
  (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Distance to highway exit -0.017 -0.0107 -0.0208** -0.0213*** -0.0138** -0.0105* -0.0156** -0.0149** -0.0123** 
  (0.0118) (0.0078) (0.0086) (0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Distance to FSU -0.0019 -0.0088 -0.0045 0.0007 -0.0044 -0.0046 -0.0018 0.0009 0.0031 
  (0.0110) (0.0080) (0.0068) (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0062) 
𝜌 0.2149*** 0.2055*** 0.1477*** 0.1465*** 0.1709*** 0.1777*** 0.1583*** 0.1556*** 0.168*** 
  (0.0445) (0.0341) (0.0272) (0.0237) (0.0280) (0.0259) (0.0252) (0.0261) (0.0252) 
Constant 6.8245*** 7.0918*** 7.8607*** 8.0012*** 7.8362*** 7.9136*** 8.3481*** 8.3872*** 8.2968*** 
  (0.5332) (0.3944) (0.3409) (0.2709) (0.3149) (0.3000) (0.3047) (0.3113) (0.3034) 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.2D. Spatial Quantile Regression Results for Model (2) – Days BWNs_year 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Days BWNs_year -0.0664*** -0.0271** -0.0155 -0.0075 -0.0064** -0.0049** -0.0048 -0.0015 0.0009 
  (0.0173) (0.0121) (0.0095) (0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0030) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0575* -0.0303 -0.046* -0.0413** -0.0323* -0.0266 -0.0092 0.0052 -0.0063 
  (0.0306) (0.0283) (0.0244) (0.0192) (0.0173) (0.0198) (0.0243) (0.0225) (0.0222) 
Construction material -0.0672** -0.0668*** -0.0636*** -0.0525*** -0.0297** -0.0298* -0.0285* -0.0256 -0.0311* 
  (0.0286) (0.0231) (0.0185) (0.0154) (0.0141) (0.0160) (0.0168) (0.0174) (0.0159) 
Physical condition 0.2683*** 0.2637*** 0.2266*** 0.1998*** 0.1758*** 0.1634*** 0.1472*** 0.1373*** 0.1473*** 
  (0.0281) (0.0217) (0.0187) (0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0181) (0.0167) (0.0159) 
Quality grade factor 0.4243*** 0.3806*** 0.3937*** 0.3875*** 0.3909*** 0.3472*** 0.364*** 0.4398*** 0.4374*** 
  (0.1245) (0.0792) (0.0677) (0.0544) (0.0488) (0.0507) (0.0668) (0.0532) (0.0657) 
Age -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0026*** -0.0024*** -0.0025*** -0.0026*** -0.0025*** -0.0021*** -0.0016*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Bedrooms 0.0235 0.0198 0.0411** 0.0487*** 0.0518*** 0.0463*** 0.0319** 0.0448*** 0.0474*** 
  (0.0264) (0.0212) (0.0164) (0.0150) (0.0126) (0.0158) (0.0152) (0.0140) (0.0133) 
Total Bathrooms 0.0059 0.0258 0.0372** 0.0572*** 0.034*** 0.028** 0.0279* 0.0152 0.0152 
  (0.0320) (0.0192) (0.0153) (0.0134) (0.0123) (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0178) 
AC 0.2074*** 0.2328*** 0.2202*** 0.2217*** 0.2169*** 0.2099*** 0.1711*** 0.1615*** 0.0909** 
  (0.0540) (0.0335) (0.0309) (0.0250) (0.0244) (0.0259) (0.0233) (0.0271) (0.0371) 
Fire place 0.1527*** 0.1059*** 0.113*** 0.1052*** 0.0905*** 0.0867*** 0.0799*** 0.0667*** 0.0553*** 
  (0.0362) (0.0220) (0.0191) (0.0138) (0.0158) (0.0150) (0.0163) (0.0176) (0.0153) 
Basement garage 0.0573** 0.0169 0.0298* 0.0159 0.0113 0.0142 0.0085 0.0032 -0.0058 
  (0.0263) (0.0203) (0.0168) (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0185) (0.0172) (0.0179) 
Lot size -0.0009 0.0088 0.0112** 0.0105** 0.0117* 0.0108 0.0244** 0.0212** 0.0381*** 
  (0.0075) (0.0065) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0073) (0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0070) 
Sidewalk -0.0753 -0.0562 -0.0216 -0.035 -0.0415 -0.0376 -0.0559* -0.0885*** -0.0933** 
  (0.0730) (0.0529) (0.0462) (0.0325) (0.0291) (0.0298) (0.0315) (0.0298) (0.0410) 
Fence 0.1351*** 0.1127*** 0.0967*** 0.0944*** 0.0903*** 0.0912*** 0.0764*** 0.0659*** 0.0434*** 
  (0.0308) (0.0249) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0130) (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0156) (0.0161) 
Crime -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0006 
  (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
School quality 0.0014 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0014** -0.001 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0007 
  (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Distance to highway exit -0.0046 -0.007 -0.0156** -0.0204*** -0.0139** -0.0103* -0.0154** -0.0128** -0.014** 
  (0.0116) (0.0085) (0.0072) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0067) 
Distance to FSU -0.0093 -0.0115 -0.0072 0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0044 -0.0024 0.0015 0.0055 
  (0.0106) (0.0078) (0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0067) 
𝜌 0.2085*** 0.2248*** 0.1709*** 0.1705*** 0.1862*** 0.1841*** 0.1633*** 0.1628*** 0.1694*** 
  (0.0439) (0.0341) (0.0302) (0.0245) (0.0248) (0.0266) (0.0288) (0.0267) (0.0264) 
Constant 6.7475*** 6.7145*** 7.569*** 7.7436*** 7.6613*** 7.8642*** 8.3129*** 8.2941*** 8.2796*** 
  (0.5188) (0.4221) (0.3615) (0.2913) (0.2727) (0.3232) (0.3527) (0.3355) (0.3264) 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3D. Spatial Quantile Regression Results for Model (3) – Duration BWNs_year 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Duration BWNs_year -0.1189*** -0.0598*** -0.0432*** -0.0345*** -0.0316*** -0.0204** -0.0163** -0.0056 0.00002 
  (0.0294) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0098) (0.0078) (0.0056) (0.0049) 
SQFT 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0321 -0.0329 -0.0532** -0.049*** -0.0296 -0.0385* -0.0101 0.0124 -0.0058 
  (0.0374) (0.0268) (0.0222) (0.0169) (0.0185) (0.0203) (0.0258) (0.0219) (0.0167) 
Construction material -0.0512* -0.0633*** -0.0578*** -0.0564*** -0.0338** -0.026 -0.026* -0.0235 -0.0312* 
  (0.0308) (0.0235) (0.0194) (0.0152) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0151) (0.0189) (0.0171) 
Physical condition 0.2575*** 0.2419*** 0.2177*** 0.1962*** 0.163*** 0.1689*** 0.1478*** 0.1428*** 0.1502*** 
  (0.0238) (0.0245) (0.0162) (0.0146) (0.0155) (0.0133) (0.0157) (0.0186) (0.0196) 
Quality grade factor 0.4621*** 0.4054*** 0.422*** 0.3792*** 0.4009*** 0.3436*** 0.3445*** 0.4166*** 0.437*** 
  (0.1186) (0.0791) (0.0619) (0.0607) (0.0452) (0.0558) (0.0624) (0.0630) (0.0641) 
Age -0.0021*** -0.0025*** -0.0022*** -0.0026*** -0.0027*** -0.0026*** -0.0025*** -0.0021*** -0.0015*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Bedrooms 0.0178 0.0258 0.0384** 0.0529*** 0.0537*** 0.0511*** 0.0332** 0.0421*** 0.0479*** 
  (0.0261) (0.0212) (0.0180) (0.0142) (0.0109) (0.0127) (0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0148) 
Total Bathrooms 0.0063 0.0264 0.0438*** 0.0609*** 0.0351*** 0.0272* 0.0266** 0.0165 0.0144 
  (0.0342) (0.0212) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0128) (0.0141) (0.0127) (0.0166) (0.0161) 
AC 0.2058*** 0.225*** 0.2289*** 0.2189*** 0.2244*** 0.2044*** 0.1753*** 0.1564*** 0.0908** 
  (0.0476) (0.0340) (0.0287) (0.0238) (0.0277) (0.0245) (0.0292) (0.0253) (0.0360) 
Fire place 0.1733*** 0.1152*** 0.1033*** 0.1048*** 0.0955*** 0.0869*** 0.0826*** 0.0687*** 0.0569*** 
  (0.0304) (0.0229) (0.0202) (0.0170) (0.0143) (0.0169) (0.0162) (0.0167) (0.0166) 
Basement garage 0.0512* 0.0255 0.0273 0.0157 0.0188 0.0074 0.0089 0.0027 -0.0026 
  (0.0277) (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0161) (0.0143) (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0161) (0.0167) 
Lot size -0.0002 0.0089 0.0117** 0.0111*** 0.0111* 0.0098 0.0241*** 0.0207* 0.0379*** 
  (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0058) (0.0076) (0.0090) (0.0109) (0.0084) 
Sidewalk -0.0863 -0.069 -0.0557 -0.0359 -0.034 -0.0363 -0.0598** -0.1007*** -0.0932* 
  (0.0839) (0.0446) (0.0528) (0.0365) (0.0328) (0.0291) (0.0285) (0.0366) (0.0545) 
Fence 0.1333*** 0.106*** 0.0976*** 0.0999*** 0.0967*** 0.0908*** 0.0736*** 0.0617*** 0.045*** 
  (0.0360) (0.0225) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0136) (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0150) 
Crime -0.0009 -0.0009* -0.0009* -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0009** -0.0006 -0.0007 
  (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
School quality 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0014** -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.001 
  (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Distance to highway exit -0.0137 -0.0097 -0.0148** -0.0187*** -0.0111* -0.0059 -0.0156*** -0.0123** -0.0138* 
  (0.0112) (0.0078) (0.0066) (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0071) 
Distance to FSU 0.0016 -0.0093 -0.0059 -0.0002 -0.0023 -0.0034 -0.0008 0.002 0.0053 
  (0.0104) (0.0080) (0.0055) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
𝜌 0.1945*** 0.1893*** 0.1567*** 0.1561*** 0.1691*** 0.1788*** 0.1577*** 0.1671*** 0.1756*** 
  (0.0456) (0.0415) (0.0291) (0.0255) (0.0272) (0.0287) (0.0269) (0.0237) (0.0276) 
Constant 6.9241*** 7.2404*** 7.7493*** 7.9447*** 7.9237*** 7.8908*** 8.4086*** 8.2293*** 8.2113*** 
  (0.4896) (0.4418) (0.3492) (0.2963) (0.2886) (0.3472) (0.3052) (0.2886) (0.3372) 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4D. Spatial Quantile Regression Results for Model (4) – BWN 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
BWN -0.5392*** -0.2971*** -0.175*** -0.1017*** -0.0676*** -0.0509*** -0.0449** -0.0074 0.0077 
  (0.0653) (0.0483) (0.0265) (0.0209) (0.0171) (0.0185) -(0.0449) (0.0205) (0.0172) 
SQFT 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Story height -0.0357 -0.0317 -0.0466** -0.0374* -0.0238 -0.0326* -0.0065 0.0089 -0.0044 
  (0.0372) (0.0285) (0.0205) (0.0197) (0.0217) (0.0194) -(0.0065) (0.0211) (0.0208) 
Construction material -0.078*** -0.0762*** -0.0519** -0.0567*** -0.0407*** -0.0311** -0.0275* -0.0197 -0.0308** 
  (0.0262) (0.0235) (0.0202) (0.0159) (0.0152) (0.0146) -(0.0275) (0.0170) (0.0151) 
Physical condition 0.2086*** 0.2265*** 0.2058*** 0.2014*** 0.1733*** 0.1622*** 0.1478*** 0.1407*** 0.1474*** 
  (0.0238) (0.0227) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0153) (0.1478) (0.0166) (0.0181) 
Quality grade factor 0.5079*** 0.4762*** 0.4752*** 0.4117*** 0.4025*** 0.3566*** 0.3477*** 0.4225*** 0.4505*** 
  (0.0963) (0.0734) (0.0509) (0.0578) (0.0609) (0.0585) (0.3477) (0.0632) (0.0692) 
Age -0.0021*** -0.0025*** -0.0024*** -0.0025*** -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0017*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) -(0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Bedrooms 0.0165 0.024 0.0406** 0.0463*** 0.0447*** 0.0481*** 0.0366** 0.0433*** 0.047*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0192) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0154) (0.0130) (0.0366) (0.0128) (0.0141) 
Total Bathrooms -0.0178 0.021 0.0406*** 0.0454*** 0.0335*** 0.0273* 0.037*** 0.0148 0.0143 
  (0.0211) (0.0223) (0.0148) (0.0168) (0.0118) (0.0141) (0.0370) (0.0172) (0.0153) 
AC 0.1847*** 0.2161*** 0.2305*** 0.2244*** 0.2281*** 0.2081*** 0.1684*** 0.1468*** 0.0936*** 
  (0.0347) (0.0372) (0.0272) (0.0271) (0.0268) (0.0295) (0.1684) (0.0287) (0.0334) 
Fire place 0.1368*** 0.1306*** 0.1319*** 0.1094*** 0.0972*** 0.0896*** 0.0836*** 0.077*** 0.0604*** 
  (0.0260) (0.0234) (0.0204) (0.0159) (0.0149) (0.0159) (0.0836) (0.0165) (0.0171) 
Basement garage 0.0209 0.0326 0.0232 0.017 0.0153 0.0081 -0.0006 0.0019 -0.0104 
  (0.0253) (0.0214) (0.0184) (0.0179) (0.0151) (0.0153) -(0.0006) (0.0165) (0.0181) 
Lot size 0.0022 0.0088 0.0122** 0.0111** 0.01* 0.0112 0.022*** 0.0218** 0.0372*** 
  (0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0050) (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0078) (0.0220) (0.0099) (0.0074) 
Sidewalk -0.0141 -0.0541 -0.0527 -0.0385 -0.0523 -0.0374 -0.0647** -0.0876** -0.0889** 
  (0.0515) (0.0345) (0.0443) (0.0334) (0.0400) (0.0312) -(0.0647) (0.0357) (0.0445) 
Fence 0.0783*** 0.104*** 0.1003*** 0.0936*** 0.0993*** 0.0938*** 0.0729*** 0.066*** 0.0514*** 
  (0.0277) (0.0226) (0.0176) (0.0182) (0.0156) (0.0170) (0.0729) (0.0144) (0.0155) 
Crime -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0007* -0.0006 -0.0007 
  (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) -(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
School quality 0.0018 0.00002 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0005 
  (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) -(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Distance to highway exit -0.0158 -0.0151* -0.02*** -0.022*** -0.0123* -0.0124** -0.0146*** -0.0163*** -0.0141* 
  (0.0104) (0.0089) (0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0058) -(0.0146) (0.0061) (0.0076) 
Distance to FSU -0.0024 -0.0072 -0.0032 0.0014 -0.0033 -0.0006 -0.0017 0.0012 0.0043 
  (0.0094) (0.0079) (0.0064) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0048) -(0.0017) (0.0056) (0.0065) 
𝜌 0.2047*** 0.1631*** 0.1507*** 0.1497*** 0.1619*** 0.1693*** 0.158*** 0.1442*** 0.1539*** 
  (0.0326) (0.0298) (0.0284) (0.0236) (0.0281) (0.0274) (0.1580) (0.0255) (0.0263) 
Constant 7.0339*** 7.5819*** 7.8347*** 7.9704*** 7.9343*** 8.0273*** 8.3479*** 8.5324*** 8.4602*** 
  (0.3612) (0.3441) (0.3136) (0.2879) (0.3276) (0.3113) (8.3479) (0.3105) (0.3152) 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Essay 3: The Impact of Access to Raw Water Sources on Residential Water Charges in 
Rural West Virginia 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Public water systems typically obtain their raw water supplies from four main sources: 
surface water, groundwater, water purchased wholesale from nearby water system, or a 
combination of two or more of these sources. In addition to these sources, water systems that 
serve remote, economically depressed, and rural communities sometimes do not have access to 
reliable raw water sources due to factors such as droughts or pollution. An example is the severe 
water shortages caused by the 1993 drought that affected multiple public water systems in 
Randolph County, West Virginia (Natural Resources Conservation Services [NRCS], 2007). In 
such cases, federal, state, and local governments and organizations work together to develop and 
maintain alternative raw water sources for these communities. The Natural Resources 
Conservation Services (NRCS), formerly known as the Soil Conservation Service (SCS), is an 
agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and one of the agencies that will assist 
public water systems in rural communities to obtain raw water supplies by constructing, 
designing, and/or funding water supply impoundments. 
Raw water sources that are utilized by public water systems play an important role in 
affecting not only the cost of treatment, but also the residential water. For example, Bae (2007) 
found that metropolitan public water systems that use groundwater sources have lower 
residential water charges compared water systems that use surface water or purchased water.   
Erfanian and Collins (2018) confirm this result for municipal water utilities around the state of 
West Virginia. 
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In addition to cost concerns, raw water sources present different risks of contamination. 
In West Virginia, out of the 446 active community water systems, 51% of them have access to 
only one raw water source as their water supply (WV Drinking Water Watch, 2019). However, 
after the Elk River chemical spill in 2014, legislators in West Virginia passed the Source Water 
Protection Senate Bill 373, also known as the Spill Bill, requiring public water systems that use 
surface water or groundwater influenced by surface water as supply sources (about 15% of the 
total community water systems in West Virginia) to complete or update their source water 
protection plans.18 One of the main goals of these plans was to assess the ability of public water 
systems to construct or establish a secondary or backup source that to be used in cases of 
emergency or contamination of their primary water source. This push toward public water 
systems to have more than one water supply source may affect the residential water charges, 
especially in rural areas. 
Public water supplies in rural areas in West Virginia are primarily provided by Public 
Service Districts (PSDs). PSDs are public corporations that were established by county 
commissions with the approval of the West Virginia Public Service Commission (WV PSC) to 
develop and maintain water, sewer, and gas systems in rural areas. PSDs can constitute either the 
whole or any part of one or more counties. Each PSD has a board with the authority to establish 
rates, fees, and charges for the water service to cover the cost of maintenance, operation, and 
depreciation. The schedule of water rates, fees, and charges may be based upon one or a 
combination of the following: (1) the consumption of water on premises connected with the 
facilities, taking into consideration domestic, commercial, industrial, and public use of water; (2) 
                                                          
 
18 For more information, see W.Va. Code §16-1-9C-B9. 
138 
 
the number and kind of fixtures connected with the facilities located on the various premises; (3) 
the number of persons served by the facilities.19 The WV PSC approves PSD water rates and fees 
based only upon cost recovery considerations with no profits being allowed to the PSDs. 
Currently, there are 122 PSDs in West Virginia that supply public water to about 200,000 
rural households throughout the state (WV PSC, 2017). Many PSDs operate more than one water 
system and mostly use conventional water supply sources. Some of these PSDs face difficulties 
in ensuring a reliable raw water supplies for their water systems and have relied upon NRCS’s 
flood control impoundments as the main source for raw water. Without these impoundments, 
these PSDs are forced to switch to inferior sources in terms of water quality or quantity. One 
recent example is Preston PSD 1 which has relied on a 50-year old NRCS’s dam for their raw 
water source. Due to replacement work, the PSD has been using another source for their water. 
However, recent reports show that health and safety concerns have led many residents to stop 
using tap water due to the low quality associated with the new source (Plum, 2019). 
 Given the above issues concerning cost and reliability of raw water sources, the objective 
of this paper is to examine the impact of the access to raw water sources on residential water 
charges for PSDs in West Virginia. This will help us to determine the relative value for each 
source compared to the others. Using regression analysis, we compare residential water charges 
per 4,500 gallons for each PSD that utilize different raw water sources including the surface 
water, purchased water, or multiple sources. In addition, we examine the difference in water 
charges between those PSDs that use NRCS’s flood control impoundments as a water source 
compared to those who use other sources. Our results suggest that PSDs that use multiple sources 
                                                          
 
19 For more information, see W.Va. Code §16-13A-1. 
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have higher residential water charges compared to those who utilize a single source. In addition, 
PSDs that rely on purchased water have higher residential water charges. Finally, we found not 
statistically difference between water charges of PSDs that use NRCS’s impoundments and those 
who use conventional sources. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we provide a background for 
water supply sources in West Virginia. In section 4.3, we review the previous literature that 
examined the different factors affecting residential water prices or charges. In section 4.4, we 
describe and develop our empirical model. Section 4.5 provide information about the data used 
in the analysis and their sources. We finally discuss the results in section 4.6 and end with 
conclusions in section 4.7. 
4.2. Water Supply Sources in West Virginia: A Background 
4.2.1. Conventional water supply sources 
 West Virginia is one of the states that has an abundance of water resources. The West 
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WV DEP, 2013) has estimated the available 
water in the state by developing a seasonal water budget for each of its 32 eight-digit Hydrologic 
Unite Code Watersheds (HUC-8 WS).20 Based on the water budget results and the estimated 
consumptive needs of the state, water supply exceeded water demand in all watersheds in West 
Virginia.21 The state receives an average of 44 inches of precipitation annually and based on this 
average the total annual amount of water available in West Virginia was estimated to be 19.3 
trillion gallons (WV DEP, 2013). There are about 10,000 streams with a total of 54,961 stream 
                                                          
 
20 Water budget is an accounting method that is used to quantify the available water in a hydrologic system, which 
incorporate both consumptive and non-consumptive water demands.  
21 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2014), West Virginia is expected to have water 
availability problems at the local level in the next decade.  
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miles statewide (WV DEP, 2013; Petty, 2018). Most of these streams in the state are part of one 
of two major river basins, the Potomac to the east and the Ohio to the west. These streams 
provide many beneficial uses including being the major water supply source to many public 
water systems in West Virginia.22 According to WV DEP (2013), public water systems withdraw 
about 80% of their total use from surface water sources. In particular, 67% of PSDs in West 
Virginia rely on surface water as the main source for their water supply either directly or 
indirectly (purchased).  
For groundwater sources, based on data from 2003-2005 water use survey, the WV DEP 
identified two general areas where groundwater resources are both abundant and most commonly 
used: along the Ohio River and the Eastern Panhandle. Even though public water systems 
withdraw only 20% of their water use from groundwater sources, they are considered the largest 
user of groundwater in the state (WV DEP, 2013). About 50% of public water systems use 
groundwater sources for their supply. Only 23% of PSDs utilize groundwater sources (directly 
and indirectly) in West Virginia.  
4.2.2. NRCS water supply impoundments23 
 In 1935, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) established the Soil Conservation 
Service (SCS), known currently as the Natural Resource Conservation Services (NRCS), as a 
permanent agency responsible for enforcing the Soil Conservation Act of 1935 (PL 74-46). One 
year later, the Flood Control Act of 1936 (PL 74-738) expanded the responsibilities of the 
agency to study and survey watersheds across the United States for possible improvement works. 
                                                          
 
22 However, due to pollution caused by human activities, about 60% of these streams are no longer capable of 
providing such benefits (Petty, 2018). 
23 Most information about the history of the NRCS water resources programs were obtained from Buie (1979), 
Woodward (2015), and the NRCS website. 
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Between 1937 and 1943, the agency initiated preliminary studies on 212 watersheds nationwide 
and detailed surveys on 41 watersheds. Out of the 212 surveys, only 25 recommended the 
installation of watershed improvements programs. Based on these recommendations, the Flood 
Control Act of 1944 (PL 78-534) authorized the installation of 11 watershed improvement 
works.  
  These 11 authorized watershed projects became the predecessors of the small watershed 
program that was introduced in the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act of 1954 (PL 
83-566). The act authorized the SCS to help local organizations (sponsors) to develop watershed 
work plans for watersheds less than 250,000 acres and provide financial and technical assistance 
for installation of improvements. Unlike the previous Flood Control Acts, this act authorized the 
agency (over several amendments) to provide assistance to purposes other than flood control 
such as projects for watershed protections, conservation and proper utilization of land, 
agricultural water management, including irrigation and drainage, public recreation, public fish 
and wildlife, hydropower, water quality management, groundwater supply, agricultural pollution 
control, and municipal and industrial water supply.  
 Over the years, the NRCS assisted local organizations to develop watershed plans and 
provided financial and technical assistance for 1,458 projects (about 12% of total projects 
constructed by the NRCS) that were designed for the purpose of providing water supply for 
public water systems across the United States (National Inventory of Dams [NID], 2018).24 In 
West Virginia, the NRCS has designed and installed 170 watershed dams with 14 of them are 
                                                          
 
24 In the entire U.S., the NRCS has constructed about 11,400 dams on some 2,000 watershed projects with the main 
objective in most projects being flood control. 
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currently being used for water supply by 15 municipalities and 12 public service districts 
(NRCS, 2019).  
The first multipurpose dam, for water supply and flood control features, that was 
constructed under the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act in West Virginia was the 
Upper Grave Dam No. 1 in 1959. This dam was built to help the City of Cameron to cope with 
its water problems including floods, droughts, and to replace the old water system that had been 
in operation for over 100 years (Sharpe, 1964). Currently, this dam is the primary water source 
for the city and provide water for its 950 residents. Another NRCS’s project of interest is the 
Elkwater Fork Dam in the Upper Tygart Valley River Watershed. This dam is the only dam in 
West Virginia that was constructed with the main purpose being water supply instead of flood 
control. It provides raw water for seven water systems that estimated to serve about 27,800 
people in four municipalities and three public service districts. Table 4.1 shows the 12 public 
service districts and information about their water supply sources. Half of them have access to 
more than one water supply source; however, in most PSDs, only one source is usually active. 
The last column shows whether NRCS’s impoundment is one of the active sources that the PSD 
is using or not. Except for three PSDs, most use NRCS impoundments as the primary source, 
which shows how important these impoundments to the communities served by these PSDs. 
4.3. Literature Review 
 We divide this section into two subsections. The first is concerned about defining the 
economic value of water and the methods that economists have developed to measure this value. 
Since we are interested on the impact water supply sources on water charges, we review the 
studies that examined the determinants of water charges and prices in the second section to 
develop a broader understanding of the factors that affect these charges. 
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4.3.1. Value of water: Definition and measures 
 The economic value of water is defined as the amount that a rational user of a water 
resource is willing to pay for it. Thus, it is dependent on both the user and the use of water. In 
most marketed commodities, prices are good indicator for value. However, in the case of water 
resources, water prices usually reflect an amount set by the political and social system to achieve 
specific goals such as equity and sustainability, and therefore water prices are a poor guide to 
economic value (Roger et al., 2002; Hanemann, 2006).  
Since water is not priced as an economic good, economists have developed multiple 
methods to estimate the value of water to provide signals of the relative scarcity that are 
otherwise not available due to the absence of markets. Figure 4.1 shows the different types of 
economic water valuation methods based on the categories provided by Young and Loomis 
(2014). They divide valuation methods into deductive or inductive techniques based on the 
mathematical procedures and type of data employed in the valuation process. In general, the goal 
of these methods is to estimate the value of marginal product (VMP) in the case of producers, 
and the willingness to pay or accept (WTP or WTA) in the case of consumers. It should be noted 
that we are interested in relative value of raw water sources and not absolute value. The former 
can be defined as the value of one object relative to another object, whereas the absolute value is 
the value of one object compared to some absolute standard (Brown, 1984). That is, what one 
raw water source is worth relative to another source. One valuation method that we are interested 
in is the estimation of producer’s cost function using regression analysis, which we discuss in 
detail in the empirical model section. 
4.3.2. The determinants of water charges and prices 
Before we start examining previous studies, it is important to distinguish between the 
different pricing terms used in the literature. Various pricing terms are used including water 
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price, water rate, water charge, water fee, and water tariffs. According to Griffin (2016, p. 303) 
water price is a volumetric price placed on metered water and often means the same thing as 
water rate. However, water rates, expressed plurally, can refer to the entire package of charges 
applied by a water supplier including both volumetric charges (i.e. per unit charge) and flat 
charges (e.g. new connection fee). Also, outside the U.S. and in some academic literature, water 
rates may be called water tariffs. In the U.S., water charges are used to express the total amount 
paid (for volumetric plus flat) to acquire a certain quantity of water and is used as one way to 
standardize the acquisition of water across the different pricing structures available between 
water suppliers (Erfanian & Collins, 2018). 
Many researchers have been interested in what factors affecting water price or charges. 
We categorize these studies into three main groups: (1) studies that explored the impact of 
multiple economic and non-economic factors on water charges, (2) studies that focused on the 
impact of water system ownership on water price, and (3) studies that examined the impact of 
specific factors, such as water quality, on water price.  
In the first group, three older studies analyzed the factors affecting water prices and 
charges. Afifi (1969) examined the various factors affecting residential (5,000 gallons per 
month), commercial (10,000 gallons per month), and industrial (750,000 gallons per month) 
water charges using regression analysis in Illinois. Among the numerous variables that he 
examined, ten were found to be the most important determinants of water supply charges 
including total population served, type of ownership, source of raw water, quantity of water 
produced, long-term debts, type of treatment applied to water, percentage of customers metered 
accounts, per capita income, average cost of water produced, and time elapsed since the last 
water rate change.  
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Similarly, Hollman and Boyet (1975) examined the determinants of residential and 
commercial water charges using data for 86 small water systems in Mississippi and simple OLS 
estimation methods. They examined multiple factors and only six of them had statistically 
significant impacts on water charges. They found that the number of customers served, whether 
there is any change in water source in last ten years, and government subsidies are associated 
with lower water charges. On the other hand, production and distribution costs, installation 
charges, and whether the water system is FHA-financed (proxy for debt) are associated with 
higher water prices.  
A more comprehensive study by Mann (1972) examined the relationship between 
multiple measures of water prices (five measures of water rates for specific consumption levels, 
four measures of average price, and three measures of water rate structure) and internal utility 
(operation and financial), demographic, and municipal finance variables for utilities across the 
United States. He found that primary determinants of water prices include operation expenses, 
taxes, and debt service costs. Secondary determinants of water price which are cost-related 
include reliance on surface sources, system scale, and the extent of waste and free service.   
More recently, studies such as Bae (2007), Thorsten et al. (2009), and Erfanian and 
Collins (2018) have used similar approach to the previous studies, but with different datasets and 
estimation methods. For example, Bae (2007) grouped the factor affecting water prices into four 
major categories: (a) institutional arrangements and characteristics, (b) government regulations, 
(c) supply factors and characteristics, and (c) natural environment and local characteristics and 
used data for 259 water systems across the United States. In terms of methods, Thorsten et al. 
(2009) and Erfanian and Collins (2018) employed spatial econometrics techniques to examine 
whether water charges in a system are affected by water charges in nearby systems. In general, 
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these studies found that several factors are associated with lower water charges such as water 
source and governmental regulations. Using a dataset for 308 cities in 102 countries, Zetland and 
Gasson (2012) examined the factors affecting water prices globally. They found that higher 
water prices are correlated with lower per capita consumption, smaller local populations, lower 
water availability, higher demand, and a lower risk of shortage. 
The second group of studies are mainly concerned about whether privatization of water 
systems increase water prices (Chong et al. 2006; Zaki & Amin 2009; Martínez-Espiñeira et al. 
2009; Ruester & Zschille 2010; García-Valiñas et al. 2013; Barbosa & Brusca 2015; Romano et 
al. 2015; Procher 2017). Most of these studies were conducted outside the United States and use 
various measures for the dependent variable such as yearly charges and average price for 
different rates. Overall, these studies found that privatization result in higher water prices for 
residential consumers.  
Finally, the studies in the third group examined the impact of specific factors on water 
prices. Piper (2003) examined the impact of water quality (measured as the difference between 
total hardness in raw and treated water) and found that poor water quality result in higher 
treatment costs and higher water rates. Klien (2015) studied the effect of both political 
determinants and yardstick competition on water prices in Austria. He found that water prices are 
lower when political competition is strong and before elections. Also, using spatial econometrics 
models he examined the existence of strategic interaction between municipalities and found that 
the magnitude of the political budget cycle depends on neighboring jurisdictions, which affect 
water prices indirectly. Similarly, Chica-Olmo et al. (2013) investigated spillover effects in 
setting water prices in Southern Spain and found that local governments follow neighboring 
municipalities when revising water rates. 
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4.4. Empirical Model 
As mentioned in the previous section, economists have developed multiple methods to 
estimate the value of water. The main goal of these methods is to estimate the value of marginal 
product for producers and the willingness to pay (or accept) for consumers. Since we are 
working with PSDs that produce drinking water, we focus on the methods used to estimate the 
producer’s value of water. From Figure 4.1, there are two main types of methods. First, 
deductive methods, such as mathematical programming, that derive an accounting price or 
financial value from constructed models of individual economic decisions made by producers. 
Second, inductive methods that estimate producer’s value of water using regression techniques. 
For example, estimation of production, cost, or hedonic property functions.  
Based on data availability, we use the cost function approach to estimate the relative 
value of raw water from different water sources used by PSDs. The basic idea is that raw water is 
an input in the production of drinking water. The cost of supplying drinking water is impacted by 
the source of raw water used. These cost impacts will be transmitted to residential users through 
water charges for the delivered water. Supposing that raw water supplied by a specific source has 
a lower the cost of production for the PSD than other raw water sources, then the relative value 
of this water can be measured by the reduction in these water charges. This economic logic make 
sense given the regulatory mandate of the WV PSC to ensure that PSDs base their water charges 
only on costs of production and delivery – not on the value to the residential customers.  Many 
studies have followed this approach to estimate the value of raw water. For studies that examine 
the costs of water supply systems specifically, examples include Abildtrup et al. (2013), 
Fiquepron et al. (2013), Vincent et al. (2016), and Faria Lopes et al. (2018). 
Since water charges are related to the cost of producing and delivering water, it is 
reasonable to use water charges as proxy for cost of supplying it under the assumption that water 
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charges cover the operation, maintenance, and repair costs of water systems in the PSD (Piper, 
2003). Following previous literature, a general form of a model that explains the factors affecting 
water charges to customers from the PSDs can be written as: 
𝑊𝐶 = 𝑓(𝑄, 𝑆, 𝑋, 𝜀) (1) 
where 𝑊𝐶 is the water charges for 4,500 gallons of water which represent the residential water 
charges in West Virginia; 𝑄 is the quantity of water sold by the PSD; 𝑆 a vector reflects the 
PSD’s source of raw water source; 𝑋 is a vector of relevant exogenous variables that affect costs 
of producing and delivering water which potentially contribute to differences in water charges 
between PSDs, and 𝜀⁡ is an error term.  
For 𝑋, as we shown in section 4.2, there are many factors that can affect water charges. 
However, internal operating and financial variables have always been found to be important 
determinants of water prices. Thus, we control for such variables including long-term debts, 
water treatment expenses and ownership, water main lines length, volume of water loss in 
production cycle, number of Safe Drinking Water Act violations, number of water main breaks 
and leaks, whether the PSDs provides sewer service or not, and number of customers and 
population density. We also control for the type of rates (i.e. increasing, decreasing, or constant 
rates) .We realize that there are other factors that have been found to affect water prices in 
previous studies such as Bae (2007), but since our focus is only on PSDs in West Virginia, there 
is little heterogeneity between our observations in terms of factors such as government 
regulations and geography. Therefore, our model does not control for these variables.  
For functional form, we evaluate the data using linear and log-linear specifications. Using 
Box-Cox specification test, the results in Table 4.2 indicate that linear specification provides the 
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best fit for our data. Thus, based on (1) and the variables described above, an empirical equation 
for water charges is written as: 
𝑊𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑍 + 𝜀⁡ (2) 
Where 𝑍 represents a vector of factors that drive the cost of service in the PSD including raw 
water source variables.  
4.5. Data 
In this paper, we rely on two main data sources. The first is the annual reports provided 
by PSDs available on WV PSC.25 The Second is historical watershed work plans/agreements 
reports between the NRCS and local conservation agencies in West Virginia. There are currently 
122 PSDs in West Virginia (WV PSC, 2017). Due to missing data, we had to drop some 
observations and the final number of observations is 110 PSDs.  
The WV PSC’s reports provide information about the PSDs financial and scale of 
operation status including number of customers, length of water main lines, gross revenue, total 
debt among many others. We follow the literature and use the information available in these 
reports to control for important variables that have been documented to affect residential water 
charges. In addition, we use West Virginia Drinking Water Watch to obtain detailed information 
about the raw water source used by each PSDs.26 
For our variable of interest, we mainly use historical watershed work plans/agreements 
reports between the NRCS and local conservation agencies to identify those dams that were 
constructed with the objective to supply raw water for public water systems. These reports are 
                                                          
 
25 All our data comes from 2018 reports, except for eight PSDs with the latest report being in 2017. 
26 Available on http://129.71.204.189:1977/DWWpublic/index.jsp 
150 
 
provided by The University of Pennsylvania (The Online Books Page) and the USDA’s National 
Agricultural Library. Additional information about the dams were also obtained from the 
National Inventory of Dams (NID). The main objective of most NRCS’s dams is flood control, 
however, some of them have multiple objectives such as recreation and water supply.27 We focus 
on the latter and use it to construct our main binary variable, whether the PSDs is using raw 
water from these dams or not.  
Table 4.3 provides summary statistics and descriptions for all variables that we 
considered in the analysis. The dependent variable, water charges per 4,500 gallons, ranges from 
$20.60 to $92.79 reflecting an over fourfold difference between PSDs in terms of water 
production costs. Explanatory variables are grouped into three categories. First, the focus 
variables related to PSD’s raw water sources. About 11% of the PSDs in the dataset utilize raw 
water from NRCS dams as one of their raw water sources. Most of the PSDs (54%) purchase 
their water from other systems (municipal water utilities) or use multiple sources (15%).28  A 
second group of variables includes those related to financial and operational status of PSD water 
systems. There are large differences in most of these variables across the PSDs. For rate type, 
most of the PSDs (86%) have decreasing block rates and the rest have constant rates. Sold water 
per capita (1,000 gallons) ranges from 18.52 to 586.08.29 One interesting observation is that 
some PSDs lose up to 67% of their water production due to leaks in the network. This reflect 
poor water infrastructure in such areas.  
                                                          
 
27 Table 1A provides information about all dams that were constructed to provide water supply for public water 
systems in West Virginia. 
28 Table 4.4 shows the PSDs and the number of sources available for them. 
29 This variable measures the total water sales from the PSD. Therefore, it includes all types of sales to, for example, 
residential, commercial, and industrial customers. Also, it includes sales to public authorities and fire protection. 
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Finally, the third group includes one variable: population density where the PSD is 
located. Since the exact boundaries for PSD service areas are not available, we use rural 
population density in the county where the PSD is located. We calculate this variable by 
subtracting county’s municipal population and land area from county’s total population and land 
area. This measure will let us obtain a more accurate measure for population density than the 
total population density since PSDs mainly serve rural areas. 
In terms of expectations, we expect that PSDs who utilize a NRCS flood control dam will 
be able to obtain raw water supplies at a lower cost than other systems, and therefore, residential 
water charges will be lower. Based on the results found in previous studies (e.g. Erfanian & 
Collins, 2018), we expect that PSDs that rely on groundwater sources will have lower water 
charges compared to the other sources since groundwater require less treatment than surface 
water. Due to considerations of economies of scale, we expect sold water to have a negative 
impact on water charges (Tsagarakis, 2013). We also expect population density to have a 
negative impact on water charges due to economies of density (Guerrini et al., 2013). The 
expected effect of sewer service on water charges is ambiguous. Based on the perspective of 
economies of scope, the provision of sewer service along with water service may lead to lower 
water charges since PSDs can share production inputs (e.g. personnel, machines, buildings, and 
equipment) and transfer some of the water supply costs to sewer service. However, if PSDs are 
able to transfer sewer service costs to water service instead, then it will result in higher water 
charges. Percentage of water loss, number of violations, number of breaks, and number of leaks 
represent the overall inefficiency in the maintenance and operation of the PSD’s water systems. 
We expect that if these factors increase, then water charges will increase as well (Bae, 2007). For 
treatment variables, we expect that PSDs that own treatment facilities will incur more operational 
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expenses and as a result water charges will increase. Finally, PSDs with more debts will be more 
likely to have higher water charges to repay them.   
4.6. Results 
 Table 4.5 shows the results from the different models that were estimated using water 
charges as the dependent variable. The difference between these models is that some variables 
were dropped that convey similar information or have missing values (e.g. inefficiency and 
treatment variables). Overall, these models show similar results in terms of estimated coefficients 
and adjusted R-squared.  
 For raw water sources, in all specifications, the NRCS variable had a statistically 
insignificant coefficient, so that flood control dams supplying raw water to a PSD does not 
impact residential water charges. Our results do show, however, that other raw water sources do 
have important impacts on residential water charges. Specifically, using multiple raw water 
sources resulted in a $15 higher residential water charge per 4,500 gallons compared to a PSD 
with a single source of raw water. This is about 29% of the average residential water charge 
among PSDs in West Virginia. This result is expected since a PSD will need to invest in more 
infrastructure to be able to utilize more than one raw water source. Also, from the results, we 
observe that as PSDs acquire more raw water sources, residential water charges per 4,500 gallons 
are lowered (Table 4.5). In addition, there is statistical evidence that PSDs which utilize 
purchased water as a raw water source have substantially higher residential water charges than 
those who use their own water sources. Specifically, the use of purchased water results in higher 
water charges per 4,500 gallons by $8.5 compared to PSDs that obtained their own raw water. 
This result confirms findings by Bae (2007). 
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For the financial and operational variables, only three variables that show consistent and 
statistically significant impacts on residential water charges: long-term debt, network length, and 
sewer service. Long-term debt per customer is positive and statistically significant at 1% level as 
expected, where a $1,000 debt increase results in about $1.8 increase in residential water charges 
per 4,500 gallons. This result is also in line with the results found in other studies such as Bae 
(2007) and Thorsten et al. (2009). Network length per customer is positive and statistically 
significant with a large impact on water charges. An 0.1 of a mile increase in the average number 
of miles per customer in the network results in $13.8 higher residential water charges per 4,500 
gallons. Given the low population density of rural areas that are served by PSDs, this result is not 
surprising. PSDs that provide sewer service in addition to water service have lower residential 
water charges per 4,500 gallons by $5.11, which supports the existence of economies of scope 
among PSDs in West Virginia.  
Finally, sold water per customer is negative and statically significant at 10% level in 
model (4). This provides a weak evidence of the existence of economies of scale in PSDs in 
West Virginia. The result indicates that a 1,000-gallon increase in water sales would decrease 
water charges by $0.03. Therefore, economies of scale that may be achieved by merging PSDs 
with municipalities or other PSDs may benefit residential consumers by enhancing financial 
performance and lowering water charges. One example of these economies of scale can be 
observed with the consolidation of Haymond PSD with Taylor PSD in 2011. This consolidation 
doubled the number of customers for Taylor PSD and decreased the residential water charges per 
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4,500 gallons by $2.52 after the merge for customers that were previously served by Haymond 
PSD.30 
4.7. Conclusions 
 Due to the continuous increase in the number of contamination events of public water 
systems supply sources, policymakers in West Virginia are attempting to push public water 
systems to have more than one water supply source to be used in cases of emergency. Previous 
research has shown that the type of raw water source used by utilities is an important determinant 
of residential water charges (Bae, 2007; Erfanian & Collins, 2018). Thus, utilizing multiple raw 
water sources will not only impact public water systems but also the charges paid by their 
residential customers.  
 In this paper, we examine the impact of access to the different raw water sources on 
public service districts (PSDs) residential water charges per 4,500 gallons in West Virginia. 
PSDs typically obtain their raw water supply from four main (conventional) sources: surface 
water, groundwater, water purchased wholesale from nearby water system, or a combination of 
two or more of these sources. However, due to drought or pollution, alternative sources 
sometimes are used such as flood control impoundments constructed by the NRCS.  
Using data from 110 PSDs and controlling for important financial and operational factors 
that drive water production cost, our results indicate that when a PSD uses multiple raw water 
sources, its residential water charges are $15 higher for 4,500 gallons compared to a PSD that 
relies on a single raw water source. This is about 29% of the average PSDs residential water 
                                                          
 
30 Here, we examine the difference between water charges when Haymond PSD was active ($41.72) and Taylor PSD 
after the consolidation ($39.20). Also, the number of customers for Taylor PSD increased from 500 to 1,000 after 
the consolidation.  
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charges in West Virginia. Therefore, policies, such as SB373, that encourage public water 
systems to have multiple raw water sources may result in an unintended consequence of higher 
production costs and therefore, higher residential water charges. Also, our results indicate that 
PSDs which have their own raw water sources have lower residential water charges than PSDs 
which purchase water. Finally, we could not find any statistically significant impact of NRCS’s 
flood control impoundments on residential water charges. One possible explanation of why we 
do not find a statistically significant impact for the NRCS variable is that water in West Virginia 
is a relatively plentiful resource. Thus, having access to raw water from NRCS dams does not 
impact the cost structure of a PSD any more than other raw water sources such as groundwater, 
rivers, or streams.   
In terms of policy implications, based on our results, if policymakers make it mandatory 
for public water systems to have more than one water supply, then the resulting increases in 
residential water charges may lead to affordability problems across the state. Mack and Wrase 
(2017) examine the impact of continuous increase in water rates and affordability across the 
United States. They found that West Virginia has the highest percentage of tracts (47%) that are 
considered at-risk category. Meaning that if water rates continue to increase, people living in 
these census tracts will not be able to afford their water bills in the next five years based on their 
current income levels.  
 Limitations relate primarily to the small sample size used in the analysis. Future 
endeavors can expand this research by examining the impact of water supply sources on 
municipalities’ water charges across the United States. Alternatively, since West Virginia is a 
water rich state, focusing on areas with scarce water resources, such as areas in western U.S., 
may yield different results. 
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4.9. Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 4.1. Methods used to estimate the economic value of water  
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Table 4.1. PSDs and their reliance on NRCS water supply impoundments (directly or indirectly) 
PSD Total number of water supply 
sources available  
Number of active water supply 
sources 
NRCS's impoundment is the 
primary source? 
Bluewell PSD 4 1 Yes 
Clover PSD 2 2 Unknown* 
Downs PSD 2 1 No 
Green Valley-Gleenwood PSD 6 2 Yes 
Hardy County PSD (Baker) 1 1 Yes 
Huttonsville PSD 3 1 Yes 
Leadsville PSD 1 1 Yes 
Mannington PSD 1 1 No 
Midland PSD 1 1 Yes 
Preston County PSD No. 1 2 1 No 
Southern Jackson County PSD 1 1 Yes 
Walton PSD 1 1 Yes 
Note: If the PSD has more than one system and they sell water to each other or obtain water from the same source, then this source was not counted in the total number. 
* Clover PSD buys water from a municipality that utilize two water supply sources: NRCS dam and non-NRCS dam. It is unknown if the municipality sells water from one or both sources. 
Source: WV Drinking Water Watch 
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Table 4.2. Box-Cox specification test results 
      Number of obs = 105 
      LR chi2 (18) = 59.010 
Log likelihood = -382.338       Prob > χ2 = 0.000 
Cost Coefficient Std. Err. P-value 
theta 0.594 0.291 0.041 
        
Test H0: 
Restricted log 
likelihood 
LR statistic 
χ2 
P-value 
theta = -1 -398.078 31.480 0.000 
theta =   0 -384.467 4.260 0.039 
theta =   1 -383.294 1.910 0.167 
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Table 4.3. Summary statistics and variable descriptions 
Variable Description Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expected 
Sign 
   Dependent variable               
Cost Water charge per 4,500 gallons to residential customers $ 51.38 12.50 20.60 92.79   
   Independent variables               
Raw water source variables               
NRCS 1 = if the PSD use NRCS's dam as a source of raw water, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.11 0.31 0 1 - 
Surface water 1 = if the PSD use surface water as the main source, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.18 0.39 0 1 + 
Groundwater 1 = if the PSD use groundwater as the main source, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.13 0.33 0 1 - 
Purchased 1 = if the PSD use purchased water as the main source, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.54 0.5 0 1 + 
Multiple 1 = if the PSD use multiple sources of raw water, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.15 0.36 0 1 + 
Number of sources Numb of raw water sources available to the PSDs Number  1.73 2.82 1 27 + 
Financial and operation variables               
Rate type 1 = if the PSDs has constant rate, 0 = decreasing block rates 0/1 0.14 0.35 0 1 + 
Sold water Sold water per customer 1,000 Gallons 61.10 68.40 18.52 586.08 - 
Debt Debt per customer $ 2,507.63 2,235.60 0 16,308.25 + 
Treatment plant ownership 1 = if the PSD own treatment plant, 0 = otherwise  0/1 0.44 0.50 0 1 + 
Treatment expenses Water treatment expenses per customer $ 42.21 61.88 0 250.73 + 
Sewer service 1 = if the PSD provides sewer service, 0 = otherwise 0/1 0.34 0.48 0 1 +/- 
Network length Main line length per customer Miles 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.17 + 
Water loss Percentage of unaccounted water loss % 22.78 15.38 0 67.13 + 
Violations Total number of SDWA violations Number 3.65 6.51 0 40 + 
Breaks Number of water main breaks Number 13.79 18.68 0 106 + 
Leaks Number of leaks Number 23.75 29.19 0 186 + 
Demographic variables               
Population density County's population density Population/mi2 72.83 68.24 7.58 381.76 - 
Observations = 111, for Rate type = 110, Breaks = 108, and Leaks = 105            
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Table 4.4. PSDs that use multiple raw water sources  
PSD Number of water sources 
Berkeley County PSD 27 
Bluewell PSD 4 
Central Barbour PSD 2 
Central Hampshire PSD 5 
Clay Roane PSD 2 
Flatwoods-Canoe Run PSD 2 
Frankfort PSD 3 
Hammond PSD 2 
Hardy County PSD 4 
Logan County PSD 4 
Mason County PSD 8 
McDowell County PSD 8 
Nettie-Leivasy PSD 5 
Oakland PSD 6 
Pendleton County PSD 6 
Pocahontas County PSD 3 
Red Sulphur PSD 7 
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Table 4.5. OLS regression results: dependent variable is water charge per 4,500 gallons to 
residential customers  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
NRCS -0.6264 0.0811 0.3542 0.7206 
  (2.6147) (2.6094) (2.6281) (2.4225) 
Surface water 4.7138 4.6895 5.2789* 4.2617 
  (3.5049) (3.2438) (2.9869) (2.8829) 
Purchased water 10.2371** 6.8656* 5.0764* 8.5523** 
  (4.7908) (4.1277) (3.0241) (3.5077) 
Multiple sources 14.8837*** 12.9710*** 14.1575*** 15.1023*** 
  (4.6454) (4.2020) (4.1454) (4.3238) 
Number of sources -0.5951** -0.6727** -0.6768** -0.7635** 
  (0.2820) (0.3181) (0.3118) (0.2999) 
Rate type -2.9759 -3.5639 -2.9155 -2.9710 
  (3.0195) (3.1576) (3.0442) (3.1153) 
Sold water -0.0254 -0.0242 -0.0236 -0.0276* 
  (0.0158) (0.0153) (0.0148) (0.0151) 
Debt 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0018*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Treatment plant ownership 3.3947 1.8389   1.8943 
  (4.0171) (3.5815)   (3.2871) 
Treatment expenses -0.0206 -0.0254 -0.0269   
  (0.0268) (0.0243) (0.0228)   
Sewer service -4.1377** -4.5581** -4.9768** -5.1048*** 
  (2.0087) (1.9278) (1.9163) (1.9142) 
Network 142.3721*** 141.9174*** 139.3766*** 138.3515*** 
  (37.1783) (36.5798) (36.7070) (34.0134) 
Water loss 0.0190 0.0685 0.1035 0.0882 
  (0.0897) (0.0819) (0.0737) (0.0746) 
Violations 0.2536 0.2356     
  (0.1998) (0.1859)     
Breaks 0.0352       
  (0.0577)       
Leaks 0.0021       
  (0.0309)       
Population density -0.0093 -0.0058 -0.0070   
  (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0160)   
Constant 33.3587*** 35.6017*** 37.4481*** 33.7163*** 
  (6.0067) (5.6281) (5.1140) (4.9858) 
          
Observations 104 110 110 110 
R-squared 0.4584 0.4329 0.4204 0.4136 
Adj R-squared 0.3513 0.3425 0.3411 0.3411 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1       
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4.10. Appendix 
Table 4.1A. NRCS water supply dams and water suppliers in West Virginia 
Dam  Common Dam Name County City Water Supplier Notes 
Brush Creek No. 19A Kee Reservoir Mercer Edison Bluefield Valley Waterworks (Operated by 
WVAWC) 
  
Brush Creek No. 14 Glenwood Park Lake or North Fork Mercer Glenwood Park Green Valley-Gleenwood PSD This System Sells Raw Water To: 
(1) Bluewell PSD 
Brush Creek No. 15 North Fork Mercer Princeton Green Valley-Gleenwood PSD   
Brush Creek No. 9 James P. Bailey Dam Mercer Stoney Gap Green Valley-Gleenwood PSD   
Charles Fork Spencer Water Supply/Spring Creek No. 17 Roane Spencer City of Spencer Waterworks This System Sells Raw Water To: 
(1) Clover PSD 
(2) Town of Reedy Waterworks 
Elkwater Fork WS Dam   Randolph Huttonsville Elkins Municipal Water Department 
Beverly Water Department 
Mill Creek Municipal Water Department 
Huttonsville PSD 
Mill Creek sells raw water to Huttonsville 
Water Dept 
 
Elkins Mun Water Dept sells raw water to: 
(1) Leadsville PSD 
(2) Midland PSD 
Lost River No. 10 Dam   Hardy Needmore Hardy County PSD (Baker)   
Mill Creek No. 13 Tug Fork & O'Brien Lake Jackson Ripley Ripley Municipal Water Department This system sells raw water to: 
(1) Southern Jackson County PSD 
New Creek No. 14 Dam Keyser Water Supply Dam Grant Laurel Dale City of Keyser Water Department   
North Fork Hughes River Site 
21C Dam 
North Fork of The Hughes Ritchie Cornwallis Town of Harriville 
City of Pennsboro 
City of Ellenboro 
Town of Cairo 
Hughes River Water Board is the wholesaler to 
these systems 
Pocatalico No. 14 Silcott Fork Lake Roane Walton Walton PSD   
Upper Buffalo No. 2 Huey Run Dam Marion Deep Valley Mannington Municipal Water Department This system sells water to: 
(1) Mannington PSD 
(2) Downs PSD 
Upper Deckers No. 1   Preston Arthurdale Preston County PSD No. 1   
Upper Grave No. 1   Marshall Cameron City of Cameron   
Sources:           
(1) National Inventory of Dams (NID) 
(2) NRCS's Watershed Plans and Environmental Assessment Reports  
(3) NRCS's Dam Rehabilitation Reports 
(4) NRCS's Watershed Progress Report (1977) 
(5) Regional Planning and Development Council (RPDC) Water Source Protection Plans  
(6) WV Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) Source Water Assessment Reports 
(7) WV Drinking Water Watch 
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CHAPTER 5 
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Summary and Conclusions 
 
 This dissertation examines how changes in water quality and/or reliability affect health 
care expenditures, residential property values, and residential water charges.  
5.1. Summary Results and Policy Implications 
In the first essay, the impacts of drinking water quality violations on state level per capita 
health care expenditures are estimated using a proxy variable of the percentage of population 
served by public water systems that experienced violations of Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
health-based standards. A positive and statistically significant relationship is found between 
drinking water quality violations and state level per capita health care expenditures. Using spatial 
econometrics, there exists a large difference between the direct (in-state) and indirect (regional) 
effects of violations on health care expenditures. One possible explanation for this difference is 
that drinking water violations are indicative of broader water source contamination problems that 
cross state lines, such as extreme weather events. Such an explanation warrants a more 
coordinated regional approach across states when addressing water quality problems related to 
drinking water quality violations as is practiced by entities such as river basin commissions. 
In the second essay, the impact of water supply unreliability is examined for single-
family, residential property sales in Marion County, WV using spatial and non-spatial hedonic 
property price models. To measure the impact of water supply unreliability, four variables are 
defined based on issuance of boil water notices (BWNs) one year prior to the sale and link them 
to house sale transactions. There are statistically significant, negative impacts on house prices 
from prior issuances of BWNs. Depending upon the model and how unreliability is measured, 
BWNs can depreciate housing prices at the margin from 0.57% to 18%. Furthermore, by using a 
quantile regression approach, water supply unreliability is shown to have a larger impact on low-
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price houses compared to high-price houses. These estimates indicate that some households in 
Marion County have a positive MWTP for a greater reliability in their water supply. Based on 
these estimates, the aggregate MWTP for a one-day reduction of the annual BWN in Marion 
County is calculated to be approximately $4.60 million. This value may help to guide water 
systems in their decisions regarding water pricing and investments in the water distribution 
network. In addition, since an unreliable water supply has a negative impact on property 
valuation and therefore property tax revenues collected by the county. Thus, these estimates can 
help inform water infrastructure investments at the local government level. 
In the third essay, the impact of the different water supply sources is examined on public 
service districts (PSDs) residential water charges per 4,500 gallons in West Virginia. PSDs 
typically obtain their raw water supply from four main (conventional) sources: surface water, 
groundwater, water purchased wholesale from nearby water system, or a combination of two or 
more of these sources. However, due to drought or pollution, alternative sources sometimes are 
used such as flood control impoundments constructed by the NRCS. The results indicate that 
when a PSD uses multiple raw water supply sources, its residential water charges is about 20% 
higher of the average PSDs residential water charges in West Virginia. Also, similar to previous 
research, groundwater is the least expensive raw water supply source that PSDs can use. Finally, 
no statistically significant impact of NRCS’s flood control impoundments is found on residential 
water charges per 4,500 gallons. Based on these results, if policymakers make it mandatory for 
public water systems to have more than one water supply, then the resulting increases in 
residential water charges may lead to affordability problems across the state.  
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5.2. Limitations and Future Research 
 Limitations in the first essay relate primarily to the data that are used. First, using an 
aggregated data at the state level may average out the effects at the local level where drinking 
water quality violations are occurring, therefore resulting in biased estimates. Second, sometimes 
people get exposed to contaminants in drinking water multiple times a year. However, our 
analysis does not account for this. Therefore, including some kind of an intensity treatment in the 
analysis may result in different conclusions. Third, our data only covers public water systems, 
thereby excluding about 45 million people who use private wells for their drinking water and 
thus are not regulated under the SDWA. Considering this population in future research would 
expand results to consider the implications of drinking water violations to more rural areas.  
Fourth, the proxy variable that we used to reflect exposure to drinking water 
contamination also has its flaws. These data include multiple types of contaminants that affect 
human health differently (i.e. short- and long-run health impacts).  However, we did not include 
a lag system for population exposure to drinking water violations in our model to account for a 
range of temporal health impacts from contaminant exposures.  
Finally, water systems have financial incentives not to comply with all the U.S. EPA 
regulations due to the higher costs that it will impose on these systems. Therefore, there is a 
higher probability that false or missing data are being reported. For example, the agency 
estimated that states were not reporting 40% of all health-based violations. Employing these 
changes in the drinking water quality variable may yield different results from our current 
models.  
For the second essay, the area of study is a relatively small geographical area. Also, due 
to missing data we had to drop a relatively large number of BWNs (90) from our analysis. In 
addition, when allocating BWNs to house sale observations, most BWNs affect one or multiple 
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streets in addition to surrounding areas. Due to limited knowledge, I was unable to include those 
surrounding areas in our analysis. Therefore, not all of the house sale transactions affected by 
BWN were included in this analysis so that the monetary estimates of BWN impacts should be 
regarded as conservative. 
 Finally, limitations in the third essay relate primarily to the small sample size used in the 
analysis. Future endeavors can expand this research by examining the impact of water supply 
sources on municipalities’ water charges across the United States. Alternatively, since West 
Virginia is a water rich state, focusing on areas with scarce water resources, such as areas in 
western U.S., may yield different results.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
